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PHILIPPINE UNCERTAINTY



Underwood & Underwood

Senator Harry B. Hawes

PHILIPPINE UNCERTAINTY

An American Problem

BY HARRY B. HAWES

With a Foreword by

SENATOR WILLIAM E. BORAH

Illustrated



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First Printing

To My Wife, Eppes

FOREWORD


EDMUND BURKE, in his immortal plea for justice to the American colonies, used these words: "Refined policy ever has been the parent of confusion,—and ever will be so, as long as the world endures. Plain, good intention, which is as easily discovered at the very first as fraud is surely detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is a healing and cementing principle." Simplicity of heart, candid, open, frank and fair dealing ought to be cardinal and first principles in all matters which have to do with the liberty and independence of a people.

This volume reveals with telling force these principles. There is neither concealment of facts nor confusion as to policy. The whole subject, a subject of great moment to our own people and of incalculable concern to the people of the Philippines, is dealt with in a straight-forward, candid fashion. The author leaves no doubt of his faith and no doubt of his objective. All readers will not agree with his conclusion, but all must admire the resolute tone and fine courage with which the writer presents his views. It carries evidence of a deep conviction.

Abraham Lincoln once said that no man was good enough to own another man. Fundamentally, no people should ever control, or dominate, another people. If circumstances seem to justify such control, it should always be regarded as temporary and to be replaced as soon as practicable with complete independence. The tragedy of a situation involving the question of independence for a

people is that it is for the dominant power to say when that independence shall be enjoyed. Selfishness, pride, and all kinds of sophistry may be expected to have influence in determining the time when a people are entitled to independence. But the American people are essentially just. Thirty years have passed and there are many indications that judgment is now being made up to the effect that the Philippine people are entitled to independence. All doubt should be resolved in favor of independence and freedom.

Senator Hawes has presented the cause of the Philippine people with thoroughness, dignity and manifest sincerity. He has related the story of how we came into control of the Philippines, the promises made, and the ultimate interests of all, with clarity and force. The cause is worthy of his unselfish effort and he has measured up in splendid style to his self-imposed task. I trust his labors will bear fruit in the cause of Philippine independence.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Wm. E. Borah". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a prominent initial "W" and a long, sweeping underline.

INTRODUCTION

MAY I say frankly that one of the causes, though not the chief cause, for this book was irritation.

During the hearings before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs which, in the session of 1930, considered bills looking to the autonomy of the Philippines, the statement was made that the Filipinos did not want independence; that their Washington representatives were not sincere; that the demand for independence was but a small voice from one group, not representative; that there was no real, earnest, determined demand for it in the Islands.

Each time I investigated these assertions, so far as I could in the United States, I found reason for believing them untrue, but they continued persistently to be repeated. Their repetition irritated me and thus prompted me to undertake in the Philippines and among the Filipino people the inquiry which has resulted in this book. There may have been therefore a bit of knight-errantry in the work I have given to this subject. I am quite willing to confess that there was. But the more I went into it the more serious it became—serious both for Americans and Filipinos—and, the more it seemed to me to be a challenge to the best American statesmanship.

The full, naked truth about the Philippines has not heretofore been given to the American people. They are entitled to have it; it is unfair to persuade or permit them to reach conclusions based on false impressions for purely selfish motives. The Filipino contends that he has re-

peatedly, *vi et armis*, asserted his right to independence. He fought for it against the Spaniard. He fought for it against the American. He declares it was promised to him both directly and by implication. He says he is ready for it. He has sent official commissions to the United States to plead for it. In these commissions were men of both the insular political parties. Every class of his citizenship has petitioned. His public men, from the highest to the lowest, have spoken and with a unity and a certainty matching those of our forefathers in the fateful years preceding 1776. Yet an effective word-of-mouth propaganda has convinced many in the United States that the Filipino does not want independence; that he does not understand what it means; that the dread of reprisal keeps its opponents silent; that they fear to speak because they may be classed as Filipino Tories or undesirable citizens.

It is true, that the Filipinos echo and follow their leaders, just as we in America accept the views and the initiative of our national or partisan chieftains. It is true that some men in the Philippines may remain silent when the leaders speak. But may it not be said with equal truth that there are able and patriotic officers both in our Army and Navy who—fearing the consequences of giving public expression to their opinions respecting our ability to hold the Philippines against a powerful enemy, knowing the potentiality of the Islands as a breeder of conflict, and recognizing their economic unimportance—hesitate to counter their superiors?

In thinking and planning for the welfare of the United States, it is neither fair nor prudent to neglect the views, aspirations, and patriotism of our Filipino wards, who by some have been classed as children, but who in thirty years have come to maturity. As twenty-one years is the American measure of maturity, should we not give to their

opinions, their appeal, and their aspirations sympathetic consideration and not ignore them because a propaganda unsupported by facts, names, or circumstances says, "They do not understand; they are led; they are still children; they are not ready for self-government," and counsels us, "Wait twenty years; wait thirty years; do nothing now"?

There are prophets who though confessedly without knowledge about the present, have nevertheless precise prevision of what is to happen fifteen, twenty, or thirty years hence; that is, at a period when these prophets shall be dead and cannot be called to account; at a time when most men now of middle age will have gone to their graves. An imaginative person, with no present check upon his vision, may predict without accountability the events of a half-century or a century hence; for there will be none alive to upbraid him when the sequel will have shown him to have been a false and foolish prophet! In the meantime, continuing as we are, Congress may impose upon the Filipinos conditions at one session, revise these in the next session, and write an entirely new law in a succeeding session. Neither American investors, nor Philippine citizens, can accept from any one Congress a declaration that will be legally binding upon its successor.

Some confusing mystical arguments concerning possibilities and eventualities in the Orient, very indefinite and hazy, and in no case persuasive, are advanced by friends of a colonial policy or a gospel of inaction. Americans could, if they tried, easily procure the historical background—the situation at the time of American occupation, the benefits of that occupation—and an insight into the educational, economic, fiscal, commercial, military, and naval factors which belong to the problem. But they may well be confused by an organized propaganda against independence. This propaganda has sedulously circularized

the American press, and on the basis of this propaganda many editorials have been written—and read and believed. But other forces concerned with the Philippines have begun to seek the facts. Among them are three great national farm organizations; the national dairy organization; union labor; certain classes of manufacturers; representatives of nineteen beet States and eight sugar-cane States; and the exclusionist, whose program has been indorsed by the American Legion. These, because their demands cannot be granted in any other way, are now advocating independence. In point of invested capital, and in numerical and financial strength, they far outweigh the opponents of independence.

On one subject there is complete agreement between those who oppose independence and those who advocate it—government officials, American investors, Filipino students, and all classes of our people. They are one in the belief that a condition of uncertainty exists, harmful alike to American and Philippine interests. For about sixteen years there has been no significant change in our legislation for the Philippines. We give consideration to the affairs of Haiti, Nicaragua, Mexico, and other Latin-American countries, and we even cross to Europe to solve or to survey internal problems there. We watch with care movements in China, Japan, Russia, and India, but seem to forget our wards in the Philippines. This is so, I think, because a campaign of suppression and distortion of facts has been waged from Manila with the purpose of misleading the American press and its readers. The Filipinos are portrayed as they were thirty years ago. No allowance is made for their advance in culture, in the arts, in agriculture, in political experience.

Independent observers, magazine writers, and investigators not affected by selfish motives, all agree that the

United States should act. These independent observers have presented a diversity of plans, but they are all in agreement that something of a definite character should be done, and that quickly. Uncertainty regarding the future is paralyzing business enterprise, curbing Philippine initiative, halting industrial progress, subordinating questions of economics to the one absorbing matter of independence.

It is dishonest to deny that there is a fixed determination on the part of the Filipino people to obtain their freedom; none but the onlooker purblind with prejudice can fail to see proof that each successive generation will be stronger and more united in its demands for independence than the preceding one. It is not the politician who originates and leads the movement. He follows the known temper and trend of the people. The "Manila American," the functionaries of an endangered bureaucracy, and "the leaners" on American power will continue their opposition.

In the course of a year I spent, as a young lawyer, in the service of the Hawaiian Republic under President Dole and Minister Lorrin A. Thurston, as far back as 1897, my mind was directed to the problem of the Orient and the Pacific. In more recent years my sojourn in Spain, the early colonizing nation, my service in Military Intelligence during the World War and my preparation of monographs on Spain, Cuba, and the republics of Central and South America, revived and stimulated my early interest. Still later my service in the United States Senate, and as a member of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and my participation in its hearings on Philippine independence, focussed and concentrated my mind upon our unsettled problem of the Philippines. Finally, I visited the Islands in the summer of 1931, to study on the

spot, so to say, the sentiments of the people and to scrutinize the political, social, religious, and economic conditions which are in part determinants of our policy. Six weeks is a short period for such an investigation, but I have been informed that that is twice the length of time ever devoted to such an inquiry by either an American Representative or Senator, whose sojourns in the Islands, unfortunately, are usually limited to one week. American officials or other prominent persons who visit the Philippines customarily spend a day or two in Manila, and then are taken to Baguio, "the summer capital," for air and altitude. They remain there usually for two or three days, in an atmosphere hostile to independence. Back to Manila, then; and in a day or two they board a ship for home. A five or six days' investigation in American clubs and under official tutelage!

In the pages which follow I have omitted many names so as to avoid embarrassments, and have failed to particularize many who volunteered their assistance, precisely because they were so numerous that I feared I might forget some.

If we intend to retain the Philippines, we should be frank about our purpose, and say so. If the Islands are to continue under a colonial form of government, let us decide for that. But if they are to have their independence, as we have promised they should, why not set a definite date so that uncertainty may be removed? By all means, there should be finality.

H. B. H.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
November 28th, 1931.

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PHILIPPINE UNCERTAINTY

CHAPTER I

A QUESTION AND A NATIONAL EXPLOSION

AT the hearings before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, when it was considering bills looking to the independence of the Philippines, the assertion was frequently made that there was no seriousness or sincerity in the proposal. Philippine political leaders, men like Manuel Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, and Manuel Roxas, were boldly charged with one of two things: Advocating independence either because political pressure forced them, or demagogically espousing it in order to secure election to office. Even General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the fight to free the Islands from Spanish dominion and President of the original Republic, did not escape the charge of insincerity. The Resident Commissioners Pedro Guevara and Camilo Osias, were also included. The Philippine Commission, then in Washington, composed of leaders of both the Filipino political parties and representatives of Mohammedans, Pagans, and Christians—business men, intellectuals, and labor—was no more immune from this charge than individuals were. The Senate Committee called attention to this matter in its report of June, 1930.

On my arrival in the Philippines, I heard this same allegation repeated by American residents there and some members of our American bureaucracy. When I made inquiry concerning the merit of these charges, they were repudiated vigorously and emphatically by the Philippine

Commissioners and the members of the Mission. I came to the conclusion then that at the first opportunity I would conduct a personal investigation.

Just prior to my departure for the Islands, in an address before the Commonwealth Club, at San Francisco, I stated that I had but one question to ask in the Philippines: "Do the Filipino people understand the responsibilities and the sacrifices which will be entailed by independence, and are they unitedly for it?" I repeated this four weeks later, on my arrival in Manila. "The object of my visit," I then declared, "is to ascertain just one thing: Do the Philippines want independence in the near future? Are there any Filipinos who oppose it?"

I took with me to the Islands two shot-guns, two rifles, and a box of fishing-tackle, I had anticipated a quiet visit interspersed with a little recreation. I counted on no speech-making. The day before we landed from the transport on which we had made the journey, one of our army generals who on two occasions had been stationed in the Islands, said to me: "Senator, you are going to have a very busy time in the Philippines. They will keep you 'on the go' continuously. Any one who has been openly associated with their aspirations for independence will be forced to accept much hospitality. And," he added, "I anticipate there will be some demonstrations."

The outcome proved the general right. My question about the people's desire for nationhood brought what might be termed a "national explosion." It seemed that every one wanted to answer me—the entire press, with the exception of the one newspaper with a circulation of 6,000 among the Americans living in the Islands, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, the various universities and colleges—all sponsored receptions. From the highest and most exclusive Philippine society, from the

leaders in business, I received, in confidential interviews, but one response—from boys and girls, and gray-haired veterans of Aguinaldo alike it came—a passionate plea for independence. I can say now with the greatest earnestness that although I spoke to many persons in various walks of life, including business leaders, intellectuals, and agriculturists (who had my assurance that I would hold in confidence any statement made in that way), not once did any Filipino man or woman who talked to me, or of whom I could hear, say he or she was not for Independence.

There was amongst some of the business men a desire that a period, of say ten years, be allowed for adjustment—the same period which was given to Spain to adjust her affairs in the Philippines following the Spanish-American war; but I did not find a single Filipino who thought that a fifteen- or a twenty- or a thirty-year plan would be helpful. I repeat for emphasis: All those with whom I talked were eager for independence; some on more favorable terms than others stipulated; but all wanted it, and were prepared to make all the sacrifices that immediate separation might entail. In this conclusion I find that almost without exception, all independent American magazine writers who have canvassed Filipino opinion within the last five years, have coincided. Some of the details of what I have called the “explosion”—a sort of detonation of popular sentiment—should prove both interesting and informative. It was not long in coming. After dining with the Governor, I was invited to dine at the Philippine Columbian Association, an organization of graduates of American universities and colleges. On the following day I accepted an invitation to go fishing in one of the upper provinces where fish are raised and sold in great quantities in Manila. Two Filipino lawyers, both

graduates of American colleges now practising in Manila, had just been elected to the legislature from Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, respectively. They asked whether I would consent, as I passed through these provinces, to make one or two stops and meet some of their constituents. They were most hearty in their invitation and I accepted without the slightest preparation for what was to follow. Both these lawyers, by the way, have numerous American clients. They had to sacrifice their practices to a great extent in accepting election to the legislature. Later I inquired why they did this. The answers were almost identical: Their fathers had been advocates of independence and they themselves thought the time for independence was at hand, and wished a part in preparing for the birth of the new republic. They were making the same kind of sacrifice that some of our lawyers are compelled to make in accepting public service in our own country.

When upon Philippine soil but a few days there came from the hearts of great multitudes—men, women, and children—the answer to my question, “Do these people speak truly when they plead for independence?” The sincerity, the convincingness these tens of thousands put into their answer I never shall forget. And because I found in these outbursts of Filipino patriotism unmistakable tokens not only of their yearning for independence but of their worthiness of it, I shall picture, so far as I may, some of the most impressive of them.

I shall relate here the experiences of that day I spent in Bulacan, because they are typical of others that came to me in various provinces where, with some variations, similar demonstrations for self-government were repeated.

I was informed that we should reach our destination, the fishing-grounds, between seven thirty and eight o'clock

in the evening; but, as it eventuated, it was eleven forty-five when we arrived at the point where we were to spend the night. My companions were Mr. Sergio Osmeña, Acting President of the Senate, and Mr. Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House, Representatives Delgado and Buen-camino, the wives of these officials, and my wife, my daughter, and my secretary, and some graduates of American colleges. When only about a half-hour out of Manila, we encountered an arch over the roadway—a framework of bamboo, covered with palm, tropical vines, and flowers. In the center of the arch was the legend, “We Want Our Independence!” This was at Polo, in the Province of Bulacan. From that point until we reached Hagonoy, in the same province, we seemed to be part of a continuous parade. At every little town there was a demonstration for independence, and frequently we were stopped at the intersection of roads, to be interviewed and presented with memorials and resolutions from lesser villages and barrios far distant from the road over which we were traveling. At this point, too, were assembled officials with placards or banners bearing the names of the towns from which they came.

At our first stop, Polo, lined back of the arch on both sides of the road, was a large waiting delegation. In this case, the present Governor of the Province, a member of the Democrata party, had been succeeded by a Governor elected as a representative of the Nacionalista party. Both the retiring Governor and his successor (who had not yet taken his seat) were present. The Municipal President, the Councilmen, business men, and old soldiers of the Philippine Republic residing in that community were also on hand. There was a band of native musicians. It was here that, for the first time, I heard the welcome “Mabuhay” (pronounced *Ma-boo-hai*) which, translated,

means, "Welcome and Long Life." From that moment there was an almost incessant chorus of "Mabuhay! Mabuhay!" until nine thirty at night, when our boat left the dock on its trip up the river.

At Polo also appeared six girls, beautiful in their native costume, each carrying a large bouquet of flowers. One of them stepped forward and delivered a little address of welcome and hope, and hospitality, ending with the request that I would take back with me to America their earnest appeal for independence. Six large bouquets, measuring from a foot to two feet in diameter, are quite a large armful on a hot day, under a tropical sun, with one's hat off, and in the presence of ladies! Thus encumbered, I found that to shake hands while I held this armful of tokens was a difficulty indeed!

My car was soon filled with flowers. Later we heaped them in the automobile occupied by the ladies. All of the cars gradually became pagodas of flowers and an extra machine was ultimately impressed to carry them. That night the blossoms went back with my weary wife and daughter to Manila, and the next day were distributed to the sick in the excellent hospitals there. Following the presentation of flowers, the President of the Municipality accompanied by his Councilmen, approached us and delivered in dignified words a welcome from his people. Then the president of the local council, accompanied by its members, presented resolutions and memorials asking for independence—all using one expression—"Immediate, complete, and absolute independence." Some time afterward I understood why this expression was universally used; I will give the explanation later in this recital.

Save for the repetition of this phrase, the appeals and memorials took different forms and were couched in various terms. The order at these receptions was that

after the officials had stepped back to their places, they gave way to representatives of a group of the Veterans of the Army of the Republic, gray-haired old fellows, all wearing a bluish-gray uniform, their straw hats pinned back in front and bearing the numerals of the company to which they had formerly belonged. Some of the few ranking officers wore swords. These veterans carried with them in the parades everywhere the American flag and the Filipino flag. At no place that I visited was there a departure from this practice. The American flag was conspicuous in each "explosion." At each halt in our progress our party would leave the cars and march between the long lines of natives gathered to greet us. Then the procession, headed by its band, followed us half-way to the next barrio.

My pockets became gorged with petitions, memorials, resolutions—so many of these, in fact, that I was compelled to stop and transfer the documents to a satchel. My secretary's pockets, too, were filled. Numerous placards and banners were borne by the manifestants. Some of the legends on them were painted, some were penciled. The work was largely that of school-children. The pictures on the transparencies and banners were sometimes crude, but all were intelligently done. At one village there was presented to us an old-fashioned autograph album, such as we were all familiar with in our youth. On each page of this album was an inscription, a verse, or a prose statement in the handwriting of each child in the local school. Every such inscription was followed by the signature of the boy or the girl who put it there. I prize this little album above all the other things that were presented to me in the Philippines. Some of the inscriptions were witty, others very dignified, and, sprinkled through it, were quotations from Patrick Henry and other early American

patriots. There were quotations also from Presidents McKinley, Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson. We left Polo, followed by a band which played "The Star-Spangled Banner" and the Philippine national anthem. They accompanied us for about a quarter of a mile, and we thought it was over; but it was only the beginning.

The rain fell in showers part of the day, but the people stood in the open, and traffic was practically suspended because of the density of the crowds. It was planting season in this district, but the farmers had abandoned their fields to come in. The hundreds of flags and transparencies glowed like tropical blossoms above the heads of men, women, and children. On their banners were such slogans as, "We Want Independence!" "Immediate, Complete Independence!" "We Are Ready for Independence!" "America, Redeem Your Pledge to Us!" "Justice Delayed Means Justice Denied!" "We Demand Immediate, Complete, and Absolute Independence!" And a small boy carried a banner with the words, "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death" (signed "Patrick Henry"). Some of the same kind appeared later in the big parade in Manila. The "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death—Patrick Henry" banners created great amusement among our American and Filipino hosts.

As we approached the next town and while we were still about a mile away, rockets were fired to announce our coming.

This was Marilao. Here resolutions were presented by the Municipal President, who was accompanied by the Town Council, plus the usual delegation of young ladies with flowers, soldiers of Aguinaldo, business men, and farmers. From Marilao we moved to Bocawe, and then to Bigaa, where a most picturesque reception awaited us. There were the arches, the band, the flowers, and the ban-

ners to which we had grown accustomed, but there was one novelty: We were escorted to the municipal building facing which was a statue of the foremost Filipino poet, Francisco Balagtas, decorated and covered with flowers, and from a balcony reviewed the parade. But by this time I was soaking wet from the incessant showers.

After the principal band had passed, we experienced a special thrill given by two groups of performers on bamboo instruments. The members of one group wore blue jackets and blue caps; those of the other red jackets and red caps. There were about two dozen musicians in each group. The oldest of these performers apparently were not more than ten or twelve years of age. The reds and the blues had each a drum-major, who carried a baton almost as tall as himself. Each leader was provided with a whistle and with this he gave his directions. First, the blue band commenced, twenty-four little fellows blowing together—a wild harmony that seemed to get you, and to hold you too, something like the folk music which has appeared in the United States during the last four or five years. Weird, yet melodious, it grips you in a manner difficult to describe.

All the while they played, and even when there was no other movement of the little bandsmen, their feet were in constant motion, keeping time. Then the baton went up, the leader's whistle blew, and off they went into what we thought was a series of evolutions, interrupted now and then by his blast—all in step, all in tune, all moving rhythmically; you could hear the continuous patter of their feet. Back at the place from which they started, the little band-master of the red contingent executed more flourishes of his baton, signaled with his whistle, and the reds were off. With the same sort of music, the same shuffling of feet, the same tempo, the same rhythm, they

went through another drill and another formation. Next came the blues' turn; and so, alternately, first the blues, then the reds wound and unwound themselves in what seemed to me very intricate maneuvers, always in perfect time with their feet and weird music. My secretary, Mr. Bon Geaslin, who was leaning over the balcony next to me, said, "If I could only take this bamboo band to New York, I could make a million dollars." And the bandsmen could make a million American friends!

Turning to the Mayor of the City, I asked him what this drill was and, to my astonishment, he replied, "They are spelling, in their marching, 'Independence.'" First the blues formed the "I" of the word; then the reds, formed the "n," next the blues formed the "d," and the reds "e," and so on through all the twelve letters, with never a falter; bamboo flutes going the while, the scores of little feet patting the ground, as they wrote "Independence" there in the sand, and inscribed it also in the hearts of our party.

It was a time for tears, and I watched them trickle down the faces of my wife and daughter, and—I am not ashamed to say it—I too had use for my handkerchief. Words were difficult to summon. Somehow they stuck in one's throat. The little boys in their blue and red costumes were recording in a new and impressive fashion the centuries-old appeal for liberty. It brought thoughts of the struggles of ages; it gripped and overpowered one.

The boys having done their share for the national cause, some of the girls sang "Independence" hymns, the President and Council presented their memorials and resolutions, and we started on our way, amid shouts of "Mabuhay," to Bulacan, a town near the capital of the province of the same name. One could not remain silent and unmoved in scenes like these. When a bevy of girls



select a speaker to interpret their hearts, and that pretty speaker's address is in English, one has to say something in reply. And it was so also with the addresses by the governors of provinces, the municipal presidents. From that time forward, my responses to these voices of a people's aspirations were almost continuous until nearly nine o'clock that night.

As we proceeded farther on our way, there was a whole day's repetition of these manifestations. We looked into the earnest, eager faces of these people pleading for the boon that my ancestors and my wife's forebears had fought for—and we felt this indeed was a new experience, a new sensation. Into our hearts there came a feeling of elation that the spirit of our forefathers was here in these remote Islands, too. But with our elation there was sadness. No wonder there was a surreptitious wiping away of tears; a “catch” in our voices. The emotions which held these people had touched us, too, and made us kin.

As we approached Malolos, the crowds became denser. Reinforcing the farmers were throngs of fishermen who had left their nets and fishing-boats as the farmers had left their implements in the rice-fields, to join the great popular petition for self-government. The program at Malolos included the novelty of a tea, which was served in the School of Domestic Science. The teachers in this school exhibited their kitchen with very evident and deserved pride. They had learned the American art of canning and preserving, and were teaching it to the girls. Here in abundance and all temptingness were the things that “Mother used to make” at home—delicious jellies and jams in glass jars and vegetables in cans. The girls were proud of their work and entitled to their pride. The guavas and the mangoes, the mangosteens and other Oriental fruits which Providence has lavished on them made

us think of the grapes, the apples, the peaches, the plums, and the pears we had in the closets back home. We found that Providence had differentiated the Oriental fruits from the Occidental: they were as different as the men and the women of the Eastern world and the Western. Incidentally, the choicest fruits of the United States have been transplanted to the Philippines by agricultural experts, but, with rare exceptions, they are failures. The same may be said of certain of our grains and vegetables. In some sections corn does well, but potatoes grow into luxuriant foliage, and nothing more.

The crowd that had assembled to greet us on our arrival at Malolos became so great that we could not have moved through it had we not been escorted by a detachment of the local constabulary, wonderfully well-drilled, quick, active, alert men, excellent marchers. They "presented arms" with verve, and went through their maneuvers with the celerity and precision of our crack Zouave drill teams of twenty-five years ago. At this place stands the old Barasoain Church, to which pilgrimages are made each year because it was within its walls that the first Philippine Republic was proclaimed.

Once more we were hailed with the usual ceremonies, petitions, and addresses. But the program here was varied by a speech by Senator Osmeña, Acting President of the Philippine Senate, who, amongst other things, made this significant statement: "We may be divided on internal questions, but all of us are united in our demand for independence. If our people are not united, and there exists a difference of opinion and dissension among us, we are bound to fail in our struggle for political emancipation."


Representative Francisco A. Delgado spoke, too. "Thirty-two years ago the first Republic in the Orient was proclaimed and consecrated in this very town," he

said. Let the reader note his words, "Republic in the 'Orient.'" "In the church yonder, met the first Congress of the Philippine Republic to formulate its constitution and its form of government, and they adopted a constitution in which the rights and prerogatives of the private individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were fully granted and the separation of Church and State proclaimed." Concluding, he said: "We have hidden nothing from you. You have seen the old men in their shirt-sleeves. You have seen the old women in their working clothes. You have seen the peasant, the young, the old, the men, the women, and the children. I need not say to you that their countenances and their expressions mean but one thing. You may go back to America and tell the American people that the desire of the Filipinos for independence is sincere and goes to the very core of their hearts. Please tell Americans that our desire for independence is sincere; that you have seen it with your own eyes; that you can testify there is no camouflage or 'make-believe' in this one national desire of the Filipino people. I want you to tell Americans that there is no mental reservation in the feelings of appreciation of the Filipinos for the Americans to-day, and the minute that American sovereignty ceases, the Filipinos will always hail all Americans as true friends and benefactors of this country. This is the real feeling of every man, woman, and child in the Philippines."

It came my turn to speak and I told them, with no little emotion, that it was a fine thing to meet in the open air, with the heavens as a canopy, surrounded by trees, with the moon shining down; that there had been enough speeches; that they had made speeches all the way with their eyes, with their smiles, and with their flowers. I reminded them that struggles for liberty called for sacrifices; that independence was one thing, but the cost of independence was

another thing; that every nation that had secured it had had to pay a high price for it; that we Americans were their friends and had done much for them in the construction of roads and sanitation works, and by introducing into their laws the American idea of justice; that we had given them the best we had in trade relations; that if and when we left them they would stand alone; that there would be sacrifices to be made in many ways when we left, and that I had come to ascertain whether they earnestly desired independence and whether they were willing to pay the price of it. So far I had not found a man who was not for independence, I said, and added that if there was such a man, he must be in hiding.

It was on this occasion that occurred one of the two unpleasant episodes of my visit. In reply to playful reference to the hidden objector, a man shouted: "If we find him, we will kill him!" The crowd applauded vigorously. With much difficulty silence was restored. I then stated: "No, don't kill him; convert him!" My remark, too, was applauded. This incident revealed to me the strain, the deep feeling, the "will-to-have," which lay just below the surface of the courtesy and hospitality with which these people had received me. The only other untoward thing was the statement of an American beach-comber. This I shall relate in its proper turn. Neither the "catch-and-kill" statement of the Filipino nor the utterance of the white beach-comber expresses truly the sentiment of their respective people. The Filipino's threat had heat in it, for he spoke it in sight of the birth-place of the first Philippine Republic. Sixteen thousand Filipino soldiers lost their lives in an effort to perpetuate their republic, and some of the survivors of that long struggle, with their children and grandchildren, were at Malolos that day. All of that should be remembered. As I proceeded with my remarks, they were



At Cebu—a typical reception committee

interpreted to the audience both in Tagalog and Spanish by a brilliant young lawyer, Félipe Buencamino.

On returning to Manila the following Monday, I found an account of the speeches in which I was quoted as saying, "Never swap horses when crossing a stream." I knew I had not made this statement, and could not understand how it found its way into the paper. I read the notes on my remarks and there was no such expression. My further inquiries disclosed that my friend, Buencamino, had used this expression in the course of his interpretation of my speech. Later I asked him how he happened to do this. He laughed and said that he had learned it in St. Louis, Missouri, and he thought it was a fair equivalent of what I had said. This contretemps explains some of the trouble that resulted when our army officers attempted to deal through interpreters with Aguinaldo and his subordinates thirty-odd years ago.

Always at the opening or conclusion of any of these meetings and demonstrations there was an invocation, an appeal to God "to look down upon and guide us to the light of liberty," or similar petition.

We went next to Paombong. It was nearly eight o'clock in the evening when we entered the town. The people had been waiting, through a misunderstanding, since one o'clock. The long delay deprived them of their evening meal, but their fasting diminished not at all their enthusiasm. And we passed on to Hagonoy. This last manifestation of the day came long after dark. The moon was out; the stars shone as only they can in the tropics. We were again in the open air. The roof was the heavens. As I listened to those who preceded me, I could not but think that the same moon and those very stars that looked down on us had beheld in distant ages the never-ceasing struggle for liberty and self-government. I thought of our fore-

fathers coming to America to seek liberty and self-determination, just as the people surrounding me here were bent on the same quest. I recalled, too, our people's cheers for the Greeks, for the Boers in South Africa, for the young Turks, for the Irish, all within my own time and recollection; and of Cuba, which we freed, and of Haiti, the black man's republic, which we recognized. And I wondered why we Americans should applaud the Greek, the Boer, the Turk, the Haitian, the Irish, and be deaf and silent to the Filipino. It seems to me to defy either justification or explanation. Why should we longer delay the fulfilment of a promise? What kind of mind has a man who says, "Wait twenty years, wait thirty years"? Thinking men must know that the patience of these people to whom we have pledged our faith will not last; that the fine feeling of friendship they have for us now will disappear; that their present gratitude will be forgotten; that resentment, fierce and glowing, will gradually take the place of placid resignation.

Tired and exhausted by travel and strain, my wife and daughter returned with Senator Osmeña and the Philippine leaders to Manila, with a mountain of flowers instead of a basket of fish. About nine thirty the same evening, we who remained in the party started for the fishing-grounds in a large boat with two automobile loads of young professional men and business men who had followed us. They sang the songs of the great universities of the United States. On the river, whose banks were lined with nipa palm and rich tropical vegetation, these young fellows sang "My Old Kentucky Home," "The Star-Spangled Banner," and played on guitar and mandolin, "Yankee Doodle," "Dixie," "The Good Old Summer-Time," "Annie Rooney," "After the Ball Is Over," "The Stein Song," and many other old-timers which they had learned

in America. It was enjoyable, but I could not take my mind from the scenes of the day, the parades, the speeches, the gravity of some of the expressions; the bright, earnest eyes of the boys and girls, the old grizzled followers of Aguinaldo. I could not enter into the spirit of gaiety, because I was haunted by something solemn, something portentous, something ominous. If the songs that I heard now should change to those of resentment (I mused), sad songs like those of Israel and Ireland, wailing songs, and songs of lament . . .

Recital of the whole story of these outpourings of patriotism would require too much space and perhaps tire the reader, so, excluding the report of other visits, let me recount what happened during my visit to the Moro Province of Lanao, to Tayabas, the home of Senator Quezon, describe the last meeting at Cavite, home of General Aguinaldo, and tell of the parade of many thousands in Manila—the “Big Bertha,” so to say, that shook the hostile “Manila American.” In each of the southern islands—in fact, in practically all of the archipelago—there is a ridge of mountains one of whose slopes is near the sea. Except in rare, rare cases, cultivation is confined to the lowlands. Transportation is by water. Railroads exist in only three of the islands; they are necessarily short, and, unlike some of the railroads in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Africa, they do not cross international boundaries. If one really expects to visit the Philippines—not merely Manila, and the health resort, Baguio, but the islands far from Luzon—one must travel largely by water. Leaving Manila on the Governor-General’s yacht, the *Apo*, with the Governor-General, his charming, well-poised and thoughtful daughter, Miss Cynthia, and members of his Civil Advisory Council, I spent two days, pleasantly interrupted by a few hours of sea fishing, and then

transferred to the *Bustamante* at Culion. The *Apo* was at one time owned by the King of Portugal. He had provided in the vessel a special cabin for the fascinating, enticing, and captivating Gaby des Lys. This yacht was later purchased by H. Clay Pierce, an American oil king, and finally became the property of the Philippine Government. It is now maintained and supported by the Philippine tax-payers. Its cabin attendants and crew are all Filipinos.

The *Bustamante* (upon which I spent seven days) is another old-timer, with an interesting history. She has a Filipino captain, engineer, and crew. The captain is a little fellow, resourceful, full of "pep," information, and nautical lore. The captains of both vessels kept the matter of typhoons in mind, and were ready to run for a safe harbor if the wireless should give warning. Riding a typhoon is not a diversion; it is a grave danger, especially in waters interspersed with seven thousand islands. It comes along quickly and contends for first place in fury and havoc with hurricanes and tornadoes.

The *Bustamante* was met at Zamboanga on the Island of Mindanao by a great delegation, with bands, attractive women, flowers, arches, banners and placards, and a contingent of well-drilled constabulary. There were at least five thousand people in the assemblage, one third of whom were Moros. The local American newspaper correspondent, however, wired the American newspaper in Manila that only two hundred were present; that the populace preferred a baseball game, which false statement was later transmitted to the press of the United States. Leaving Zamboanga, we started into the Moro country to visit Camp Keithley and the Lake of Lanao, which formerly was the headquarters and place of retreat of the Moro pirates who infested this section in ancient times.

We were met at the dock at Iligan by John J. Heffington, the American Governor of the Province of Lanao. He is one of the three Americans still occupying provincial governorships, and is of course the Governor-General's appointee, a fine, understanding man, a typical Kentuckian, hailing from Bowling Green. He knew intimately his province and its people, and their problems were of deep concern to him. We had with us on the *Bustamante* his predecessor in office Colonel Paulino Santos, a native Filipino trained under General James G. Harbord, when the latter was commanding troops in the Philippines. Notwithstanding this tutorship he has never visited the United States. Colonel Santos held the office of governor of this province for nine years. During his term there was little trouble with the Moros. They understood him and he understood them. During my short visit it became quite evident to me that he had both their confidence and their respect. All the Moros I met were fully satisfied to have him, a Malay Christian, as governor. He is now Director of the Bureau of Prisons, has charge of Bilibid prison in Manila with 3,800 inmates; the model prison farm at Iwahig, with 1,700 inmates, and a second prison farm at San Ramon, with 1,000 prisoners.

Our reception at Camp Keithley was much the same as those in the northern provinces, except that there were no soldiers of Aguinaldo among the welcoming concourse. But the constabulary was there, with its snap, its fine appearance, and effective drill. A rocket signaled our approach and we entered beneath an arch. But here the picture changed. The sultans and dattos were clad in colorful garments, in bright reds, blues, and yellows. Their head-dress was more picturesque than the hats of European style worn by Filipinos of military or civilian status. The banners in the procession were very much

alike—all demanding independence. Some carried the statement that they wanted no separation from the rest of the Philippine Islands. At the first arch under which we passed, one of the head men met us with two little dancing-girls. He was in bright colors, and the little girls, executing a rhythmic dance difficult to describe, with their arms waving and feet shuffling came forward. The Sultan of Ragain and the dattos followed. On the roadside were a number of Moro wives, who, apparently abashed at first, covered the lower portion of their faces with their shawls, but these they later removed. The music here was different, produced chiefly by primitive drums and brass gongs, or a species of cymbals. The musicians and their instruments presented a wonderful combination of color and primitive music—very much in contrast, both in their appearance and their melody, to the northern Malay of the Christian faith.

Our progress along the highway was a recurrence of crowds, with banners proclaiming the demand for independence; till finally, on approaching Camp Keithley, a most amazing delegation greeted us. Advancing in front, one of three of the dattos there carried a silver chest. After him walked another datto, carrying a silver sword, and still another, a ceremonial vessel of some kind. In the rear stretched a long line of banners, inscriptions, and insignia, all of them eloquent supplications for independence. We moved to the Lanao Golf Club, at Camp Keithley. There I received a large key, wrought of a bright metal resembling silver, and about a foot long. Inscribed on one side in the native language, and on the other side in English, was the following: "From the Mohammedan Filipinos of Lanao, P. I., to Senator Harry B. Hawes of U. S. A., as a symbol of the Moros aspiration for Liberty, July 6, 1931."

Souvenirs that I desired I could not find at Zamboanga. As I rode along with the American Governor and his predecessor, the Filipino Governor, Colonel Santos, I inquired whether I could buy some souvenirs at Camp Keithley. I was told that I could. One of the dattos was summoned and he escorted me to his house. I was very courteously received and introduced to his wife and family, in a large room that we entered there were many trays, boxes, and other ornaments, all of brass, and a variety of other articles made of the same metal. I was invited to select the things I wanted, and then for the first time was informed that this was not a store and that the articles were not for sale. We could ascertain the price, if we chose, we were told. So I selected what I wanted, noted the price of each article, and these were then presented to me with some ceremony; the understanding being that objects of equal value were later to be purchased by Colonel Santos and sent as presents from me to the datto and his family. This I did. There were some things, however, that we did not find at the datto's household, and I inquired how they could be procured, there being no store. If I would wait half an hour, I was assured, word would be given and all those having articles for sale would exhibit them at the Lanao Golf Club. Later we visited the club. The natives had come in from all directions. It was like a bazaar. What they had to sell was shown to me, the eager venders pulled my coat and jostled me, four of them at one time offered me similar articles. I made my purchases only with difficulty and after a great deal of haggling through an interpreter.

This was all very different from the stores and bazaars of the Christian Filipinos. You walked into these and found a salesman. Wares were distributed in booths or stalls, and one made purchases in the ordinary way. In

this respect the Moros have stood still. An old army officer, who had served there the first time thirty, and again twenty-five years ago, remarked to me sadly: "They have not advanced. The Christian Filipino has gone far beyond them. I thought at one time that one Moro was equal to ten Christian Filipinos. I have changed my mind," he said. Looking at the trained, soldierly, alert Filipino Constabulary we could easily understand what he meant.

I witnessed while at Camp Keithley a long conference between Speaker Manuel Roxas, Dean Maximo M. Kalaw, and other Christian Filipinos with the sultans and the dattos, but as they spoke in their native language I did not understand them. Later I learned that all of those present—and there was a large gathering—were unitedly for independence. They did not want the separation of Mindanao and the Moro Provinces in case independence was granted. We stopped at other places, on the way to Cebu, the home of Senator Osmeña. Here, for the first time, a flotilla of boats, covered with bunting, carrying bands of music and displaying placards asking for independence, was part of the demonstration for our benefit. The Governor of the Province came alongside our steamer in a yacht. There was a delegation of brilliantly attired girls bearing bouquets of flowers.

Great crowds swarmed the streets and open spaces. A multitudinous parade moved before us. Cebu is a modern city in its way. Under the inspiration of Osmeña the streets were widened, the stores were modernized, the water purified and supplied in satisfactory volume. All of the officials whom I met gave him credit for these great improvements.

Once more there was a presentation of memorials and resolutions and again speeches were made. These at an

end, a midday dinner was given by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and the Filipino business men of Cebu. The addresses, of course, had for their subject the people's longing for independence, and their gratitude to the United States. The toastmaster was exceedingly witty and humorous. He drove his points home, with satire and fun. At the conclusion of that dinner I was certainly convinced that the Filipinos at Cebu were quite ready for self-government.

The newly elected Governor of Palawan, I discovered, was a graduate of a medical school at Philadelphia. After his graduation he returned to his native home, where he practised medicine and took a keen interest in the work for independence; and, although a very young man, he had been elected Governor of the Province. I later heard him deliver a brilliant address which would compare favorably with any that I had ever heard in the United States. Naturally, I thought he was "ready for it."

We picked up a number of officials who were on their way to Manila, and I was interested in the books they were perusing, for they are omnivorous readers, these Filipinos. One young man, who had just been elected to the lower House, was studying parliamentary law. He asked me about the procedure in our House and Senate. All those on board the boat were reading American books of a historical, or political character. They too certainly were all "ready for it."

Returning to Manila from the Southern Provinces, I found Senator Key Pittman and Mrs. Pittman there. On the following day came a parade that, because of the numbers and the fervor of those participating in it, and because of the painfulness of an incident of which it was the occasion, deserves description in detail. First, we were informed that a committee would call for us at three o'clock,

and we were asked to be ready. There were to be no speeches, for which we were appropriately thankful. Senator Osmeña, Speaker Roxas, and Senator Juan Sumulong arrived. Senator Pittman, myself, and others, with our wives and my daughter, started for the legislative building. Now it was that we began to realize that an extraordinary thing was happening. We could not move through the throng of people, until some one got on the running-board and shouted to those in front of our car, "Senator Pittman, Senator Hawes!" A lane was opened and we went forward by inches. Finally, from the reviewing-stand on the front steps of the Capitol, we looked upon a sight I never expected to witness.

I had seen the great crowds in London in 1914, when Great Britain was deciding to go to war. I was in Paris when an army marched through it, and vast numbers filled the streets. In my home town, St. Louis, I had witnessed the frantic thousands—I know not how many—that paid tribute to Lindbergh. The Armistice Day crowd, mobs in Madrid, the homecoming of the victors of the World Series of baseball games, great political parades—all these and each of them brought forth waves of humanity. But they compared not at all to this inundation. Here were myriads on the roofs of buildings; in the trees; everywhere. Directly in front they were packed so dense they seemed to have merged into one fluid mass. One could have walked upon them as upon a highway of flesh for two squares without once treading earth. It was amazing, awe-inspiring! The upturned faces were intent, but smiling. It was a good-natured gathering. Its constituents had come resolved to be part of the demonstration. It was a solemn occasion, withal. There was no more room for those in line; no more divisions could be formed. So all the rest of the thousands were obliged to wait, and to

watch their relatives and friends march and countermarch.

There were 144 bands. There were all the elected officials of the city, there were manufacturers and other business men. In the multitude there were also the wives of officials, society leaders—some in native costume—girls from the tobacco factories, from colleges and seminaries. Union labor had its representatives and there were a delegations of Moros and a delegation from the Igorrote country. There were priests and preachers, aristocrats and plebeians. Those in the rear good-naturedly pressed the crowd in front until the latter were wedged tight against the reviewing-stand. The congestion halted and held the procession. We could hear bands playing in the distance, but the line could not move. Through a loud-speaker the people were asked to clear a path for the parade, and they surged back, only, however, to be plunged forward again. Police and constabulary shoved and threatened. A space cleared for an instant would be filled again. Long ropes were brought, and stretched as barriers. For a while they served. In vain the bands played marches. No one could march! With one exception there were no fisticuffs; not a blow was struck. If it had been in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, or any other large American city, there would have been a hundred fights.

But the procession had reached an impasse. The program was at a standstill, too. Resort to strategy finally dissolved the crowd. The chairman announced that Senator Pittman and I were to speak at another point in the city. We were exhibited, got into an automobile and rode through the crowd, which opened a lane. A part of the crowd followed us. The ruse worked. It was hardly fair, but it was the only way. We waited at a distance till we were informed the parade was under way; then we circled back and the first half of the line passed by. What a

medley this cortège was! There were delegations from the provinces, including governors and lesser officials; long lines of students; veterans in uniform, soldiers of the short-lived Republic, carrying stands of native flags along with Old Glory, and a miscellaneous content of the rich and the poor, the high and the humble. It was estimated that there were 50,000 in the parade and 150,000 others looking on. These figures are the minimum. The maximum estimate was 250,000. The American newspaper men used the later figure and subsequently reported it correctly to the American press.

Unfortunately, some of those in the crowd either were thrust upon or deliberately trespassed on the grounds of the Army and Navy Club. Native waiters were sent to drive them off. Some boys retaliated with stones. Two persons were struck. The story was cabled to America that there had been a riot and that American men and women had been stoned. This naturally prompted head-lines. The news of the demonstration for independence was all but lost in America in the false report of a riot and an assault upon Americans. With this exception, then, there were no fights, no arrests, no disorder. Because this sort of perversion of facts in the prosecution of a pernicious propaganda against the Filipinos is so harmful to the right understanding and the just settlement of the Philippine question, I shall revert to it in a subsequent chapter.

It would take too long to describe the ceremonies we beheld from the reviewing-stand, save that Senator Pittman and I received each of us as a token a framed copy of the American Declaration of Independence from one speaker, a resolution on parchment from another speaker, and then, of course, an introduction to the assemblage, and equally of course each of us spoke briefly. The formal meeting in front of the legislative building, was opened

with an invocation, gracefully spoken, as the head of every auditor bent low. Dr. Bocobo, invoking God, prayed: "Bless Thou every hand that toils and every heart that throbs for freedom. Grant that in the vehemence of our struggles for liberty, no ill-will or hatred may creep into our hearts."

The amazing spectacle closed with "Mabuhays" for our President, for the Governor-General, for Senator Pittman and me, for independence. We returned to the hotel in silence. We had witnessed a national heart-throb, a national "explosion," a conclusive answer to my question, "Do the Filipinos sincerely seek, will they prize, will they cherish independence?"

Later we went to the Province of Tayabas, home of Senator Quezon, along seventy-five miles of highway bowered by tropical plants and blossoms. These roads were designed by a Philippine engineer, and paid for by Philippine taxpayers. Our final visit was to Cavite, the home of General Aguinaldo. There we were graciously entertained, and had an opportunity to examine his relics of the Republic, to review a parade of 3,000 veterans, to see loving, careful hands carry him in a chair to our automobile, lift him to the platform, and to hear him speak to the remnant of his army, as he sat in a chair. For the Liberator's leg was broken.

Sherwood Eddy, Asiatic Director and investigator for the Y. M. C. A., who has carefully studied the Philippine situation, says in his new book, "The Challenge of the East":

We found no people in the world so unitedly, so passionately, so insistently desiring independence as the Filipinos. . . . The Filipinos desire independence, as we have seen, probably more unanimously than any other subject people in the world. . . . It is not generally realized in America that there

exists in the Philippines today something very like the spirit of 1776 in the American Colonies. . . . They can think of nothing else. They are continually upset by this fever of a burning demand for independence which has possessed almost the entire nation.

Mr. Eddy speaks the plain truth.

CHAPTER II

WHO ARE THE FILIPINOS?

IN 1898 Admiral Dewey caused a scurry for maps and atlases; old travel books were conned and encyclopedias read, but even then there remained in the average American's mind a good deal of uncertainty as to the exact location of the Philippine Islands.

By degrees the people of the United States learned that the Philippines are a group of islands southeast of Asia, between 5 degrees and 22 degrees north latitude, and between 117 degrees and 127 degrees east longitude; that, roughly, they are bounded on the north by the Japanese Islands, on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the south by Borneo and the Celebes Islands and on the west by the China Sea. It was the learning of a new, or the repetition of an old, lesson in geography. But there was much more to acquire both from books and experience. Dewey had suddenly and violently confronted his fellow-countrymen with a good many problems, political, social, and economic, for the solution of which thirty-odd years have not sufficed.

Years before we occupied the Islands, Dean C. Worcester, then a zoölogist, visited them. He was a scientist and contributed significantly to Philippine development; but his minute classification of the natives and their dialects, though it has been questioned by high authorities, has nevertheless been followed by most writers who have had occasion to deal with those subjects. He could never forget

this specialty of his, and was intent upon the finding of new species of animals and fishes, new tribes and parts of tribes. The discovery of a new language, or a new dialect was for him a matter of satisfaction. Much, therefore, of the confusion in respect of the Filipino's capacity for independence had its source in his writings.

Racially the Filipino is a Malay, and throughout the Islands the bulk of the population shows distinct similarity in origin and type. The old belief that the Filipinos are a conglomeration of tribal peoples has been so thoroughly discredited that I shall give little effort to its refutation. Christian Malays number 91 per cent, Mohammedan Malays about 4 per cent, and Pagan Malays about 5 per cent of the population of the Islands. I have heard a "Manila American," who was part English, part Irish, and part French, describe the Filipinos as a "mongrel race," when, as a matter of fact they were less mongrel than he.

The Celtic, the Anglo-Saxon, and the Norman admixture in England, results sometimes in blond and dark and red hair in members of the same family and differences also in color of eyes and complexion of skin. My friend simply did not understand the ethnic strains of Europeans, much less those of Americans, and certainly he did not grasp the meaning of the word "mongrel."

All of our ancestors, no matter from what part of Europe they came, were originally descendants of a tribe or a clan. The American Indians were separated into many tribes with different dialects, but they all came from one stock—they were all Indians.

Now, the really important distinction in the Philippines is one of religion and not of race. This is not my personal opinion alone. It is held by all those who have investigated the subject of Filipino origins, except those whose purpose is to prove a racial inferiority in the Filipinos so that

this may be urged to prove the need for a new and more powerful colonial government in the Islands.

A fine bit of humor flashed one day in the Senate hearings on bills looking to independence for the Islanders. One of the Filipino Commissioners, Mr. Osias, for many years president of a great private Filipino university, directing the early education of six thousand students, furnished the fun—and incidentally an impressive fact.

"This idea of continually harping on our alleged 'tribal' difference," he said, "I can answer by saying that the lack of such differences can be proven here now in this room. I ask you to pick the Ilocanos, the Tagalogs, and the Visayans among the Filipinos in this room. Speaker Roxas comes from the Visayan Islands. Commissioner Guevara and Doctor Gil, Minority Floor Leader, are supposed to belong to the Tagalog Tribe, and I belong to the so-called Ilocano Tribe. I ask you to look at the various Filipinos here and see if there is any more difference among us than there is between an American of the Connecticut Tribe, let us say, and one of the Michigan Tribe, or of the Missouri Tribe, or of the Maryland Tribe, or of the Pacific Coast tribe, or some other American tribe."

The Senators present were from Connecticut, Michigan, Missouri, Maryland, and California.

Dr. Merton I. Miller, when he was Chief Ethnologist of the Bureau of Science of the Islands, said, that "with the exception of the few scattered Negritos, the people of the Philippines, Pagan, Moro, and Christian—are one, racially."

James A. LeRoy, in "Philippine Life in Town and Country," says:

"That the native stock of the Philippine Islands is Malayan is one of those things that have been recognized always, everywhere, and by all. But in the writings, es-

pecially of recent years, so many fantastic strains of blood have been introduced into the archipelago, and so many purely hypothetical and often unreasonable conjectures as to diversity of tribal origin have been evolved in the treatises of library workers or whilom globe trotters, that the underlying homogeneity of the inhabitants of the archipelago has often been obscured."

Former Chief Justice Taft, who served for several years as Governor-General of the Philippines, said:

"The word 'tribe' gives an erroneous impression. There is no tribal relation among the Filipinos. There is a racial solidarity among them, undoubtedly. They are homogeneous. I cannot tell the difference between an Ilocano and a Tagalog or a Visayan—to me all Filipinos are alike."

Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of the first Philippine Commission—that appointed by President McKinley shortly after we occupied the Islands—gave this testimony:

"Nothing could more unhappily describe . . . these people than the word 'tribe.' Let us drop so misleading a term and speak of them as communities, and let us call the aggregate of these communities the Philippine nation."

The Negritos—the term is Spanish and signifies "little Negroes"—the one exception to the rule of Malaysian derivation, are one of the smallest races in the world; quite black in color, with woolly, kinky hair. They are not of Malay but of Negro extraction. Very few remain. They are a dying, disappearing race.

It doubtless is true of the Filipinos, except the Negritos, that the tropical climate, the fruitful soil and other environmental influences they have encountered in the Islands, have greatly changed the characteristics and dis-

guised in some measure the traits of their Mongol antecedents on the mainland of Asia. Malays in the Philippines are of a light-brown color, with straight black hair, dark eyes. They are not very large of stature. In the main they are exceedingly intelligent, muscular, active, and energetic.

Let me quote former Governor Forbes:

"But the fact is that the people are all reasonably similar in type, generally so in religion, have the same ideals and characteristics and are imbued throughout with a great pride in their race and desire for its advancement which should make them capable, under a common language, of being welded into a united and thoroughly cohesive body politic."

Those who question Filipino capacity for self-government should look for other arguments against it than that of tribal diversity and discordance. A customer in a restaurant inquired of the waitress, "What kind of pies have you?" She answered, "Three kinds: Open-faced, cross-barred, and 'kivered'—all apple."

Some years ago, while I was on a fishing trip, I visited one of the British islands of the Grand Bahamas. The controlling official in the island, representing the British Government, was a Canadian. All the rest of the inhabitants were of Negro origin. They could speak English but when they conversed amongst themselves I could not understand them. Their dialect was not derived from English, French, or Spanish. It was a peculiar "lingo" and, when they were not addressing us, they used it continuously. Inquiring, I was told that three shiploads of African slaves intended to be sold in America could not be landed here because before their arrival the sale of slaves had been prohibited. The slavers did not know what to do and started back; but, on reaching this island, they de-

cided not to return the slaves to Africa. Instead they left the Negroes on the island. Their descendants have for many years preserved their African language. It was that strange tongue I had heard and could not understand. This incident does not precisely illustrate the situation in the Philippines, but it describes a condition which might apply to other portions of the world. The opponents of independence, I think, have not taken such things fully into account.

The Christian Filipinos were converted by the Spanish missionaries. Centuries ago some of the Filipinos adopted the religion of the Koran, refused to eat pork, practised the rite of circumcision, and became polygamists.

The Pagans are fetish-worshippers. They worship also the spirits of their ancestors, which are represented by small images. In some mystic way, too, they reverence certain animals and birds, and formerly offered sacrifices of pigs, chickens, and other creatures. The Pagans are either abandoning or modifying their pristine worship. The Mohammedans (called Moros), are decreasing in numbers and influence, and are divided amongst themselves, under the leadership of various minor sultans and dattos. One virtue—or is it eccentricity?—of the Mohammedan is that he never uses alcohol as a beverage. As an offset to this virtue, however, he practises the vice of chewing the betel-nut.

Advances in government, in education, in political science, and in general culture are remarkable among the Christian Filipinos. A number of former American soldiers whom I met, and who had returned to the Philippines after an absence of a quarter of a century, were deeply impressed with the progress of the Christian Filipinos in all walks of life and at the same time manifestly disappointed at the backwardness of the Moro, although

the latter has been continually coddled and petted by sentimentalists.

The Filipinos have intermarried with the Chinese and the Spanish. All observers know that there have been similar intermarriages of Spanish and native throughout Latin America. Intermarriage of Anglo-Saxons and Indians in North America has been frequent from the days of colonization. Some of our First Families boast of a like strain. Intermarriage of the Chinese with Filipinos is merely a reblending of the old Mongolian blood which has for centuries flowed in the veins of both. The children of these marriages, if they are educated in Philippine schools, become Filipinos, and have all the characteristics of the Filipino. At one time those who advocated permanent possession of the Islands instanced these intermarriages as arguments for creating a new classification, *mestizo*, in the population of the Philippines.

The Christian Filipinos are divided as follows in the Census of 1918: Roman Catholics, 7,790,937; Aglipayan, 1,417,448; Protestant, 124,575. There has been no strife between the Protestant missions and the Roman Catholic Church or between either of these and the Aglipayan Church. There would be little conflict between the Christian and the Mohammedan Filipinos if American officials would only permit the Malays to settle their differences between themselves, as Malays. For thirty years American officials have interposed in behalf of the Moro, but without notably improving him. The Christian Filipino has made his own advance, without guidance from a Bureau. The census of 1918 gives the following division of foreign nationalities in the Islands: Chinese, 43,802; Japanese, 7,806; Americans, 5,774; Spaniards, 3,945; English, 1,140; Germans, 286; French, 182; Swiss, 125; other nationalities, 1,156.

In stature, the Filipino is much below the Caucasian average. Five feet six inches is a considerable height and 130 pounds is good weight for a native of the Islands. They are square-shouldered, strong of neck, stout of limb, and, as a rule, of small girth. Small though they be, they are nevertheless remarkably comely, agile, and athletic. Filipinos taller and heavier than the generality of their fellows are to be found, but they are the exception.

As to the personal habits of the Islanders Dr. Robert W. Hart, in his work, "The Philippines Today," writes:

The lowland Filipinos are, so far as the writer remembers, the cleanest dark-skinned people with whom he has ever come in contact. It is jokingly maintained that the Spanish invaders, the soldiers who remained in the islands for any considerable period of time, developed one very bad habit, which they took back to Spain with them, i.e.—they learned to bathe frequently. It is difficult to find a really dirty individual among the natives, for as a rule they bathe their person two, three, or more times a day, and in the matter of clothing, no matter how poor or scanty, it is usually washed at frequent intervals and is nearly always immaculate.

As Dr. Hart served in the Philippines as a surgeon in the United States Public Health service, his opinion is that of a scientific observer, and therefore valuable.

These people are fond of dress, and especially garments of bright colors. Many of them have costumes especially for public ceremonies, receptions and the like and others for purely social affairs. The native garb of the women, worn on formal occasions, is beautiful. Neither in China nor Japan did I see women's attire comparable to that common to the Philippines. In point of daintiness and picturesqueness the Filipino costumes for women are unique. Woven from the fiber of the pineapple, these

native gowns, with their brilliant colorings, are most striking.

It is said that the Spanish gift to the Filipinos was cock-fighting, the American gift, baseball. But Americans introduced also prize-fighting, which has become exceedingly popular. The Filipinos are excellent boxers, game, and go "to a finish." They are great favorites in this sport in Hawaii. Unfortunately, and much to the humiliation of the Filipinos, California has passed a law prohibiting them from contending in boxing tournaments in that State. Baseball is played everywhere, even in the smallest barrios. Tennis and hand-ball also are popular. Rugby is not common, but "soccer" football is a game known throughout the Islands.

Filipinos of the upper classes generally are highly educated. They speak and read English, Spanish, and the native language. They are good conversationalists and natural orators. Their speakers for independence before the House and the Senate committees were commended in the Congressional cloak-rooms, not only for their logical arrangements of facts, but no less for their ease and fluency of statement. My impression of the Filipinos is that they are temperamental and sensitive. They are unwilling to be treated as inferiors because of their Oriental origin. In general, however, they are companionable, musical, fond of dancing, gifted with a keen sense of humor and a ready laugh to go with it. They are capable of anger, too, and at times of violent action.

On my return from Fort McKinley one evening, I found an American in his automobile, surrounded by a great crowd. He had apparently run into and damaged a horse and vehicle. We stopped our car. My companion was a real American, but had lived long in the Philippines. I approached the unlucky driver, asked him whether he was

hurt, and proposed that he leave his automobile and return with us to Manila in my car. My friend strenuously advised against this, and said that at the next barrio he would send back a member of the Constabulary to adjust matters and take care of our fellow-American. This he did. I asked him why he had so urgently objected to my offer. He explained that accidents of this kind greatly excited the natives and those we encountered might forcibly have detained the hapless driver if he had attempted to leave.

With the Oriental flair for games of chance and skill, the Filipinos are experts at cards, dominoes, Mah Jong, pool, and billiards. There is in Washington a group of newspaper men who don't like bridge and the controversies it provokes, and who have a high ambition to restore to its proper place in the esteem of Americans the distinctively American game of poker. Having heard of their proficiency with cards, I told them I stood ready to wager a dinner that, in equal division between National Press Club members and Filipinos, the latter would win the most chips. The matter was given thoughtful attention. The challenge was declined, however, because the Filipinos were classed as experts.

They are good workers. In Hawaii the sugar planters, having experimented with Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, Porto Ricans, and East Indians, have decided that the Filipino is preferable to all the others as a laborer on plantations and in sugar mills. They have come to be employed almost exclusively. The planters provide club houses and playgrounds, moving pictures, teachers and readers, and other means of entertainment and instruction for these Filipino laborers. After accumulating what is for them a considerable sum of money, they return to the Philippine Islands; but, as my Hawaiian informant told

me, they soon begin to long for the community entertainments the sugar people in Hawaii supplied, and return. The Hawaiians are nervous about the matter of Philippine independence. They fear that if independence is granted, the United States Exclusion Act or Immigration laws will be made to apply to Hawaii as an American Territory and cut off their most valuable labor supply. I can not believe the Congress would fail to give sympathetic consideration to Hawaii's necessities in this regard.

All observers agree that the place of the women in Filipino life is unique. Women keep the purse. The husband confides his money to his wife. She not only directs the household and the education of the children, but also has charge of expenditures and the savings account. Forbes says of the Filipino *mater familias*:

She is usually the business manager of the household, keeps the keys, does the providing, receives all cash earned by any member of the family, including the proceeds from the farm produce, and supervises the expenditure. It is she who makes the budget. A man who fails to turn in his receipts for his wife's direction somewhat injures his standing in the community. . . . The educated Filipino women throughout the lowlands are quiet, modest, unassuming, and carefully dressed. They have excellent manners, pleasant, quiet voices, and under most circumstances comport themselves with great self-possession.

In commerce, Filipino women are notably more numerous than men in retail trade, and also are important factors as local jobbers in agricultural produce and Philippine textiles as well as imported merchandise. In many instances women successfully manage substantial investments in agriculture, fisheries, and other industries. They compete with the men in the professions of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy, and are entering the practice of law. . . .

These are engaged in welfare work rather than po-

litical activities. There seems to be little popular demand for woman's suffrage, but many Filipino women hold important positions in government service, including such posts as assistant attorney in the Bureau of Justice, medical officer with the rank of senior surgeon in the Bureau of Health, and Municipal treasurer. . . .

By those who believe that the position of women is a fair index of a people's degree of civilization, the Filipino must be rated high, as the women of the Philippine Islands more than almost any other Oriental people hold a position of responsibility in the management of the home and even in the business of the husband. As has been mentioned earlier, the relationship of husband and wife is one of generous partnership.

David Doherty wrote as follows:

"The status of the Filipino woman is distinctly western. She is not the slave nor the toy of her husband, but she is his partner and helpmate."

Judge Charles B. Elliott, long a member of the Supreme Court of the Islands, describes the Filipinos' home life as follows:

Village life is gay and joyous. The people are good-natured and kindly, and welcome the stranger with hospitality which is sometimes oppressive. The *banquete* and the *baile* play a large part in their lives. They delight in music and dancing and every village has its gorgeously uniformed band, which turns out on the slightest provocation. . . .

Family affection is strong and relatives of remote degree find a home with the moderately prosperous. It is almost impossible to induce laborers to remain long away from their homes, and during railway construction times it was found necessary to build temporary villages where the laborers might be joined by their families.

Hospitality is a conspicuous characteristic of the Filipinos. They carry it almost to an extreme. In "Our Island Possessions," we find Worcester's statement:

The traveler cannot fail to be impressed by his open-handed and cheerful hospitality. He will go to any amount of trouble and no little expense in order to accommodate some perfect stranger who has not the slightest claims to him. If cleanliness be next to godliness, he certainly has much to recommend him. Every village has its bath, if there is any chance for one, and men, women, and children patronize it liberally.

Many miles up the river above Hagonoy, in a bamboo house, with a bamboo floor—a private home it was—the following meal was served to me: Fruit—bananas, mangoes, and three other fruits; soup; fish—white fish, shrimp, crabs, oysters; meats—whole roast pig, turkey, pigeon pie, lamb; vegetables—green corn, asparagus, peas, corn pudding; salad; white bread; rice; three native pickles; two native preserves; custard pudding; ice-cream; coffee, wine, and Scotch whisky.

The Filipinos are abstemious in the matter of liquors of a high alcoholic content; they seldom drink whisky. Their favorite beverage is a light Sauterne. Drunkenness is almost unknown among them. The Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act have not followed the flag to the Philippines. Indeed, the Islands seem to be the only spot over which our flag does fly where this amendment does not apply. Americans and the foreign contingent are the best patrons of the bars. When Americans are invited to a banquet, the Filipino host serves not one wine but a variety. At dinners at which I was the guest of Filipinos, I noticed the waiters taking out trays of glasses that were full. They had not been touched by the Filipino men and women. A high official told me that an American woman, a strict Prohibitionist, in conversation with him had urged that all sorts of liquors be eliminated at public functions and dinners. Asked why, she replied that it was setting a bad example to the Filipino. The official replied: "It is just

the other way; the Filipino is abstemious, practically a teetotaler," and he added that from her point of view the Filipino was setting a good example to the Americans.

I shall quote Judge Elliott again, as his service on the Supreme Bench gave him excellent opportunities for observation. The following is his picture of rural life:

The Filipinos are anxious to own land and much of the country is divided into small farms, but they are a gregarious people who dislike the isolation of a country life and prefer to live in the towns to which they return after the day's work on the farm. The result is that a country which is highly cultivated often looks unoccupied. Much of the work is done by laborers who sleep during the hot hours of the day. Highways which are deserted during the day are often crowded during the night by vehicles carrying produce to the market towns. . . .

Dr. Hart describes the people thus:

The Malay people are carefree and happy, . . . They are most kind to children and in spite of the fact that they have large families, the children are always well cared for within the limitation of their understanding, both the father and the mother, apparently, taking an equal personal and individual pride in all offspring and spending hours dandling and playing with them. It is most unusual to see children harshly treated by Filipinos, regardless of whether they belong to themselves or to others. They are quite kind and hospitable to strangers, not only of their own race but to Caucasians as well. . . .

THE MOHAMMEDAN MALAY: THE MORO

Only infrequently did the Spanish wage war against the Moros. The English gave them a drubbing and the Spanish did the like at long intervals. The Moros attacked defenseless towns, stole property and carried off the people, and sold them into slavery. They generally descended on

a village in small boats and, separating into two or more parties, returned to their stronghold by different routes. It is to the Spanish that the Moros owe any power they retained, for Spain disarmed the Christian Filipinos and left them defenseless, lest with arms they might turn upon the Spanish. This situation continued for over a century, till at last the use of steamships, with their speed and independence of wind, ended the pirate menace. The Moros' slow craft were easily overtaken and captured by the armed steamers.

The Spanish found a convenient and effective method of controlling these Moro freebooters. It was the payment of a yearly tribute to the Sultan of Sulu. It was hardly more or less than a bribe. It was either a question of keeping more soldiers and more ships in the Philippines or of paying the Sultan—an old pirate custom. It was quite natural, then, that he, having acquired the habit of receiving this gratuity, and finding it necessary for the support of his court and harem, negotiated with General Bates for its continuance by Americans. The Sultan had adroitly induced the British also to recognize him and liberally requite him as the head of the Mohammedan religion in Borneo. At present he receives an income from the British Government and another from the United States Government (paid out of the Philippine treasury); and recently was appointed a Senator by the Governor-General at a salary of \$4,200. This salary also is paid out of Filipino revenues. With these several allowances from three Governments he should be quite free from economic worries. To-day the Sultan has more power in Borneo, a foreign country, than he has in the Philippines. In fact his authority in the Philippines, outside of Jolo, is gone. Numerous minor sultans and many more dattos pay not the slightest attention to his wishes. They do not yield

him a tribute of any kind, as do the British and Americans, nor do they recognize his authority. In Jolo, where he resides, 85 per cent of the population is Mohammedan, but this is the single province where the Mohammedan has an overwhelming majority.

While General Leonard Wood was Governor of the Moro Province, he wrote to Governor-General Taft as follows:

The Sultan possesses little or no authority; his influence is not equal to that of any of the more prominent dattos. . . . He has not maintained the semblance of a government, nor could I find that he has observed, in good faith, the terms of the so-called Bates agreement. . . . The principal dattos of the island ridicule the idea that the Sultan is in any way their master, or that he has the power to compel them to do anything they do not want to do.

In Agusan Province, the Christians outnumber the Moros by 38,000; in Davao by 31,000; in Zamboanga by 70,000. The Mohammedans outnumber the Christians in Bukidnon by 25,432; in Cotabato by 166,232; in Lanao by 116,960; in Sulu by 229,632. Therefore, of the seven so-called Moro provinces the Moros have the majority in four and the Christians the majority in three. If, in the event of independence, the governors and other elective officials of these provinces were chosen by popular vote and on the basis of religion alone, the Moros would dominate four, and the Christian Filipinos three. This would give to the Moros all the autonomy and power to which their numbers entitle them. Another and different method of filling these offices might be applied, if an independent Philippine government were established. The power of appointment might be vested in the new President of the Republic, with the provision that he should select governors who represent the majority opinion.

There is no racial distinction between the Moro, so-called, and the Christian Filipino. The difference, as I have pointed out, is one of religion. Our Constitution and the Jones Act provide for religious freedom and the separation of church and state; so it is obviously embarrassing, to say the least, to try to introduce a religious distinction in official life. At present the Governor-General is empowered to appoint certain governors of provinces inhabited by the so-called non-Christian tribes. These provinces are Bukidnon, Cotabato, Lanao, the Mountain Province, and Sulu. All other governors are elected by the people. The Philippine Legislature has provided for the election of governors in all so-called non-Christian provinces, except those named above. Power is reserved to the Governor-General to appoint Senators and Representatives for these districts, but such representatives need not be residents of the districts.

Most of the troubles in the Moro country arise from differences between the Moros themselves, between minor sultans or dattos. They refuse to permit the Sultan of Sulu to settle or arbitrate their disputes. In 1915, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison appointed a pure-blooded Christian Filipino as the Governor of Lanao. He served for nine years. I have told of my meeting with this gentleman—Colonel Santos. Governor Carpenter, in one of his annual reports, said of him:

"The present Governor of Lanao, Captain Santos, a young Filipino Constabulary officer, is cool, intrepid, tactful, and vigilant. No better man could be found for that position."

Upon Captain Santos's retirement from the governorship in 1924, General Wood, in accepting his resignation, uttered this commendation:

"In view of your long and valuable service, nine years

as Governor of Lanao . . . and the constructive work that you have done in building up the civil government of the province, pushing forward the school work, and especially in the development of agriculture and lines of communication, I feel that your wish should be granted."

Colonel Santos had few official difficulties with the Moros during his term of office, notwithstanding they all knew him to be a Christian Filipino. Himself a Malay, he knew the right method of approach to these other Malays; he kept faith with them. He told me that one of his great troubles as Governor was that of procuring rights of way for new roads; and a still heavier task, that of establishing schools. The Moro endeavors to isolate his wives and daughters. They do not occupy in his life the same high place the Christian Filipino assigns to the women of his household. They feared the influence of the Christian Filipino teacher upon the intellectual development of the daughters; for example, their girls might acquire a new view of life, new ideas of home and family and another concept of woman's position and dignity in the modern world.

All the Christian Filipinos believe that it is best for them and for the Moro to have either a Christian or a Mohammedan Filipino appointed or elected as Governor. My own opinion is that it would be better for both groups if this were done. Moros visiting Manila see the advancement of the Christian Filipino in both wealth and political influence, and become well aware that they could not succeed in a test of arms with the Christian. They must know that the Philippine Constabulary would wipe them out in short order. The Moro understands also that he receives from the United States no money for roads or schools or internal developments. He can hardly fail to realize that his financial contributions to the Philippine

treasury are very small; that the improvements and benefits he enjoys are derived from taxes paid by the Christian Filipino. He has seen the Philippine Constabulary grow into a magnificent body, strong, active, courageous, good marksmen, well armed. Revolt against the Christian majority, if the Moros should attempt it, would be quickly crushed by the Constabulary.

Filipino laws prohibit citizens from bearing concealed weapons. They must obtain a permit to possess either a rifle or a shot-gun. The Moro, therefore, like the Christian Filipino, is disarmed. Moreover, the Moros are not united. They are without arms and have limited resources. They have not the money with which to purchase arms, and it baffles me to understand how any one could suppose that, even if they were united, fewer than a half million Mohammedan Filipinos could defeat or drive out 12,000,000 Christian Filipinos. It would be the other way about. In a conflict between Moros and Christians the latter, by reason of their numerical strength, their control of the Constabulary, and their power could easily suppress the former.

The so-called Moro question cannot be settled by Americans. The longer they continue to interfere, the harder the problem will become, and the greater the delay in solving it. Christian Filipinos charge that the question is kept alive and given publicity solely as an argument against independence. Mr. Forbes, Governor-General and afterwards a commissioner appointed by President Harding to make a special investigation of conditions in the Philippines, certainly understood this matter. He said:

It is an unfortunate fact that certain elements among the Americans have not hesitated to discredit Filipinos. Especially humiliating was the frequent charge that the Filipinos were not courageous as fighters and compared unfavorably with the Moros in this respect. The record of the Filipinos in the

ranks of the Scouts and Constabulary was good and did not justify this sort of comment. It is to be noted that some distinguished officers of the army and of the Constabulary who had had experience with hostile Filipinos during the insurrection and later with hostile Moros in Lanao and Sulu, expressed the conclusion that in organized warfare or guerrilla operations the Filipino is equal or superior to the Moro.

Army officers returning after an absence of a quarter of a century readily admit that the Moro has stood still; that he is not the fighter that he used to be; that he can easily be managed by the Constabulary; that he is disorganized, and without cohesive leadership. And the Moro, on his side, recognizes that the Christian Filipino who has been permitted to have arms during the last thirty years is better trained, better armed, better disciplined than he. People who understand the situation are not afraid of Moro insurrection.

Americans, by their interfering, advising, and directing, are responsible for a good deal of strife in the Islands. In the beginning of this book I spoke of two disagreeable episodes of my visit to the Philippines. One of these I chronicled. I come now to the other. When my party reached Lanao, my secretary was taking motion-pictures. A swaggering American approached him and said, "I wish you would take my picture." My secretary obligingly complied with his request. After it was done the American said, "I want you to show that picture to the Senator, and tell him that if we have independence, I'm going to start running guns to the Moros and we will drive all the Christian Filipinos out of the country."

Later I inquired who this man was. I shall not use his name, but his nickname was "Windy."

American interposition discourages and delays personal contact and comity between the two great religious

groups of the Philippines. There has never been any attempt by Christian Filipinos to interfere with the Mohammedan religion, or to proselyte among the Mohammedans. Wherever the effort at converting the Moros to Christianity has been undertaken, its inspiration and furtherance have been wholly American. The Christian Filipino knows that the Moro menace has been exploited in the United States and that a romantic fiction has been spread by propaganda, the purpose being to retard independence, to put an impediment in its way.

It is plain now, I think, that although the Moro does not contribute anything like a fair share of taxes, nor respond to progress or education as quickly as the Christian Filipino does, he nevertheless has thus far had and will hereafter have more than his equitable proportion of benefits derived from the common Philippine treasury. Judge Elliott, former Supreme Court Judge of the Islands, states:

Practically all the non-reliable and outlaw chiefs, who until about 1913 made necessary the presence of considerable bodies of American and native troops in the Moro province, have now been hunted down and disposed of, and the balance of the datus and sultans, with that fatalism characteristic of Islam, show a disposition to accept the new order and turn from war to agriculture and peace.

There is only one occasion upon which either an American or a Christian Filipino fears the Moro, and that is when he runs amuck. Dr. Hart describes this frenzy as follows:

. . . he binds himself tightly, "in order that the blood may not run freely and that he may last longer," takes an oath to die killing infidels, and armed with a kris, may attack a whole company of troops, or an entire regiment, in order to vindi-

cate his honor and to die fighting. This practice of running "Juramentado" is all too frequent among the Moros and has resulted in countless murders. For a time so much trouble was experienced, as a result of this practice at Jolo, that natives were made to deposit their weapons at the gate of the city wall before being allowed to enter.

The American soldier invented an effective if somewhat indefensible means of coping with these homicidal seizures. The Moro does not eat pork. To him the hog is unclean. So an enterprising officer devised the plan of burying a hog in the same grave with a dead Moro who had gone *juramentado*. It hampered his entrance into the Mohammedan heaven. This device was similar to that employed by the English in the Sepoy rebellion, that of blowing Mohammedans to pieces at the mouth of a cannon, so that he could not be buried, as his religion required he should be.

The practice of polygamy, the petty ruler's exercise of supreme power over life and death, the existence of slavery—all these were evils with which the American army and the subsequent civil administrations had to deal in the early years of our occupation. Forbes declares:

"There is no question but that the action of the American authorities in breaking up these practices brought about a disaffection and armed resistance with which the administration of the Mohammedan territory has been marked."

In the beginning the Moros gave very little trouble to our army of occupation. Only a few of them fought under Aguinaldo. The fighting between the Moros and the army came at a later period, and when the Filipino-American war had all but ended. It was the result of attempts to stop the slave trade and polygamy, and to introduce public schools and establish public order. It would seem

that when the Moro learns whether the American Government or the Filipino Government is going to control the Philippines he will accept the situation and adjust himself to it. But American interference, as I have said and reiterate, keeps the question open. It is one of the manifold uncertainties that complicate the Philippine problem.

Undoubtedly the Moro made his greatest progress in education and communications between 1914 and 1920, when Christian Filipinos were governors of some of his provinces. In 1914 there were 157 schools operating in the Moro country. In 1920 there were 606. In 1914 there were 311 teachers, and in 1920 there were 1,261. The improvement in roads, trails, telephone facilities, hospitals and sanitation proceeded in like or even greater proportion.

The present Sultan of Sulu, now a Senator by appointment, is the same man to whom General Bates agreed to pay an annual gratuity. He never opposed the United States in arms; he never surrendered an army. He had nothing to surrender. The so-called treaty with General Bates was abrogated by President Roosevelt on March 2, 1904. In 1915, Governor Carpenter entered into new negotiations for the support of the Sultan. The process and the results are thus described by Governor Harrison:

Governor Carpenter undertook to straighten out the tangle. On March 11, 1915, after eleven days and nights of negotiation, with which I was kept in touch by cable, he signed an agreement with the Sultan by which the latter, for himself and his heirs, renounced temporal sovereignty over the Sulu Islands, including the "right" to collect taxes, the right to decide lawsuits, and the reversionary right to all the lands. In exchange, he was recognized by the Government as head of the Mohammedan Church in the Philippines, his pension of Pesos 12,000 was continued for life, and he was

given a grant of land in Jolo. He was wise enough to accept the substance, however small, for the shadow, however great.

Governor-General Forbes describes the incident in this way:

The Sultan claimed that, prior to American occupation of the Islands, he and his predecessors had always exercised sovereign powers at least as to internal affairs, and that under the Bates Treaty the American authorities had recognized his government and authority to administer justice in cases arising between Moros. . . .

It therefore seemed of fundamental importance that all pretensions of the Sultan to temporal sovereignty be terminated. Negotiations to that end were entered into by Governor Carpenter, of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and a formal agreement reached March 22, 1915. In this agreement the Sultan specifically and without reservation recognized the sovereignty of the United States of America in the Sulu Archipelago and over the Sulu people wherever located within American territory with "all the attributes of sovereign government that are exercised elsewhere in American territory and dependencies."

It will be observed that the so-called Bates agreement was entered into without proper authority, was not approved by the Senate, and was subsequently revoked by President Roosevelt. Twelve years after the war was ended, the new agreement was entered into by Governor Carpenter.

An interesting and amusing discussion took place in connection with the abrogation of the treaty when the Sultan and his advisers were brought to Manila in July, 1904, for a determination as to his future status. On the second day of the conference between the Philippine Commission and the Sultan, and while awaiting instructions

from Washington, the incident to which I refer occurred. I quote from the official record of the proceedings:

The Sultan: We are half American and half Moro in our customs. The half that is Moro is that we have many wives and they all expect many presents when we get back to Jolo, and we have seen many things around Manila that we would like to buy for our wives, and for that reason we would like to get the money here. [He had reference to the payment of his subsidy, then several months overdue.]

The President (of the Commission): Tell them that this is a very common custom with the Americans, to buy presents for their wives. If a husband goes home without any present when he has been away, he has trouble.

The Sultan: If I go back without presents my wives will have very good reason to be angry with me. I depended for my income, on the revenues I derived from my people from the different sources which I have set forth in my letter, and now I depend upon my fathers, the American Government. . . .

The President: It has occurred to us that probably it might be just as well to make a small appropriation of 5,000 pesos for them, and let the Sultan or Major Scott divide it out, in order to enable them to make their purchases, and then we will get the other money for them besides, and [turning to Major Scott] the presents besides. We will pass a resolution now and you can talk the matter over with the Sultan and Hadji Butu as to how it shall be divided up among them. It is only for the Sultan and his suite.

Whereupon, the sum of five thousand pesos was immediately appropriated out of the treasury of the Philippine Government to be used for the purpose indicated.

Major Scott: The first thing they will ask me is whether this is an advance.

The President: No, it is a gift. It is simply an expression of our good will and is not intended as part payment of any-

thing that may be paid them hereafter. It will simply enable them to buy such presents for the ladies of their households as will keep them in good humor.

Hadji Butu: We are very thankful.

In America at this time probably the most popular of American light operas was delighting American audiences. "The Sultan of Sulu" (libretto by George Ade) told of our American schoolmarms, the soldiers, the plurality of wives, and made the United States laugh.

The Sultan is not taken seriously outside of Jolo. Speaking neither English nor Spanish, he will be unable to understand a word uttered by his colleagues in the Philippine Senate, to which he has recently been appointed by the Governor-General. The law requires, as a qualification for the position of Senator, that he shall have knowledge either of English or Spanish. How the Sultan escapes compliance with this provision has not been explained. I dined with him in Manila. He was interested in firearms, so I presented him with one of my revolvers. I asked which he preferred, the large or the small caliber, and his interpreter answered "the big one." I have since been informed that he has had some difficulty in getting a permit to retain it. After I gave him the revolver an American friend told me I had made a mistake, adding that he might shoot one of his wives. Another American present suggested that as he had a number of them he might spare just one.

Certain sentimentalists and opponents of independence exaggerate what they call our promise to the Moros. There never was any promise to the Moro people; it was a promise to the Sultan. The full burden of this pension has always been borne by the Philippine Treasury. For twenty years the Sultan had as prime minister former Senator Hadji Butu, a Moro, a linguist, and a man of very

unusual ability. He was recently reported in the American press as being opposed to independence. This was denied by him as soon as his attention was called to the statement. Speaking of the administration of a Filipino governor directing Moro affairs, he made the following statement before the Secretary of the Interior: "I can assure you that the people of Sulu are entirely satisfied with the actual state of affairs and always will be so if the government of Sulu should be entrusted to Filipino hands. Those of Sulu prefer that the governor of the province should be a Filipino, because if a Moro were nominated he might be partial in his administration. My people wish for and are in conformity with independence (of the Philippines), and when that is conceded, I can assure you that nothing will happen between the Moros and the Christians, not only now, while the majority of the Moro race is uncivilized, but also when the Moros shall have embraced civilization."

I visited Dansalan, in Lanao, the largest headquarters of the Moros in the Islands, excepting Jolo. I was met by the local sultans and dattos, bearing a petition asking for independence. They presented to me a large key with an inscription upon it in both English and the native language. A long parade of Moros and their wives and children greeted me with the greatest kindness and courtesy. They carried banners asking for independence, and left with me memorials signed by them and urging that I present their request to Congress. The leading sultan of that district, Sultan Sa Ragain, called upon me at my hotel in Manila and discussed this subject. He later followed it up at the conference of the head dattos and others at Camp Keithley. If there was any division among them as to independence, it was certainly not apparent in any of these conferences.

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Filipinos have acted as governors for long periods with little or no serious resentment or recalcitrance on the part of the Moros, but the policy pursued by American officials in alternating Filipinos and Americans leaves the Moro in doubt as to whether the United States or the Insular Government is the dominant power. He adjusts a problem or adopts a policy in perfect accord with the Filipino Governor. Then, in all probability, the American successor rejects or revises the arrangement. Naturally subservient to power, the Moro may for a brief period, and for his own purposes, yield to the superior force.

Senate President Quezon, who was a former Commissioner to the United States, and who is recognized as a leader by all classes in the Philippines, made this statement in 1925: "One is told that an independent Filipino government would solve the Moro problem by stamping out the Moros. We practically governed the Moros during the seven years of the last administration and had no trouble with them, whereas whenever they have been governed by Americans there has been continual trouble with them.

"We naturally understand every element of our population better than can foreigners. We never have been guilty of persecuting the non-Christian peoples of the Philippines. We have been fair and generous to them in respect of education, roads, sanitation and everything else. From this practice there would be no departure under independence. We believe in educating all our people and promoting their prosperity and happiness in order that we may have a great and contented nation."

Both Speaker Manuel Roxas of the House of Representatives, and Presiding Officer Senator Sergio Osmeña of the Senate assured me with emphasis that Filipinos could compose their religious divergences more readily without

than with American interposition. General Aguinaldo, in a letter he wrote to me on July 25, 1931, makes this statement: "The so-called Moro problem has never existed and does not exist. . . . I repeat that there is no such problem. It has been fabricated by the enemies of independence in order to discredit us in the eyes of the government and the people of the United States."

There are but two provinces known as Pagan provinces. One of these is the Mountain Province, which includes Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippines, the home of the Igorrote where Americans encourage war-dances by natives clad in gee-strings, and from which a visitor who perhaps has not seen other sections, may carry away the thought that many of the Filipinos are very primitive. The Pagans in the Mountain Province outnumber the Christians by 203,977. In the other Pagan province, Nueva Viscaya, the Christians outnumber the Pagans by 36,564. The Governor of the Mountain Province is appointed by the Governor-General, while the Governor of Nueva Viscaya is elected by the people.

One of the most hurtful episodes in Philippine life was the St. Louis Exposition, where the Igorrotes were exhibited in their native costumes, and widely advertised as dog-eaters. Their alleged brutality and savagery was heralded as a means of attracting the crowds. This exhibit was unfair to the great mass of Christian Filipinos. It left a wrong impression, and this still is retained by hundreds of thousands of our citizens who visited the fair. Subsequent attempts were made to give further exhibits of this kind in our country, but they were prevented first by private initiative and finally by legislative prohibition. Encouragement and advertisement of these old barbarous dances cause humiliation and indignation among the 12,000,000 Christian Filipinos. An attempt is

made at Baguio to persuade American visitors (especially if they happen to be Congressmen or Senators) that the Pagans in that district are hostile to independence. Quite the contrary is the case. The representatives of these districts, in both the House and the Senate, always vote for the independence resolution.

Let me relate an experience of mine: The automobile in which I arrived at Baguio from Manila became separated from the other cars on the way to the Baguio Country Club. We could not find our way. A young Igorrote, well dressed, and speaking excellent English, left his own car, got into mine and told us he would direct us to the Club. He was born in the province, and I asked him what the people there thought of independence. They were all for it, he said. Looking back, I found about twelve cars had formed in line and were following us, all filled with natives of the province. Upon our arrival at the club they left their cars and approached the entrance. I was invited into the club. The natives were left outside. A complaint appeared in one of the papers that this was done intentionally, that it was an attempt to separate our party from the Igorrote and destroy or prevent a contact. I do not believe this was true, because it could not have been planned in advance; but the Americans asked me to make the correction when I returned to Manila. This I very gladly did.

Feeling about this incident became rather acute. On the next day at eleven o'clock, a reception was held at the City Hall in Baguio. The room was filled with city and provincial officials, and leading Igorrote business men. They made numerous speeches, all declaring in favor of independence. They presented a petition for independence, signed by these officials. I assume that not one American visitor in five hundred ever comes in contact



One section of independence demonstration, Manila

with a group like this. At noon these officers, with their wives, gave us an elaborate luncheon. The entire group favored independence.

The Igorrotes, though Pagans, are of high intellectual capacity. They are sending their children to school and have the same eagerness for education and advancement that the Christian Filipinos have. In this respect they contrast sharply with the Moros. Personally, I hope the exhibit of the Igorrote as a pagan and a primitive will cease. To send these people to other lands to perform dances that they no longer practise, except for hire, and to describe them as head-hunters, which they have not been for many years, and to call them dog-eaters, when they are not, is unfair to the Philippine nation no less than to the Igorrotes.

As an instance of how a misunderstanding regarding the customs of a people may originate I cite my attempt, while I was in the Philippines, to relate an amusing occurrence. My anecdote caused consternation as well as laughter. It followed me everywhere, for the Filipinos have a keen sense of humor. Senator Osmeña and his charming wife gave a luncheon to Senator Patterson, Congressman Yon, and myself. Seated at my right at the table was a very delightful Filipino lady. I tried to be entertaining by relating the following story:

Eighteen Senators were dining with President Coolidge at one of his eight-o'clock New England breakfasts. The breakfast was excellent. Taking advantage of the absence of Senator Barkley of Kentucky, and turning to President Coolidge, I said:

"Mr. President, this New England breakfast is delicious. I wonder if you have ever heard of the famous Kentucky breakfast?"

"No, Senator," he replied.

"Mr. President," I said, "a Kentucky breakfast consists of a dog, a beefsteak, and a bottle of whisky."

There was silence.

Then I added, "Mr. President, you of course understand that the dog eats the beefsteak."

When I had finished the story the lady at my right looked at me with a horrified, startled expression, and exclaimed:

"Oh my, Senator! Some Igorrotes ate dogs many, many years ago, but they stopped that custom long since. It is horrible for me to think that you Americans eat dogs in the city of Kentucky!"

With the assistance of Vice-Governor Butte, who is exceedingly popular, and a linguist, I finally straightened this matter out for this charming lady, and I believe I convinced her that Americans never did eat dogs. The story went the rounds. Herbert Anderson, manager of the Manila Hotel, is a big, jovial Kentuckian; so of course, mischievous Filipinos made a show of inquiring of him if it were really true that Kentuckians ate dogs for breakfast. Notwithstanding his customary good nature he grew indignant as the story spread, and his annoyance was increased by more frequent inquiries. His irritation was all the greater because he supervises the kitchen of the Manila Hotel, and prepares the big banquets in the Capital city.

THE NEGRITOS

The Negritos, whom I mentioned in an earlier paragraph, are a numerically small tribe, the last of the aborigines, and are dwarfs. They live in the almost inaccessible depths of the forests. They do not engage in agriculture or manufacture, have no political organization, and apparently do not want any. They take no part in the govern-

ment, and are probably the only class of Filipinos who do not understand what independence means.

They are fast disappearing and will soon be an extinct race. The only appeal they have is to the tourist, or to the anthropologist interested in primitive races. They number only about 30,000.

CHAPTER III

THE ISLANDS, THEIR RESOURCES, THEIR DRAWBACKS

THERE has been little to compensate the United States, in an economic way, for the expenditure of men and money in taking the Philippines and for the vexations and embarrassments their occupation and government have cost us. Although the Islands are really a part of Asia, and therefore all Oriental, they are too far south of the principal trans-Pacific trade routes to serve as a base for trade with the Orient when time is an element and the unloading and the reloading of cargoes a tax. Their remoteness has had important consequences in the political status of their people. For one thing, the distance separating the Islands from the United States has been one of the explanations of the refusal of Americans to colonize them. Our Government has a two-year period for those who serve it in the Islands. Transportation costs for civilian and military functionaries every year are therefore a considerable item in our national expense. San Francisco and Manila are separated by 7,164 miles. The stretch from Los Angeles to Manila is 7,520 miles; and from Seattle, 6,923 miles. The distance from New York to Manila via the Panama Canal is 14,533 miles, and from New York via the Suez Canal is 13,288 miles. The trip through the Suez Canal is therefore 1,200 miles shorter than through the Panama Canal. The boys in the armies of England and the United States in 1917-18 sang:

"It's a long way to Tipperary,
It's a long way to go."

This matter of distance may have influenced the American representatives who signed the Four-Power Treaty in 1922 by which we agreed we would not further fortify either Guam or the Philippines, although control of all the surrounding ocean is mandated to Japan. Try sending a letter back home—or longingly expect one—if you are in the Philippines. It will be at least thirty days on the way! American newspapers and magazines, unless their contents include something of a general character in which time is no element have long since lost novelty and interest for readers in the United States by the time they reach Manila.

An American newspaper correspondent using the cable can send from the Islands any kind of account about any person or event, and it will be thirty days before Manila learns what he has written. Indeed, such reports, except those intended for publication in one of the larger papers, rarely arrive in Manila even within that period. Accordingly, if the "story" is incorrect or false, it is almost too dead upon arrival to justify an objector in making a reply or a denial. There is a special need for truth and accuracy on the part of Manila correspondents, for while Americans read these "stories" dealing with the Philippines and newspapers predicate editorials on them, people in the Philippines are helpless if an injustice has been done them. This situation puts, therefore, both a temptation and an opportunity in the way of the propagandists. I happen to have suffered from this sort of journalism.

If one starts to the Philippines from New York, and travels by rail to San Francisco, he will be five days on that fraction of the journey. From San Francisco to

Manila the voyage is one of almost a month's time. If one makes the trip by water, even with the short cut through the Panama Canal, twelve days more must be added. Of course, one adds or subtracts a few days, according to one's place of residence in the United States, and depending on whether a northern or a southern route is traversed. Allow, in addition to the duration of the trip, for only a week in the Philippines (most if not all to be spent in Manila), and more than two of the twelve months of the year are gone. In brief, one can reach London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Moscow, or Constantinople in much less than half the time required for the journey from any point in the United States to the Philippines, and can reach even Hongkong and Shanghai in China, or Kobe and Yokohama in Japan, in less time. Honolulu is only a week's voyage from San Francisco.

On our way out from San Francisco we lost a Sunday, but were promised we should be recompensed by obtaining an additional Sunday on the return trip. This elimination of Sunday created some confusion in church attendance and religious exercises. It happened, however, that on the return trip (on a different ship) we gained a Monday instead of an additional Sunday. The net result was obviously that we lost a holiday and added a workday! When it is seven o'clock at night on the Atlantic seacoast of the United States, it is eight o'clock in the morning of the following day in the Philippines. The Filipinos celebrate the Fourth of July twelve hours ahead of us!

Now, in the facts about the remoteness and inaccessibility of the Philippines, there is something besides romantic interest. These have a very practical importance because they explain the cost and the difficulties of commercial exchange between the United States and the Islands.

ISLANDS, RESOURCES AND DRAWBACKS 67

The Philippine Archipelago consists of 7,083 islands. These islands contain a total area of 114,000 square miles, or 73,216,124 acres. There are no large cities except Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo. Most of the inhabitants live in small towns and villages. The Philippines is larger in area than any one of eighteen countries in Europe, and larger than any one of ten in the Americas. If the Islands were independent they would be a country ranking thirtieth in size among the fifty-seven independent nations of the world. The Islands extend northwestwardly and southeastwardly for a thousand miles and have a coast line greater than that of the United States. The Philippines is primarily an agricultural country and its chief source of wealth is the production and exportation of agricultural commodities. Virtually every tropical product can be grown in the Islands. Vegetation is luxuriant throughout the year.

Of the total area of 73,000,000 acres, only about 9,000,000 acres, or 12 per cent of the total area, are cultivated lands on which are grown rice, hemp, coconuts, corn, tobacco, sugar-cane, coffee, rubber, and other crops indigenous to the tropics. The vegetative area of the Philippines is classified by the Bureau of Forestry as follows:

	Type of vegetation	Acres	Per cent of total area
1	Commercial Forest	39,302,162	53.7
2	Non-Commercial Forest	7,201,353	9.8
3	Cultivated Land	9,174,380	12.5
4	Grass and open Land	13,834,157	18.9
5	Mangrove Swamp	669,325	.9
6	Unexplored	3,034,747	4.2
Total		73,216,124	100.00

The Philippines is large in forest resources, and many of the Islands contain mineral deposits—of which, how-

ever, there has been no extensive development. These deposits include stores of minerals. The difficulties of their development include the dependence on water transportation and the distance between the coal and the minerals.

The Bureau of Agriculture estimates the principal varieties of live stock in the Islands for the year 1927 at 1,888,137 carabaos; 1,069,462 cattle; and 317,672 horses and mules. There are, in addition, large numbers of hogs, goats, and sheep. The carabao is an exceptionally useful animal. It draws the plow and the cart, supplies milk, and is finally used for food.

Rice is the important crop of the Philippines, and is a staple food of the people. Production at the present time barely meets the demand. Our Indian corn has been introduced and is finding great favor in some of the islands. It promises to become a valuable crop. Abaca, called Manila hemp, is superior to all other fibers for the manufacture of cordage and rope. Of this commodity the Philippines has virtually a monopoly.

Within the last twenty years the production of sugar has steadily increased. The possibilities in this line are enormous; only a beginning has been made. Methods now employed, with few exceptions, are not modern. Artificial irrigation has not been utilized on a large scale.

The coconut tree—one of the natural assets of the Islands—requires ten years to attain productivity. The copra produced from the coconut is a very important export. A high grade of copra yields 62 per cent of pure coconut oil. It is estimated that there are more than 60,000,00 bearing coconut trees in the Philippines. Coconut oil is used by the American manufacturers of soaps, and serves also as a substitute for butter and lard. American soap manufacturers are largely dependent on the Philippines for their supply of this oil.

Philippine tobacco differs in flavor from that to which our smokers are accustomed. The finest grades are mild and aromatic and win favor with those who try them.

The production of rubber on a large scale has not proved a success, because of the Congressional enactment prohibiting the sale to any one person or corporation of more than 2,500 acres of land. Some years ago American manufacturers, among whom was Harvey Firestone, made an extensive investigation of this subject, to determine whether America could produce its own rubber supply. The enterprise was subsequently abandoned. The production of rubber and the development of the mineral resources cannot be successfully accomplished until the uncertainty concerning the future of the Islands is removed. American capital will not invest while this uncertainty continues, and foreign capital is virtually excluded. The money called for by the opportunities and the necessities that exist cannot be obtained until a fixed and final status shall have been given to the Islands.

Earnest effort has been made to introduce various kinds of American vegetables, but the results have been disappointing. The gardens connected with the common schools are continuing the experimentation with our vegetables. Tropical fruits, such as bananas, pineapples, oranges, and lemons are successfully grown in large quantities.

Less than 7 per cent of the population of the Philippines is engaged in trade and transportation; 11 per cent in professional occupations and only 13 per cent in mechanics and manufacturing, 29 per cent in domestic and personal service, and fully 40 per cent in agricultural pursuits.

Railroads are found only on the Island of Luzon, the Island of Panay, and the Island of Cebu. Communication between the Islands and Manila, situated in Luzon, is at

present feasible only by water. Fast steamers may reach Mindanao in two or three days, but require longer periods for the trip to the big hemp centers. The means of transportation to and from many of the islands are inadequate. Some of them are touched only once a month by larger vessels.

Spain, although she occupied the Philippines for more than three centuries, was never able to colonize the country on a large scale. The greatest number of Spaniards (excluding the army) that inhabited the Philippines probably never exceeded 10,000, notwithstanding the fact that the acclimatization of the Spaniard, coming either from Spain or from Mexico, was much easier than the American. We find in an old English book published in 1598 that a famous Spanish sea-captain, Sebastian Biscaino, laments the mortality occasioned by the tropical climate in the Philippines. He wrote quaintly: "The country is very unwholesome for us Spaniards. For within these twenty years of 14,000 who have come to the Philippines, there are 13,000 of them dead, and not past 1,000 of them left alive." Though the southernmost of the islands lies within five degrees of the equator, the temperature is not very high, but the humidity is excessive, and the American visitor or resident must take constant precaution to safeguard his physical condition.

The coastal areas are moist and warm, and deleterious to the Occidental. In Manila the average mean temperature is 75° Fahrenheit; the maximum is about 85° Fahrenheit. The thermometer in Manila seldom registers the maximum figures attained in New York and some other American cities during warm spells, but our periods of abnormal heat are of short duration, and are sure, of course, to be followed by cooler weather. In those parts of the Philippines near the equator, the heat continues almost

unabated month after month. It is a hardship which the American cannot undergo. Some physicians hold that the sweat-glands of the Occidental do not function so freely as those of the Oriental; yet sunstroke, though frequent in America, is but little known in the Philippines. The day before we arrived in Manila several passengers, who had been in the Islands previously, put away their wrist-watches, explaining that they never used them there, because unable to stand the slightest compression of the pulse.

The seasons are but two—dry and rainy. The rainfall is very heavy, and averages annually about ninety inches. As I have already indicated, the tropical character of the climate will make it impossible for any large number of Americans—and those only the hardiest—to live continuously in the Islands. American women experience greater difficulty than American men. Children are affected most of all. On the other hand, the Filipinos seem to thrive in their climate. They are active, vigorous and, as a whole, healthy. Through many centuries of acclimatization, they have become accustomed to the sun, the temperature, and the environment. Their food supply, while not varied, is sufficient in quantity and low in cost. Their homes require no heating. The same weight of clothing can be worn throughout the year. Dress is largely a matter of personal comfort.

The decline of the American population in the Philippines and the paucity of new-comers, especially younger men and women from the United States, is undoubtedly due to two reasons. One of these causes is the uncertainty of the political situation, the other is the climate. Whatever the medical explanation may be, the fact is that the vitality of those accustomed to a temperate climate is sapped by long residence in the tropical Philippines, so

that for Americans a furlough at home is necessary every two or three years. Virtually all children of American parents living in the Islands are sent back to the United States for education—not because good schools are wanting in the Philippines, but because the health of the American boys and girls is surer here than there.

The effects of the climate on Americans were very early recognized by the Army, and the term of military service in the Islands was limited to three years. Quite recently, however, the War Department has reduced this to a two-year period. On the transport going out I had for fellow-passengers a large number of fine American soldiers. In addition to the daily setting-up exercises, they were encouraged to box, and the chaplain of the ship arranged for sparring matches two or three nights a week. Some of these were fast and vigorous. There were frequent knock-outs. I congratulated the chaplain and expressed the hope that he would have some good fights on the return trip, but he answered that this was unlikely. He could rarely arrange a contest during the voyage back, he said. I asked him why, and his explanation was that something in the climate of the Philippines took it out of the boys. On their homeward journey they could not be interested in boxing.

When I bade good-by to the doctor on the transport (an able, scientific man he was) I wished him a pleasant voyage home.

“Senator,” he said, “on the voyage out I have very little to do, but going back my hands are full with sick people. I am busy all the time, with no opportunity for diversion.”

Every one is advised, upon going to the Philippines, to exercise great care in the quantity and the kind of his eating and drinking. A period of rest, a siesta, each day after the noon meal is urgently recommended. Virtually

all shops close during the noon hour. Natives in the fields also rest from their work at that period. Even the carabao quits, and seeks his favorite mud-wallow.

There are few openings in the Philippines for an American artisan or mechanic. Manufacturing has not developed and probably will not develop to any great degree. There is no such thing as "mass production." It would be impossible, of course, for our people to work on the farms or in rice-paddies. The natives engaged in agriculture must wear hats almost as large in circumference as small umbrellas, and they toil stripped to the waist, with legs bare. So I cannot foresee large numbers of Americans engaged either in manufacture or agriculture.

Few young men from America are going to the Philippines, even as clerks. The present American business leaders there are nearly all gray-haired men. The early American clerks and assistants have gradually been replaced by Filipinos, because of the climate's effect upon the former, and as a consequence also of the smaller salaries and wages paid to the Filipinos for similar services. Some of the executives of the large American establishments in the Islands are from the States; all of the others are Filipinos. Not a few of the greater businesses are now entrusted entirely to Filipinos. The natives are everywhere replacing the American in business, in the professions, and as teachers in the colleges and schools. I asked one of the "old-timers," a very intelligent man who had been in the Islands for thirty years, why the young Americans were not coming out; why he did not employ them himself. With some vehemence he said he had tried it, but found the Americans would stay for a year or two and then return home for a vacation—from which they never came back to the Islands.

Entirely aside from climate, there is a difference be-

tween the Orient and the Occident, and their respective denizens. Even the placid, peaceful, patient carabao—friend of the family, beast of burden, and source of food, the means of transportation, and the sustenance of agriculture—seems to sense this distinction between East and West. He has an instinctive antipathy to the white man. One of our army generals related to me an experience of his in the early days while hunting with a companion for ducks, and using a shot-gun containing small shot. The men had a Filipino boy about ten years of age carrying their ducks for them. They moved ahead of him, and a carabao came charging out of a thicket. There was no place to hide and no tree to climb, and as the beast came toward them the hunters decided their only defense would be for each to shoot at its eyes and thus stop the charge. At this crisis the small boy came up and, realizing the situation, dropped his ducks and advanced toward the carabao, waving his hands. The animal stopped, turned, and ran away. Not afraid of two white men, it was intimidated by one Filipino child.

The domestic carabao can be controlled by a native boy five years old. We frequently saw tiny natives upon the backs of carabaos or leading them. But the animals will not submit to the direction of a white man. My secretary, upon one occasion, was taking a photograph, with a great many natives for spectators. A small boy came out of an adjacent field, riding one carabao and leading another. The second carabao started to charge my secretary. There was no reason for this, except that he is a white man.

The climate of the Philippines has had its effect upon domestic animals, too. The horses, though strong and agile, are diminutive. They were originally of Spanish or Chinese extraction, and unquestionably their ancestors were as big as European horses. Chickens, sheep, and goats

are much smaller than those indigenous either to Asia or to North America.

At one time, say the anthropologists, there was a blond race of men in the Orient, but they are now extinct, probably victims of the climate. During our stop at Honolulu I dined with the Governor of Hawaii, who was entertaining for the Japanese Prince Takamatsu and his bride. The Governor's delightful and novel entertainment was an original Kanaka dinner, served in coconut-shells and consisting of some thirteen different varieties of native foods. This was followed by a performance of twenty-four hula-hula dancers. Three of these were blonds—with yellow hair. I commented upon this fact to the Governor's wife, and was informed that the parents of these girls were natives of pure blood, without Caucasian or other Occidental strain.

We cannot understand the Filipino of to-day unless the high points of more than three hundred years of Spanish sovereignty are known to us. In addition to the Spanish, the Portuguese, the English, the Dutch, and the Chinese have all of them, at different periods, left imprints on the customs of the aboriginal inhabitants, but Spain's sway and influence were longest and are therefore most apparent. Oriental porcelains, silver- and gold-work, silks, spices, ornaments, and new varieties of fruits caught the attention of the greater nations of Europe five or six centuries ago, and excited the interest that prompted attempts to discover a shorter and safer route from Europe to the mysterious Orient. Having concluded her long wars with the Mohammedans, late in the fifteenth century, Spain began that brilliant career of exploration by which she came to acquire large sections of North America, all of Central America, nearly all of South America, and the Philippine Islands. Her possessions and trade were dis-

puted by the Portuguese, English, and Dutch. The battles, the adventures, the prowess of these early mariners are as romantic and dramatic as the poetry of Homer or Virgil.

Some mention of British achievements is necessary, too, because the British defeat of the Spanish in Manila and in other portions of the Islands greatly diminished Spain's prestige among the native Filipinos who had previously believed the Spaniards to be invincible. Never again were these people as docile as they had been before this proof of Spanish weakness. Sir Francis Drake, in 1577, appeared in the Pacific. Having successfully fought the Spanish in Panama, he crossed the Pacific Ocean and touched the coast of the Philippines at Mindanao, contending there with the fleets of both Spain and Portugal. His ship was the first after Magellan's to circumnavigate the globe.

Thomas Cavendish, another Englishman, followed Drake in 1587, rounded the coast of South America, destroying shipping and attacking the strongholds of the Spanish. Following the Pacific coast northward, he went as far as the Spanish possession which is now our State of California. He visited the Philippines and safely returned to England, sailing up the Thames with the masts of his ship hung with silks and damasks which had been taken from the Spanish. Rivalries and contests originating in the Pacific were nearly always finally settled by battles on European soil or in European waters.

Spain's naval battles with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English finally caused her to do most of her outfitting of both ships and men in Mexico. The long route from the Philippines to Spain was beset with many dangers, so Mexico gradually became not only the outfitting post but also the point from which many soldiers, of Mexican as well as Spanish origin, were transported to

serve in the wars with the Filipinos. At one period of Spain's occupancy of Mexico all of her outfitting was done there. With the loss of Mexico in 1820, when the people of that country achieved their independence, direct contact between the Philippines and Spain became more regular and continuous.

At the time of the conquest of the Philippines by Legaspi in 1570, the native inhabitants numbered about 500,000. There has been a very considerable increase of this population—amounting, indeed, to more than 1,000 per cent—despite many wars and other calamities. At the time of the American occupation the population had grown to 6,700,000. The Spaniard brought the cross with his sword, and no sooner had he landed than he undertook the work of Christianizing the Malays. Like the Puritan forefathers, as some one has humorously remarked, "they first fell upon their knees, then upon the aborigines." It was fortunate for the Spaniards, in the work of subjugation, that the Filipinos of that period were divided into a multitude of small communities each independent of the other. That dispersion and disunity were natural. Europeans and Americans have never provided transportation for all the seven thousand islands in the archipelago. The natives of four hundred years ago could hardly be expected to be both cohesive and coöperative.

By a repetition of the mistake in classification that was made in North America and South America, Magellan called the inhabitants of the Philippines "Indians," and that was always used in his description of the Filipinos. Those early navigators of the Pacific did not differentiate between the East Indian and the Malay. Magellan's successors found in the Philippines a people with a written language and a good deal of skill in manufacture. They produced cloth, pottery utensils, and implements of steel

and brass. They had carried on commerce with Borneo, Java, and parts of Asia long before the Spanish arrived. Chinese traders, decades before the appearance of Magellan, had introduced into the Islands firearms and gunpowder, and these were in use to a limited extent at the time of the Spanish conquest. It is significant that the first gun factory established by the Spaniards was under the direction of a Filipino.

The fruitful land was parceled out to the Spanish sovereigns, generals, and captains, and to the Church and its dignitaries, in accordance with the practice of the times. The Spaniard was fully satisfied to obtain a fair share of the agricultural products of the Islands, and, through trading at Manila, a share also of the rich products of China. The governmental policy of the first fifty years of the three centuries of Spanish rule was continued, with slight modification, during the remainder of their occupancy.

Between 1569 and 1898 there were 109 Spanish governors. Most of them served for periods of only two or three years. Some were generals, others admirals, and others ecclesiastics. Spanish failure in the government of the Philippines may be attributed largely to Spain's refusal to give to the natives any important part in the administration of local affairs. The best American administrators, since our occupancy of the Islands, have pursued an entirely different policy—giving to the native population, as rapidly as possible, a measure of control in all governmental affairs of the country. Every interruption or reversal of this policy of letting the natives coöperate with the United States for their political and social advancement, for ultimate self-government and self-reliance, has resulted in a setback. Taken as a whole, however, the American policy has been from the first exactly contrary to the Spanish policy.

In the several centuries of Spanish dominion there were some liberal governors who attempted to extend education into broader fields. Certain leading Churchmen fought valiantly for greater liberality and more education. There were spasmodic attempts to bring about a broader understanding and a closer coöperation between the rulers and the Filipino people. Spanish liberals at times wielded large power and their liberalism was reflected in Hispano-Filipino administration. But these periods of liberalism were brief and usually followed by a reactionary administration that destroyed the work of its liberal predecessor. Education, except for the higher classes, was in general neglected. Manufacturing was not encouraged. Commerce was carried on almost exclusively by Spaniards and Chinese. Vast areas of land had been withdrawn from use by the people and were owned by some of the religious orders. The history of Spanish occupation recites numerous controversies, plots, and counter-plots contrived by the Spanish generals, admirals, and ecclesiastics who governed for Spain. This continued controversy between the military governors and the Church was another factor in Spain's failure in the Philippines.

When Mexico won its independence in 1820, and Spain lost, one after another, all her other American possessions except Cuba and Porto Rico, her prestige declined to such an extent that Manila and the Philippines suffered severely. This deprivation of territory and power carried with it a ruinous decrease in Spain's Chinese trade, and the Philippine group yielded its former standing in the Far East. The Philippines was never a profitable investment for the Spanish. While Spain governed them the native Filipinos were largely withdrawn from contact with the outer world. Natives were not drilled in the use of firearms. They were not permitted to possess arms ex-

cept in emergencies. Not even sufficient arms were allowed them for defense against the raids of the Mohammedan pirates.

A slight change for the better came with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, thus reducing the time and enhancing the facilities of travel between Spain and the Islands. There resulted a measurable increase in the Spanish population. Now a steamer could make the trip from Barcelona to Manila in thirty days. Incidentally, with Europe no longer so far away in miles or days, the wealthier Filipinos were enabled to send their sons to Spain or France for a higher education. These young men saw the contrast between the democracy of government in Europe and the absolutism that reigned in the Philippines. They took back with them to their Islands the new ideas they acquired during their stay in European universities. One fruitage of those ideas was Aguinaldo's revolution in 1896.

Filipinos have an insatiable desire for more and better education. This fact is conceded by all observers. So, despite the burdens imposed by the Spanish administration, schools of a national character were established. The oldest was Santo Tomás University, founded in 1611, twenty-five years before the beginning of Harvard University in the United States. José Rizal, the national Filipino hero, belonged to the intellectual class of native Filipinos. He was a scientist, surgeon, novelist, and linguist; a man of great force of character. Time will not permit me to rehearse the story of his dramatic execution, but his death fired the national spirit of the Filipinos; it brought them together in greater unity than ever before under Spanish rule.

A powerful secret organization, called the *Katipunan*, came into existence in 1892. Its members were almost ex-

clusively younger Filipino patriots and students who had been studying abroad and the humbler class of Filipinos. The revolt against Spanish rule, inaugurated by the *Katipunan*, spread to all classes. A general movement for emancipation and freedom was planned for the year 1896. Cavite, the home of General Aguinaldo, became the center of the struggle. The Spanish army, at the beginning of the revolt, consisted of only about 1,500 troops, but, despite the exigencies of Spain in Cuba, that year, she multiplied her forces to 28,000. The insurrection was led by Aguinaldo, born in Cavite in March, 1869. He was and is a man of great force of character and fine organizing ability. At that time he was a member of the *Katipunan*, and among the first to take up arms. From the balcony of his present home in Kawit he issued a proclamation in Spanish, English, French, and Visayan, declaring that the Philippines resolved to be free and independent.

After severe fighting, great loss of life, and the destruction of property, an amnesty proclamation was issued by the Spanish authorities in July, 1897. Negotiations were carried on with General Aguinaldo. Promises of reform were given, and upon these conditions Aguinaldo, with some of his leaders and other compatriots, left his native land for Hongkong. Upon his departure, new revolts broke out. What would have been the final outcome of this new movement is conjectural, but the virility of the Filipino people was being demonstrated, and it appeared certain they would ultimately wrest independence from Spain.

Spain gave Christianity to the Philippines; we drove Spain from the Islands. Some of the opponents of independence contend that the Islands should be retained because they are "the spear-head of Christianity" in the Orient. They seem to believe that the creation of this

spear-head was an American achievement. It was due solely to the Spanish, as we have seen. My answer to this specious argument is that a free Christian State in the Far East would be an immeasurably better advertisement for Christianity among Orientals than a Christian satrapy could possibly be. Besides Christianity, the Spanish took to the Philippines a desire for better art, the opportunity to improve musical talents, and in some measure, also education. All the intellectual Filipinos speak Spanish. It seems likely to remain one of the popular languages in the Islands.

Just when we were driving the Spaniards from the Philippines we were driving them also from Cuba, to whose people we subsequently gave self-government. We expelled the Spanish from the Philippines but retained sovereignty for ourselves, although the prospect of Filipino victory in the fight for a republic was much more favorable than the prospect of Cuban success was. And we cannot but recall that the Filipinos proposed to establish in their Islands a republican form of government—the first of its kind in Asia. Be it remembered that the fight for Philippine independence began before a single Anglo-Saxon had set foot in North America. The Filipinos offered armed resistance to Spanish occupation in 1521, 1574, 1585, 1588, 1589; again in 1622, 1643, 1645, 1649, 1660, and 1661; in 1744 and 1762; and again in 1811, 1812, 1814, 1820, 1823, 1846, and 1872. In 1872 there was a vigorous revolt in Cavite in which a number of native priests joined. It was suppressed, and forty-one participants were condemned to death. Shortly afterward, eleven more were shot. A Masonic lodge was formed in the Philippines in 1856, its members all Spaniards. This was followed later by other lodges with Filipino membership, and in these

lodges, it was charged, was fostered the growing desire for independence.

Scattered over many islands, denied the use of firearms except in emergencies when Spanish necessity sometimes permitted and sometimes compelled their use, these struggles for emancipation cannot be ignored. Spain learned how great was the price of the conquest and control of the Filipinos. Just before our occupation, the Spanish forces had been driven from their strongholds in the interior of the principal islands and were concentrated in and near Manila. They were under siege; no longer masters. Every fact and circumstance of that beleaguering indicates that Admiral Dewey arrived just in time to allow the Spanish to surrender to us instead of the Filipinos.

CHAPTER IV

"MANILA AMERICANS" AND "PROPAGANDA"

It need scarcely be said that there are in Manila some charming and delightful Americans, pleasant companions, well-informed men and women who frankly admit not only that we have promised independence to the Filipinos but also that it was wise of us to do so—first, because it stimulated in the people a proper national aspiration; secondly, because it tended to make more agreeable our social and political contact with the inhabitants of the Islands; and, thirdly, because our refusal to bestow ultimate sovereignty would engender in the hearts of the Filipinos ill feeling and resentment toward us that would once more put the United States in the rôle of suppressor of a nation's fight for freedom. But in the 350,000 people of the capital, there is a group which has been jokingly called "Manila Americans." They are, in one of their aspects, somewhat amusing, but in their sum total they are prejudicial to the amity that ought to characterize the relations of the American people and the Filipinos. This Manila-American group is far from friendly to the Filipinos' cause. Indeed, its members provoke race antagonisms. They are all "die hards" in their resistance to Filipino independence.

The older United States officers of our Army who served in the Philippines in 1899—the generals, colonels, and majors—have nearly all passed away. Virtually all of them returned to the United States immediately after the

close of hostilities in that year. In fact, all the volunteers, a small number excepted, returned to their homes, to families, professions, and business. But for various reasons—whether because life in the Philippines was novel and adventurous or because the old town and the old surroundings in the States had lost their lure or because there was no prospect at home more tempting than a career in the Islands—however doubtful its destination—a good many of the officers and men of our Army remained in the Philippines. Of these, not a few survive to this day. It is largely from their ranks that the “Manila Americans” are recruited.

They return to the United States occasionally for change of air, on errands of business or for invigoration, but never for long periods. They have had, during all the thirty years of absence, no connection, contact, or acquaintance with American politics. They vote nowhere, and, like every one else in the Islands, read American papers thirty days old. In the meantime they catch glimpses of the world in the brief flashes of the cable. Some of these “Manila Americans” have acquired property, businesses; others represent American investors or manufacturers. They individually have no very great financial stake in the Philippines, but have constituted themselves, nevertheless, spokesmen for all Americans, and resent on the part of a visitor from the States any expression of opinion which has not been first censored by them. They have opposed any liberalism in the Philippine Government and have criticized every Governor-General or other official who has given additional power to the Philippine people or aided the replacement of Americans by Filipinos in public office.

Their object in life (I continue to speak of the “Manila Americans”), aside from that of earning a livelihood from

the patronage of the Filipinos they oppose, seems to be opposition to independence. They are free, almost reckless, with their views on that subject, especially when American sojourners are their auditors. They inspire the propaganda that tells Americans "the Filipinos are not ready"; "they do not understand Independence"; "the leaders do not want Independence." They will glibly unreel for you the names of Filipinos who are "opposed to independence"; will tell the time and place when avowals of opposition were made. But in every case in which I had an opportunity to check their statements, especially with prominent men, I found they were wrong; that they had either misunderstood or misinterpreted the leaders whom they quoted.

Formerly there were two American daily newspapers in Manila. Now there is but one. This journal is the Bible of the "Manila American." Whether he reads this paper because it publishes only what he wants, or whether the paper publishes only what he wants because he reads it, I don't venture to say. I only know, from observation and experience, that paper and patron understand each other thoroughly and are correspondingly congenial. The circulation of this paper is about 6,000. The total American population in the Philippines is estimated at 7,000 in a total of 13,000,000. So its circulation does not quite equal the number of American residents. This publication's effectiveness against the Filipino is among Americans who appear in the Islands for a week's visit, or the like, and as the source of propaganda cabled to the United States as news and made—often in good faith—the basis of editorials in our papers here. It is an evil that long has been recognized by those familiar with the problems of the Philippines.

William H. Taft, when he was Governor-General, com-

plained of his treatment by the "Manila Americans" and their journalistic organs. In "The Outlook" for May 31, 1902, he thus paid his respects to them:

There are in the City of Manila American papers owned and edited by Americans who have the bitterest feeling toward the Filipinos, and entertain the view that legislation for the benefit of the Filipinos, or appointment to office of Filipinos, is evidence of a lack of loyalty to the Americans who have come to settle in the Islands. Accordingly, they write the most scurrilous articles impeaching the honesty of Filipino officials, the Filipino Judges, and the whole Filipino people, as a basis for attacking the policy of the Commission.

In 1903, Mr. Leupp discussed the situation. His statements are still applicable:

These men are the loudest and most bitter in their criticisms of the conduct of affairs. They disapprove most vigorously the friendly attitude of our government towards the natives, and denounce the policy of benevolent assimilation as preposterous and visionary. . . . They object to the appointment of so many Filipinos to office and instead of cultivating the good will of the native people and creating a demand for American goods, they spend their time and energy finding fault and making gloomy predictions.

The people here described have sent emissaries to Washington to convince the authorities that things are all wrong in the Philippines, that the iron hand of white supremacy should replace the Taft policy of "the Philippines for the Filipinos." What they call a Chamber of Commerce in Manila is really an organization for bringing about conditions more favorable to the exploitation of the islands, without reference to the welfare of the natives. . . . The relations between the "American element" there and the Filipinos are most seriously strained; the newspapers which cater to it never say a word for the Filipinos, nor, for that matter, the civil government.

A speech in the American jingoistic strain—the sort of speech that discredits the United States and gives new merit to the cause of independence—I reproduce, in part, in the following paragraph:

“They [the Filipinos] did not realize that we, who are here tonight, are the Government, and that that Government could not have been here without us, and cannot stay here without us. . . . I believe in peace and harmony. I always did, and when I had a battalion of volunteers behind me I felt awful peaceful. . . . I believe that if we could put about one hundred thousand American troops here it would be very peaceful [laughter], exceedingly so, and you would not see any more *Katipunan* [Filipino] banners eight or ten feet long, with their designs emblazoned in silk, going along the streets with a little six-cent American flag carried underneath it. It would be too peaceful for that.”

Resolutions of a sort that breeds mischief have not infrequently been passed by the “Manila Americans.” Here is one of them:

(1) No unconditional promise of independence has ever been made [to the Filipinos], even in the preamble to the Jones Bill. (2) We are here by right, we are here by conquest and we have a title by conquest and a title by purchase. (3) We are here as possessors and we are here as sovereigns; we are here as owners and controllers of absolute sovereignty.

Charles Edward Russell, in his book “The Outlook for the Philippines,” portrays the methods and the successes of this clique. He cites an instance—of 1920:

There had come to the Islands an excursion troop of Members of Congress and their wives, bound on what is usually called a junketing trip. It was of a voluntary and personal character and had no official significance; but in Manila are

published several American newspapers and these thought the occasion good to convince the visiting statesmen of the inferiority of the Filipino. They published, accordingly, for the congressional edification, much sarcasm and some abuse at the native expense. They had done this before with impunity; doubtless they assumed they could continue to do it. Except the editorial executives, all the employees on these journals were Filipinos, and of a sudden the executives found themselves alone in the buildings. Compositors, pressmen, stereotypers, mailers, sweepers, clerks, reporters, stenographers—the entire staff except the executives—walked out and left behind them a situation new in the history of Manila. None of the journals could be published; not a printer, pressman, or stereotyper could be had on any terms.

After this had lasted a few days, an important commercial body of Manila was brought in as peacemaker. "What do you want?" said the president to the strikers. "We are tired of reading abuse of our country and our countrymen," they said, "and we are going to stop it." Prophecy has seldom had surer fulfillment. The newspaper proprietors were compelled to make solemn undertakings that the offense should not be repeated. The strikers demanded that the writers of the insulting articles should be dismissed. This was finally adjusted upon a promise that they should not be allowed to write for the journals, and the storm passed.

Because of his part in extending Philippine autonomy, Governor-General Harrison became the particular target for the "Manila American" and the two American newspapers of his day. In his book "The Corner-stone of Philippine Independence" he deals at length with the evils of this anti-Filipino cabal, but I quote him briefly:

To appease home sentiment stories of native cruelty or inefficiency are glaringly circulated. Kipling owes his sudden fame and popularity largely to his having coined a phrase which brought unction to their souls. "The White Man's Burden"

is to-day their formula. The native inhabitants, however, generally believe that the "White Man's Burden" is the "burden of his cash." . . . It was fashionable among Americans to explain that the demand for independence came only from a few agitators or hotheads or demagogues working for their own advantage. Those who are familiar with any struggle for human rights, the world over, will recognize the terms. . . . "Old Manila residents" spread the bad tidings to all the quarters of the wind. An active lobby was maintained in the Manila Hotel which seized on each traveler upon his arrival and filled him full of race prejudice and gloom; strangers were told that the Democratic administration was turning over the islands to a mob of irresponsible, dishonest Filipino politicians who were headed toward chaos and disorder. . . . On Christmas Eve the "insurrection" occurred and consisted of a gathering, at the Botanical Gardens in Manila, of several dozen ignorant men, without arms, mostly of the cook and coachman class, who were arrested by the city police. This disturbance was heralded in the United States press as an insurrection, and was evidently expected to have an adverse influence upon the passage of the Jones Law then under consideration in Washington. . . . Around the American supper-table, the matter went much farther: Every possible story, real or fabricated, which stirred up hatred of or heaped ridicule upon the Filipino people was told there with gusto, and all were probably carried forth and repeated by the patient-looking and apparently uncomprehending Filipino muchachos (servants) who waited upon table. . . . The prestige of the white man must be maintained at any and all hazards. The Asiatic must not be recognized socially, he must not be admitted to any clubs or friendships of equality; he must be humble in address and cringe before his master; in fine, he must be kept in his place. Thus were some of the most ancient civilizations of the world held up to hatred, contempt, and ridicule. We cannot wonder that resentment has burnt into the soul of the Asiatic. . . .

Judge Elliott, whom I have already introduced, I bring forward again. He speaks thus of the "Manila American":

The trouble was that the local community always refused to take seriously the statement that the Americans are in the Islands for the benefit of the Filipinos and for the purpose of training them to govern themselves. To the American who had gone into business in Manila it seemed inconceivable that the United States "would ever be so foolish as to withdraw from the islands." The persistent demand for the declaration of a definite policy meant that Congress should declare that the United States does not intend to withdraw from the islands or that independence is not a question for the consideration of the present generation—the exact reverse of the policy which in 1916 was expressed by Congress in the preamble to the Jones Bill. . . .

In 1911 a Filipino provincial governor who had killed a prisoner confined in the provincial jail was convicted of the offense. Pending an appeal he jumped his bail and induced his friends in a small village in the foothills to aid him in robbing a provincial treasurer, and then, following the good old ladrone custom, escaped to the mountains. He was soon captured by a detachment of the constabulary and was ultimately hanged for the murder. The newspapers in the United States, in glaring head-lines, described the incident as a serious uprising on the part of the Filipinos.

Governor Taft in a speech in Manila in December, 1903, said:

There are many Americans in these islands, possibly a majority, and this includes all the American press, who are strongly opposed to the doctrine of "The Philippines for the Filipinos." They have no patience with the policy of attraction, no patience with attempts to conciliate the Filipino people, no patience with the introduction into the government as rapidly as their fitness justifies of the prominent Filipinos. They resent everything in the government that is not American. They in-

sist that there is a necessity for a firm government here rather than a popular one and that the welfare of Americans and American trade should be regarded as paramount."

In the next several paragraphs I will report what others have had to say on this subject.

Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, in "The Rise of American Civilization":

For American consumption it was then reported that only a few politicians and agitators desired independence, that the withdrawal of American power would leave millions of helpless wards to the tender mercies of local satraps.

Hermann Hagedorn, in his biography of Leonard Wood:

Wood's determination to coöperate with the "politicos" in making efficient the form of government they had established rather than sweeping it aside and beginning afresh, relieved the tension among the Filipinos but brought snorts of indignation from the Americans in Manila. The majority had no sympathy with the desire of the Filipinos for autonomy and independence. Democratic self-government, they said, was an Anglo-Saxon ideal which even Anglo-Saxons with difficulty translated into reality. . . .

Henry Parker Willis, in "Our Philippine Problem":

A strong race feeling has been developed, and there has been a marked tendency to look upon the Filipinos as an inferior race and to treat them as such. . . . This state of feeling is fostered by violent expressions of the American Manila press and by the lower class of Americans throughout the islands. . . . The condition of the Philippine press (printed in English) is naturally unsatisfactory. The large decrease in the number of Americans in the Philippines has naturally diminished the possible circulation of these local papers, which are little read by natives, and must therefore depend upon foreign patronage for subscription support. With an American

population of less than 5,000 civilians, and a much smaller number of other English-speaking inhabitants, the newspapers are almost obliged to pursue one of two courses; they must either cater to army feelings and prejudice in order to gain circulation among the body of troops stationed near Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, or else fall back upon official support in the shape of advertising or other subventions of one sort or another.

Nicholas Roosevelt, though not overly friendly to Philippine independence—he leaned rather to the side of a new colonial policy—has recorded in his book “The Philippines: a Treasure and a Problem” some interesting remarks about those who assume to represent the American attitude toward the Filipino and his outlook:

Many are former soldiers who became enamored of the Islands while serving there. Unfortunately some of our representatives are not endowed with overmuch tact or tolerance, and consequently have irritated the Filipinos almost as much as the Filipino politicians have annoyed the Americans. The outspoken and sometimes intemperate scorn of some of the American business men and editors for the Filipinos has fanned latent race hatred and aroused a sullen, bitter resentment against all Americans. The existence of racial barriers in the American clubs has also created ill feeling, especially among those Filipinos who have been educated in America and have there been hospitably received by all classes. As a rule no Filipino is admitted even as a guest.

Ralston Hayden, who has rewritten Worcester (“The Philippines Past and Present”), refers to attacks made by these organs and oracles even upon Secretary Stimson when he was Governor-General, because he was conciliatory. They decried him because he did not draw the “color line,” and because he recognized Filipino ability and included Filipinos with Americans in our Government.

Perhaps I have given too much space to the opinions of others, but I wish to show that my experiences with this clique were not singular. As I am the joint author of a bill for Philippine independence, I could hardly fail to be objectionable—even odious—to the “Manila Americans” and their mouthpiece. Within thirty hours after I landed from the steamer I was assailed by the American newspaper because I had visited a Filipino club whose members are graduates of American universities. From that time on, throughout my stay, I was the object of attack from the lone American daily; and, returning to the United States, I was amazed to find, under glaring head-lines, what purported to be an account of Filipino assaults on Americans as a consequence of my presence in the islands; false reports that I had paraded in native costume; and insinuations that I had all but incited riot and insurrection.

At first these falsehoods distressed me. But I remembered that I had refused to be hectorred by the American daily or the “Manila Americans,” and could not, therefore, in the light of the past, expect fair play from the paper or its supporters. But the practice is one which maximizes the difficulties of all who are seeking an equitable, workable, enduring adjustment of our relations and responsibilities toward these 13,000,000 fellow-men. As an illustration of the method by which public opinion in the United States is poisoned by the propagandists in Manila, I return to the incident at the Army and Navy Club on the occasion of the public demonstration that was part of the notice given to my visit. Some of the crowd, it will be remembered, either were thrust or trespassed on the grounds of the club, and an encounter between employees of the institution and the trespassers followed. It gave the

propagandists an opportunity to strike a blow—a foul blow—at independence and me.

There was not much likelihood that a distortion of the facts would deceive the people of Manila, because there must have been at least hundreds who witnessed the fracas and these knew its insignificance. Accordingly, the "Manila Bulletin" (July 13, 1931) published the following as paragraphs three and seven of its report of the big demonstration:

The day's festivities were marked by an unexpected incident at the Army and Navy Club. A crowd of independence enthusiasts swarmed over the premises, and when angered at attempts to get them off the club grounds, they stoned bathers in the swimming pool, bruised several civilians and army officers.

Witnesses said that there is little likelihood that the attack was premeditated. Excitement caused by the parade was credited with responsibility for the fracas. Witnesses said that most of those who did the stone throwing were youths. No arrests were made.

This American paper in Manila said editorially the next day:

"The Bulletin" believes, and clearly stated on Monday morning, that the incident was not a calculated event but a product of the excitement of the moment and an act of irresponsibility which should be regarded as such. It was far from representing the spirit of the independence parade.

Now let us see what the newspapers in the United States and their readers got from almost the same source from which came the paragraphs I have just presented. Many papers in this country received and published the following:

Manila, July 12—What was planned as a huge parade for the benefit of Senator Harry B. Hawes turned into the greatest political demonstration in the history of the Philippine Islands today, while an anti-American manifestation resulted in two Americans being injured and at least a dozen others receiving slight hurts.

This occurred on the premises of the Army and Navy Club where a mob of 200 swarmed over the lawns and invaded porches. The demonstrators grew ugly when ordered off by private police and invaded an outdoor swimming pool, stoning army officers, their wives and children.

One great American daily, whose intelligence and good taste ought to have safeguarded its readers, reproduced the foregoing despatch under this heading: "Americans Stoned as Filipinos Stage Parade for Hawes." I am very sorry to have been the occasion for this paper's egregious departure from its traditions. Noblesse oblige!

A number of Senators and Congressmen (one of whom is now a Supreme Court Judge of his State) had warned me before I went to the Philippines that I was likely to be derided and denounced by this group, but I discounted their statements. There are three serious evils that flow from this misrepresentation and downright mendacity: First, it suppresses or distorts facts which ought to be known to the American people; secondly, it seeks to prevent or discredit fair inquiries into problems in the islands; thirdly, it foment and inflames racial animosities. This can only eventuate in the aggravation of our present difficulties in the Philippines and in loss to American investors and traders there. American manufacturers who sell some of their products in the Islands are concerned primarily with finding and keeping these customers. They must rely for such good-will and patronage on their representatives in Manila. If the advice they receive is erroneous and they

act upon it, the outcome may be costly. It is my view, therefore, that American manufacturers and exporters having markets in the Philippines should not associate themselves with provocative propaganda of the sort I have described in preceding pages.

Many Americans of high intelligence and broad culture are not conversant with the systematic disparagement of the Filipinos and of independence for which these coteries in Manila are responsible. The editors of some of our great American newspapers are unaware of this condition. They rely, as they have a right to rely, on their correspondents in the Philippines for the statements they publish regarding the Islands and their people. If their correspondents are without correct information or color it with their prejudices, not only a few editors, but—and this is immensely worse—many thousands of readers will be misled.

“Manila Americans” are unconsciously doing more than any other group to bring independence. Leading the fight against it by their disregard or open contempt for the Filipino’s pride of race and by their covert attacks on his character and capacity, they are promoting solidarity among the natives and advertising, by their hostile activities, the very cause they so stubbornly and unfairly oppose. Their purpose and their policies are becoming pretty well known, and very distasteful, to real Americans. This combination of a stronger sentiment in the Philippines and a greater sympathy in the United States will make independence inevitable.

In a way the “Manila Americans” are dear old boys. Their sense of importance and responsibility as the mentors of Uncle Sam is amazing, and therefore also amusing. They have come to believe, I am sure, that they symbolize the might and majesty of the United States. Some of them

have founded themselves on the best English colonial models—those of India as portrayed by Kipling. They have three or four servants in Manila; “back home” they would have had probably one, if any. In Manila they wear white shoes, white trousers, white socks. They have cultivated “strutting” till it has arrived at the dignity of a fine art. In the little village “back home” in the States, the little home of yesteryear would have allowed them no room for “struts,” and their coming and going would have attracted no attention. But in Manila, with great ostentation, they carry “the White Man’s Burden.” Back home they would have nobody’s burdens to carry but their own; and, incidentally, nobody in the old town would care very much what they said or what they did. So their strutting and their depictions of “white man’s supremacy” have graduated them into a ridiculous American aristocracy impossible to produce or to perpetuate in the air of the United States. The strutting of these folk, if they like it, would be unimportant if it did no more and no worse than give them satisfaction. Unfortunately, it irritates the Filipino intellectual, who knows more of early American history and of American tradition than these “new American aristocrats” in Manila. It would be very salutary if the “Manila American” were to study the early history of his own country. His attendance at the lectures on this subject in the universities of Manila might enlighten him and thus silence him. He would find at the university that instruction in our history is imparted in such a way that its sacrifice and heroisms and glories have put emulation of these in the hearts of Filipino youth.

Let these American imitators and champions of English satraps in India recall how few were the people of the North American Colonies of Great Britain when we wrested our independence from her, and consider how

large is the population of the Philippine Islands now; let them remember, too, that we were a part of the British kingdom, spoke its language, read its books—yes, of the same flesh and blood as those who governed us. Then let them keep in mind that the Filipinos are a race alien to us: Malays, Orientals, Asiatics with no history, tradition, or experience in common with us. If we could not brook dominion by our own kin, how can we expect the Filipino to accept and enjoy government at the hands of people so utterly foreign to him in ancestry, color, language, culture, and mentality?

Some nine or ten daily and weekly newspapers are published in Manila. The only American newspaper, to which I have several times referred, is owned by an American who resides in Los Angeles. It is patronized very largely by American firms and the American community in Manila. Though this paper has always opposed Philippine independence, it has recently begun to moderate its intolerant manner. On its staff are some very intelligent, capable Americans. Several of these represent American news syndicates and American newspapers. They probably experience difficulty in reconciling the news they publish in the Philippines for the consumption of the 6,000 Americans there and the articles they send to 120,000,000 Americans in the United States. One can well understand how much versatility they must possess if they are to present, on the same day, two independent—and incompatible—versions of a given statement, condition or event; one for the 6,000 "Manila Americans" and one for the people of this country. I think I have shown that they don't succeed.

"The Philippines Herald" was purchased by a group of leading Filipino business men in 1920 and 1921, shortly after the Filipino employees of its former owners had

gone on strike against the publication of opprobrious articles concerning the Filipino people. The three newspapers, "The Tribune," "La Vanguardia," and "Taliba," called the T. V. T., are published in English, Spanish, and Tagalog, respectively, and jointly have the widest circulation in the Islands. They are owned by the Roces family, citizens of the Philippines but of Spanish descent. The managing editor of these papers is Carlos P. Romulo, a brilliant American-trained journalist, who was at one time secretary to or representative of Senate President Quezon.

"La Opinion," published in Spanish, is controlled by Don Ramon Fernandez, a prominent business man in the Islands. Mr. Fernandez and his brother José control the "Compañia Maritima," which is the largest company operating a fleet of inter-island steamers in Philippine waters. "La Opinion" is a strong supporter of independence. "El Debate" is an independent Filipino newspaper not controlled by any individual or political faction. It is published in Spanish, and is never afraid to criticize or ridicule any one in the Islands when it believes it is justified in so doing. It, too, is for Philippine independence.

"Philippines Free Press" is a weekly magazine with a very extensive circulation all over the Islands. One of its editors, Theodore Rogers, is a very likable person, indeed; exceedingly popular, cosmopolitan, and well informed. While this weekly is of American ownership, it does not offend the Filipino people, and gives interesting chronicles of events as they transpire. It has an unusually large circulation.

"Graphic" is a weekly periodical, born about five years ago. It is owned by Ramon Roces, eldest son of Don Alejandro Roces, head of the T. V. T. publications. Mr. Ramon Roces has been very successful in publishing the

"Graphic" (in English), and the "Liwayway" (in Tagalog). These publications are friendly to independence.

Another weekly publication is the "American Chamber of Commerce Journal," edited largely by that old Nestor of newspaper men, that historian and charming companion, Walter Robb. It tries to be fair, but the aims of the Chamber (a relatively small organization) are naturally inconsistent with independence.

"The Philippine Magazine" is published by the Philippine Education Company, one of the large retailers of books and school supplies in the Philippines. The magazine is owned and edited by Americans. Its object is the culture of the Filipinos. This it offers with discretion and good taste; but, like the other American publications, is covertly antagonistic to Philippine independence.

BAGUIO

Dean C. Worcester describes in "The Philippines, Past and Present" an accidental meeting with some Spaniards who, on a fishing trip, described a spot on the Island of Luzon where pine-trees grew at an altitude of some 5,000 feet. He decided to visit the place. At that time, it was accessible from the north on an old road, but the direct, easy route from Manila was not yet established. This was the genesis of Baguio. Much of the \$3,000,000 appropriated by Congress for rehabilitation and emergency assistance of the Filipino people was devoted to the construction of a road from Manila to this obscure retreat. This is the only American money that has been spent upon it. The rest, amounting to about \$11,000,000, came from the Philippine Treasury.

Baguio is like Hot Springs, Virginia, Hot Springs,

Arkansas, and certain places in the White Mountains of New England. Similar spots are to be found in nearly every one of our forty-eight States, but apparently this is the only place of its kind in all the Philippines. It has no importance as far as population or industries are concerned. It is twenty-five miles from a railroad, and one hundred and sixty miles by automobile from Manila. It is no place for a poor person, but those who have the means to go there or the good fortune to be sent there for recuperation—American soldiers and others—know it as a delightful resort. Some one once said Baguio reminded him of “a baited duck blind” with live decoy ducks set out for the purpose of luring wild ducks so they might be brought in and shot at (or converted). An American Congressman or Senator, having but five or six days to spend in the Philippines and eager to inform himself of conditions there, if he yields to the invitation to spend half of the time in Baguio, has been decoyed.

After leaving the environs of Manila the average Congressional sojourner reaches Baguio, in the Pagan country. Although there are only 400,000 Pagans and 12,000,000 Christian Filipinos, half of the visitor's time is spent in a city in the Pagan Province, inhabited by Pagans, listening to Manila-American propaganda. I know of at least one American representative whose convictions with respect to Philippine independence underwent complete reversal in the course of the two or three days he passed at Baguio. Of course he had an opportunity to hear but one side of the case there—the bureaucratic Manila-American side. More than half of his stay in the Philippines was in Baguio. Tired after a three weeks' trip at sea, promised the coolness of a high altitude and beautiful surroundings and a rest, a man who could resist such an invi-

tation is hardly human, especially if it is broadly hinted that his health requires it. The Filipinos bear the expense of supporting the summer capital, but they seldom enjoy it. Nor does the Filipino need it. What for him might be an interesting side trip is, to an extent, a necessity for an American who does not return regularly to America for air and refreshment.

Camp John Hay at Baguio was established and is operated by the War Department for the benefit of the United States Government employees and their families, where they may recoup vigor lost in the lowlands. Here, big dormitories are provided where one may stay at a nominal cost.

The building of the road to Baguio was undertaken with the purpose of giving employment to natives during a period of depression. Instead of being expended upon improvements in the several provinces, where also there was serious unemployment, the funds in hand were, virtually all of them, devoted to this single enterprise. Willis, in "Our Philippine Problem," has this to say of it:

It is certainly odd that the Commission should practically have limited its roadmaking work after the first day of its legislative existence to the construction of a highway intended to connect Manila with a mountain resort intended for use as a summer capital for the Commission. This, however, is what has been done. . . . Thus, all road construction was practically limited to getting access to a mountain resort where a "sanitarium" used as a summer hotel by the Commission and a few of the higher officers of the Government, had been erected. In the process of constructing this road, there has been great sacrifice, not only of money but of lives, as may be seen from the reports of the engineer in charge.

MANILA

Manila was a city three hundred years before Dewey's fleet cleft the waters of Manila Bay. It was a market to which Chinese traders for many decades took their wares, selling them to the Spaniards, especially before foreigners were admitted into Chinese or Japanese ports. Romance and interest—the blending of the ancient and the modern, the Oriental and the Occidental—are the first impressions and the lasting memories of Manila. It reminds one of some of the Spanish cities, despite its modern buildings, its telephones, telegraph, radios, electric lights, trams, and railroads. Through its streets pass the picturesque peasants from the barrios. One sees in its finest quarters carts drawn by the faithful carabao.

There are beautiful spots and ugly spots, too, in Manila. The old walled town is in the center. The moats which anciently surrounded it are now filled up to make playgrounds, golf-courses, and athletic fields. The Pasig River flows through the city, mountains form a distant background. The streets are well paved, there are fine parks, drives, and avenues. Churches that date back two centuries, scenes of former battles, a fine aquarium—these are among the antiquities and beauties of Manila. One could spend a week there and not be through visiting interesting and historic places. The Manila Hotel, owned by the Philippine Government, and paid for by the Philippine taxpayers, is one of the finest in the Orient, in appearance, appointment, and management.

There are 350,000 native Filipinos in Manila. Besides the 6,000 or 7,000 Americans in the city and elsewhere in Luzon, there are about 1,000 in the various other islands. For the most part they are in charge of the great sugar, coconut, and rubber plantations. Their part in the com-



Entering Senator Quezon's Province

mercial life of the Islands—that is, so far as stores and factories are concerned—is negligible. These Americans naturally gravitate to one another and come to form a caste. This is especially true of the military officers and their families. The replacement of American clerks, salesmen, mechanics, and executives by Filipinos is proceeding apace, and there is therefore a steady decline in the American population.

From Manila to Davao, in the hemp country, the distance is about 774 miles; to Zamboanga it is more than 500 miles. From three to six days are required to reach these places. The boat service is not regular; in fact, one of the serious obstacles to the economic advance of the Philippines is the lack of adequate water transportation. Few vessels reach Manila direct from North America. Virtually all of them stop first at ports in Japan and China. At each stop (and there are usually four or five) from one to two days are consumed. So the time for a voyage from San Francisco to Manila is usually about twenty-eight days. The passage from Seattle or Vancouver requires a little more than three weeks.

CHAPTER V

DEWEY AND AGUINALDO

LONG before our declaration of war against Spain it was becoming quite evident in the minds of watchful observers that the conflict was imminent and inevitable. Commodore Dewey consulted Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, then an active, virile young man, who had every detail worked out. He believed the war was certain to come and he wanted the commodore put in command of the Asiatic Squadron. Dewey tells us in his memoirs that he never before had asked for political influence in obtaining a promotion in rank, but, at the suggestion of Mr. Roosevelt, he then for the first time sought it. Dewey was assigned to the command of the Asiatic Fleet, with private instructions to prepare for eventualities.

General Aguinaldo, it will be remembered, had in 1896 conducted a campaign against the Spaniards. His soldiers were never properly armed and equipped, and finally they were without ammunition even for such guns as they possessed. Faced by a long guerrilla warfare under such conditions, and with the outcome very doubtful, Aguinaldo accepted a proposal for mediation and met with the Spanish commanders. They agreed upon many reforms, including improvements in the judiciary, larger autonomy, Filipino representation in the Spanish Cortes at Madrid, separation of Church and State. In addition, the sum of \$400,000 was appropriated to compensate the Filipino Army for losses, for the restoration or replace-

ment of property damaged or wholly destroyed during the fighting. This money was afterward used for the purchase of arms and supplies for Aguinaldo's new army.

One of the conditions imposed by the Spaniards was that Aguinaldo and his staff go into exile. This also was accepted. After the departure of Aguinaldo and his associates the Spanish refused to fulfil their agreements, so fighting was renewed. This was Aguinaldo's second time in exile as a penalty for his activities. His first banishment was ordered because he became a member of a Masonic fraternity whose lodge served also as a meeting-place for independence advocates. Membership in the Masonic brotherhood was forbidden by Spanish law, in force in the Philippines.

From their retreat Aguinaldo and his compatriots watched with intense expectancy the approaching war between the United States and Spain. The coaling preparation of Dewey's ships at Hongkong was no secret. The Filipino exiles were more or less familiar with it. They saw in these preparations an opportunity for a new and greater struggle for liberation. The money—\$400,000—they had received from the Spaniards two years previously was in a bank at Hongkong. Through an arrangement made by E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul-General at Singapore, Aguinaldo was to meet Commodore Dewey at Hongkong, but on his arrival there Dewey's fleet had departed. Later, at Dewey's invitation, Aguinaldo proceeded to Manila aboard an American war-ship.

Our highest representative at the time in the Philippines was O. F. Williams, United States Consul. Before the appearance of Commodore Dewey in Manila, Williams was reporting to his superiors in Washington the successes and advance of the Filipino revolutionists. If President McKinley had been rightly advised of the situation which

existed in the Philippines when Dewey reached Manila, there would have been no conflict between the United States and the Filipino people. A change of one vote in the Senate on the ratification of the treaty would have prevented that war. If Dewey's discretion had not been limited by ill-advised officialdom in Washington, there would have been no war. If a statement similar to that embodied in the Jones Act of 1916 had been the declared policy of the United States, in 1898, there would have been no war.

Finally, if the Filipinos had spoken English, or if the American officers had understood the native language and could have given the Islanders an understanding of the intentions of the United States, there would have been no war. The tragedy which followed was the result of misinformation and misunderstanding. As Dewey afterward said, it was a time for real statesmanship. This statesmanship was lacking, and when the first American Commission arrived on the scene, it was too late: the war was on, and necessarily it had to go to a conclusion, a military decision.

The events of the early American occupation affect the present attitude of the Filipino people and their aspirations for independence. They can not understand why in the face of conditions we gave freedom and self-government to Cuba and yet denied these boons to the Philippines. They feel that they deserved as much from the United States as Cuba deserved, and they cite the history of the few months before and the three months following the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Dewey. Their complete coöperation for three and a half months, while Dewey was waiting for President McKinley to decide our future course, and for the arrival of the American army; their friendship and their active part in forcing

the surrender of the Spaniards—these evidences of their good-will and usefulness to us they recall. Our actions subsequently they cannot comprehend, and we give no explanation of them.

Official records disclose the extent of this Filipino cooperation with our forces in the Philippines in the summer of 1898, and reveal also how spokesmen of our Government permitted the Islanders to believe that we were aiding them to independence as we were at the same moment aiding the Cuban people.

Admiral Dewey was near Hongkong on April 25, 1898. On that date he received the following cable from the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor.

The new revolt which followed the expatriation of Aguinaldo is described by Consul Williams in a Communication to the Secretary of State on February 22, 1898:

Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The Crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within 10 miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field. A Republic is organized here, as in Cuba. Insurgents are being armed and drilled; are rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency. . . .

In March he cabled additional details:

Insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded, and made prisoners on both sides. . . . Rebellion never more

threatening to Spain. Rebels getting arms, money, and friends and they outnumber the Spaniards, resident, and soldiery, probably 100 to 1.

These official despatches describing the condition in the Philippines were sent two and three months before the arrival of Admiral Dewey at Manila. They are historic evidence that a revolution against Spanish rule in the Islands was then in progress and that it gave every promise of success when the American ships arrived.

After Consul-General Pratt had conferred with General Aguinaldo, at the meeting I have already mentioned, he telegraphed to Dewey:

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general coöperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.

Admiral Dewey replied:

Tell Aguinaldo to come soon as possible.

Subsequently (April 28, 1898) Pratt wired the Secretary of State, Wm. R. Day, this information:

General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong, arrange with Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.

And still later he cabled to Secretary Day:

I think that in arranging for his coöperation with the Commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

Almost concurrently with the events chronicled in these various cablegrams the Filipino exiles in Hongkong issued a proclamation in which they disclosed knowledge of Dewey's intentions and their confidence that the Ameri-

can overthrow of Spanish power in the Philippines would result in Independence. The proclamation was this:

Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for.

W. Cameron Forbes, who was Governor-General of the Philippines for many years, comments on these events as follows:

These official records establish the fact that a state of insurrection against the Spanish Government actually existed in an important portion of the Islands, especially the vicinity of Manila, at the time that war broke out between the United States and Spain, and that General Aguinaldo, after representing that the aim of the Filipinos was their own government, was invited to proceed to Hong Kong for conference with Commodore Dewey. Having failed to get to Hong Kong in time, by Admiral Dewey's orders he and thirteen companions were given transportation on a United States Navy vessel to Cavite, where General Aguinaldo arrived on May 19 and established himself under the protection of the American squadron.

Ever since 1898 there has been a controversy regarding the terms of the agreement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey. Admiral Dewey declared he had given the Filipino leader no direct promise regarding American recognition of the Filipino republic. On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino in Hongkong, who was in exile as a consequence of his revolutionary activities in 1872, sent to the Filipino people a manifesto from the headquarters of the Philippine Junta in that city. This manifesto, which received wide circulation, proclaimed:

Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our independence, and this under the freest form to which all individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.

The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos, find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.

At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the Philippines.

We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not make such a mistake; rather [shoot] kill yourselves than treat our liberators as enemies.

History records that the American military authorities furnished to Aguinaldo's soldiers rifles, ammunition, and other requisites; that the Filipinos drove the Spaniards into Manila and cornered them there until the coming of American troops, and that the native forces actively coöperated with the American Army and Navy in accomplishing the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards. I repeat this testimony of impartial history, because it is neither so well known nor so justly valued as it should be by Americans. It is granted that Rounseville Wildman, United States Consul-General at Hongkong, acted without authority in his preliminary negotiations with Aguinaldo. It nevertheless remains true that Aguinaldo could hardly be expected to distinguish between a consul and a diplomatic official—especially when Dewey himself accepted suggestions from Consul Pratt—as the general well knew. His experiences justified his reliance on Mr. Wildman's statements, and later on those of the United States Consul at Manila, Mr. Williams.

When Aguinaldo arrived at Manila on the *U.S.S. Mc-*

Culloch, our fleet was in the harbor, unwilling to bombard the city and its civilian inhabitants. There were no American soldiers in the Islands. Dewey was, therefore, unable to land or complete the capture of Manila. The only military forces then likely to be of service to Dewey were those commanded by Aguinaldo. He had united the entire Philippines in armed opposition to Spain. Large numbers of native troops attached to the Spanish forces had joined his army. He was surely a valuable ally. Cables which Dewey sent to Washington at the time reveal his views of the importance of the Filipino share in the beleaguerment of Manila:

June 6. Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of Cavite during the last week; they have had several small victories, taken prisoners, about 1,800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native.

June 12. Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila. They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States troops. . . .

And then a week later:

I have given him [Aguinaldo] to understand that I consider insurgents as friends being opposed to common enemy. He has gone to attend meeting insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful.

I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has invariably done.

When General Anderson, in command of the expeditionary force, arrived in Manila, he addressed General Aguinaldo on July 4, 1898, as follows:

General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, . . . has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people coöperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces.

[Signed] T. M. ANDERSON,

GENERAL.

General Anderson afterward said, regarding Aguinaldo's grounds for supposing that the consular, naval, and military representatives of the United States received him as the head of the Philippine Republic:

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt of Singapore and Wildman, Hongkong, and Williams, Manila, did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts, rather than from their statements."

John Barrett, newspaper correspondent and observer of the period, wrote:

After his arrival at Cavite he [Aguinaldo] organized with wonderful rapidity a provisional government, and in a short time he had an army which was capturing Spanish outposts with the frequency of trained regulars. . . . The impression went abroad among the masses of the people that Aguinaldo had arrived to establish an independent government, and that the Americans would assist him. The actual working of his government under the guns of our ship was sufficient evidence to them of our approval. . . . These influences had a tremendous effect. Before Aguinaldo had been in Cavite a month he not only had more soldiers than he could arm, but contributions of large sums of money, with unlimited amounts

of rice and other raw food supplies brought in by the people for the support of his Army.

Mr. Barrett later gave this description of Aguinaldo's army:

He had over twenty regiments of comparatively well-dressed soldiers carrying modern rifles and ammunition. I saw many of these regiments executing not only regimental but battalion and company drill with a precision that astonished me. . . . The people in all the different towns took great pride in this army. Nearly every family had a father, son, or cousin in it. Wherever they went they aroused enthusiasm for the Filipino cause.

Mr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of the First Philippine Commission, recounts how Aguinaldo: "enjoyed the confidence of the insurgents and their sympathizers and abettors, . . . in virtue of his patriotic services, his attested honesty, and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with able coadjutors and administrators."

John T. McCutcheon, correspondent of the "Chicago Record," in a despatch dated June 24, 1898, makes this statement:

All during the week following there was constant evidence of the strife that was being waged between Cavite and Malate. . . . Imus, Bacoar, Las Piñas and Parañaque were captured in less than a week notwithstanding the fact that the Spaniards had splendid guns and ammunition in unlimited quantities, supported by five mountain batteries and rapid fire guns. Over in Cavite, the calm, passionless statements of great victories that Aguinaldo gave us were being substantiated every day for hundreds and hundreds of Spanish soldiers were being marched in and placed in prison! . . . Closely following the remarkable insurgent successes in Cavite Province, where the whole district had been captured in eight days, came stories

of other successful operations in Pampanga Province; Macabebe, and San Fernando were captured and the great Spanish General Molet fled in terror to Manila. Over one thousand Spanish soldiers had been taken prisoners and their arms given out to natives as quickly as possible. . . . Our respect for the insurgent prowess had grown a great deal, for by June 30 they had taken almost every province in Luzon with the exception of isolated garrisons and were hammering away at the doors of Manila.

Under the leadership of Aguinaldo fourteen miles of trenches had been dug around the city of Manila. The inhabitants were reduced to a starvation diet and the water supply was cut off, so that the final capitulation of the city merely awaited the arrival of American troops and their demand for surrender. General Anderson, telling of the military status of the armies in the Islands not long after he landed in Manila, says: "We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the Island [Luzon] was held not by Spaniards but by the Filipinos. On the other Islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns."

Note the vital difference between the situation in the Philippines and that in Cuba! Unaided, except for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, almost wholly by their own efforts, the Filipinos were near final triumph over their former masters. In Cuba, on the other hand, the insurgents were herded in concentration camps or harried or butchered by the Spaniards. Here is a glimpse of things there and then given to us by General Otis, American commander in the Philippines:

In December, 1898, we find that in northern and south-eastern Luzon, in [the Islands of] Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller Islands, the aggressive Tagalog present in person and, whether civilian or soldier, supreme in authority.

When Manila finally was surrendered, the American commanders stipulated with the Spanish commanders that the Filipino troops should not be permitted to enter the city. Section 7 of the terms of capitulation reads:

This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.

The insurgents, who had fought long and bravely and felt therefore that to their energies and sacrifices victory was mostly due, were naturally indignant at the refusal to permit them to enter the city and participate in at least some of the pageantry. Then began the friction that begot first unfriendliness and ultimately open hostility.

George A. Malcolm, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, a distinguished American lawyer and author, recited in two paragraphs the course of the Filipino struggle for freedom:

The revolt of 1872 against Spain failed almost at once, while its revival on a larger scale in 1896 was temporarily checked by the Pact of Biac-na-bato between the Spanish authorities and General Emilio Aguinaldo, the commander-in-chief of the Filipino forces. A recrudescence of the outbreak, with various causes, the principal of which was a misunderstanding of American aims, began in 1898, and was brought to a conclusion by the dispersal of the Filipino forces and the capture of General Aguinaldo, followed by the amnesty proclamation of the President of the United States of July 4, 1902, granting full and complete pardon to all persons for political offenses committed in the Islands.

A Filipino government was first established in the form of a dictatorial government by a proclamation of Aguinaldo, promulgated on May 24, 1898. Such a government, according to the proclamation, was "to be administered by decrees pro-

mulgated upon my responsibility solely," until the Islands shall be "completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention and to elect a president and a cabinet in whose favor I will duly resign the authority." One month later the dictatorial government gave way to the revolutionary government with Aguinaldo as President. The objects of the revolutionary government, according to the proclamation providing for its temporary Constitution were "to struggle for the Independence of the Philippines, until all nations, including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country for the establishment of a real republic."

During the entire period, 1897-1901, Emilio Aguinaldo was successively the commanding general, the dictator, the President of the revolutionary government, and the President of the Philippine Republic.

In Admiral Dewey's autobiography there are passages which testify to the cordiality of the relations and the effectiveness of the collaboration between the American fleet and Aguinaldo's army, show Dewey's sympathy with the insurgent at this time, and make clear that he disapproved the instructions that came to him from Washington and deplored the subjugation of the Filipino people by American arms. I quote here these significant testimonies:

[Page 239] The question of making the Philippine Islands United States territory was one of policy for the nation at home to decide, which had nothing to do with my duties as a naval officer. [Page 246] Obviously, as our purpose was to weaken the Spaniards in every legitimate way, thus hastening the conclusion of hostilities in a war which was made to free Cuba from Spanish oppression, operations by the insurgents against Spanish oppression in the Philippines under certain restrictions would be welcome.

Aguinaldo was recognized both by the Spanish commander and the American commodore. Witness this:

[Page 247] Their numbers increasing by daily additions, the Filipinos slowly but surely drove the Spaniards back toward the city. By day we could see their attacks, and by night we heard their firing. We had some negotiations with them in regard to the disposition of Spanish prisoners and the transfer of Spanish women and children who had fallen into their hands; and again, at the request of the Spanish captain-general, Don Basilio Augustin Davila, I asked Aguinaldo's good offices in securing free passage through the insurgent lines for Don Basilio's own family and other Spanish families who were cut off from Manila. [Page 248] The insurgents fought well. Their success, I think, was of material importance in isolating our marine force at Cavite from Spanish attack and in preparing a foothold for our troops when they should arrive. By the end of May they had entirely cleared Cavite Province of the enemy, and had so nearly surrounded Manila as to cause a panic among the inhabitants.

[Page 269] The insurgents had been at work only two months with an organization of the flimsiest character, yet by means of guerilla warfare, developed from years of experience in their resistance to Spanish domination, had not only advanced their lines along the beach almost to the fortifications, but had invested the city on the inland side as well. Thanks to their advance, we were able to land our troops within easy striking distance of their objective. [Page 270] Therefore, without holding any direct communication with Aguinaldo, he directed General Greene to persuade the Filipinos to move out of the way. This Greene tactfully accomplished, and our men soon occupied part of the trenches built by the insurgents. [Page 283] . . . Our government had yet to decide whether or not to keep the Philippines. If we decided to keep them, there was the question of our policy of administration, the urgent importance of which was readily realized by one on the spot, while it was difficult to make it realized by those in Washington who had had no experience of Oriental countries." [Page 284] At the time the delegates to the Peace Conference scarcely comprehended that a rebellion was included with the purchase.

We were far from being in possession of the property which we had bought. Manila was only the capital city of the most important group of many Islands, with many capitals, in all of which we must establish authority. With the native population welcoming us this would have been only a formal task.

In response to Dewey's request "to conduct war humanely," Aguinaldo issued the following proclamation:

Filipinos: The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty, and therefore the friend of our people, oppressed and enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing for ourselves our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation, we should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes leading to persons or property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflicts during the period of our campaign.

I decree as follows:

Article I. The lives and property of all foreigners, Chinese being included in this denomination, shall be respected, as well as that of all Spaniards who neither directly nor indirectly contributed to carry on war against us.

Article II. Enemies who lay down their arms must also be respected in like manner.

Article III. All hospitals and ambulances must likewise be respected, as well as all persons and goods found therein, including the staff on duty, unless they manifest hostility.

Article IV. Those who disobey what is prescribed in these preceding articles shall be tried by summary process, and put to death, if the said disobedience has resulted in murder, robbery, or rape.

Given in Cavite, the 24th of May, 1898.—EMILIO AGUINALDO.

The climax is thus pictured by Article 2 of the Agreement for the Capitulation of the Spanish Army:

2. It being impossible for the Spanish forces of the garrison to evacuate the place either by sea, on account of the lack of steamers, or by land on account of the insurgents, it is hereby agreed that all the fighting forces capitulate with the honors of war, the officers keeping their swords, guns, horses, and furniture, and the troops will deposit theirs in the place agreed. [Appendix H. p. 321.]

It is true that Admiral Dewey disclaims that his co-operation with Aguinaldo was intended as a recognition of the Philippine republic, but it is equally certain that at this period there never was a frank avowal on our part that we not only did not design to accept Philippine independence as a fact but actually were resolved to deny and prevent it.

Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U.S.N., serving under Dewey, was during these stirring events navigator of the *U.S.S. Petrel*, and later of the *U.S.S. Monadnock*. His book "War Time in Manila," was "made up mainly of extracts from letters to my mother written on the spot immediately after the various events narrated had occurred." I quote from it:

[Page 68] They [the Filipinos] said they were organizing solely against the Spaniards; to prevent the Spaniards from ever getting back to power, in case the United States did not take the Islands for itself. They declared they would never let the Spaniards get back to power. We thought it an exceedingly good plan to help them; because, although Dewey could take Manila whenever he wished, as things were then, yet things might change, especially if any European power should intervene; or if, from any cause, the Governor General should gather confidence. In any such case, this army of barefooted but determined natives, familiar with the country and accus-

tomed to its climate, might become a powerful aid. Besides, the very fact of its existence as a fighting organization would encourage the Filipinos in Manila, and discourage the Spaniards, and tend to keep the Governor General in his present frame of mind; and it would furthermore decrease the chances of Spain's ultimate success, and thus lend an additional reason to any European power why it should not intervene. Everything seemed to us to depend on keeping things as they then were, until the American troops should come. [Page 79.] We of the Petrel came into close touch with the insurgents during these weeks, both at the arsenal and in Bacoar Bay. In going back and forth, Filipinos would always rise in their boats and cheer the Petrel and call out "Americanos amigos!" We liked them; they seemed to be brave; and we found they had gratitude and humor. [Page 87.] By this time Aguinaldo's army had practically surrounded Manila, and had captured the water works, so that the city was dependent on the provisions already in it, and on rain water.

Perhaps the white man's prejudices contributed to the breakdown of the first good understanding between the American troops and those under Aguinaldo. Admiral Fiske says:

[Page 89] The afternoon after the American troops landed at Cavite, Hall and I and some others of the Petrel got into conversation with an Army Lieutenant, a very handsome man whose name I cannot recall; and in the course of our talk he spoke of the Filipinos as "niggers." I cannot tell how unpleasantly this word sounded to us, especially because the accent of the voice and the context showed that it was used as a term of dislike. After an embarrassed pause, one of us said: "You know we fellows in the Navy here have become very friendly with the Filipinos, and we like them very much. We've seen a good deal of them, too, and seen them fight, and seen them wounded and dead in the hospitals. They're really an entirely different kind of people from niggers; and besides, they're fighting on our side, and we think we ought

to treat them well"—and then we all went on to tell him what we knew about the Filipinos. The Army Lieutenant seemed much astonished at our ideas, and although he listened to what we had to say, it was plain that we did not make much impression on him. So we changed the subject, and in a few minutes we parted, quite cordially, but with that vague feeling of hostility that a strong difference of opinion usually carries with it.

This incident made a painful impression upon us, and was the subject of conversation that night at dinner; and we said to each other that this Army Lieutenant probably represented the ideas of his companions, and that if the troops were coming to Manila with such false prejudices against the Filipinos, not only would great injustice be done but the Malay blood of the Filipino would be aroused, and then we should have a worse foe than the Spaniard. [Page 105.] The difficulty of handling the Filipinos became greater when the American army came. The army was brought into contact with the Filipinos more closely than we were and never having travelled did not know how to deal with them, and began to call them "niggers", and to treat them as "niggers"; so that friction between them and the Filipinos was quickly brought about, and the friction increased as the size of the American camp increased. [Page 202] About this time we received a large mail from the United States and a great many newspapers. We smiled as we read the long and able articles with which they were all filled, proving that "the peaceful solution of the Philippine question" was at hand.

May not the ordinary Filipino, though unable to express his thoughts well, have felt as did the man of culture that Admiral Fiske quotes in the following paragraphs?

[Page 173] A few days later I was going down from Manila to Cavite in a rickety wooden steamer, that made trips between those places and I got into conversation with a Filipino gentleman of considerable education who talked English very

well. He said: "We are very much grieved that your President has told the Filipino army to lay down their arms, because that means that the United States will take the Philippine Islands. We thought that we were going to have our Independence."

I said, "You're going to have your Independence; I mean in the way in which Ohio has her Independence, or any other State."

He said, "No, I mean our Independence; I don't call belonging to the United States having our Independence; we want to have our own government and to be a nation in the world, a real nation ourselves. . . . But we thought the United States fought the Spaniards here, just as part of the war with Spain, and that it didn't wish to keep the Islands for itself. We thought that it would give us the islands to govern and give us its protection; and you really made us think that. You let us form a Filipino army and fight your battles, and you encouraged us in every way to do it. You knew that General Aguinaldo had made a proclamation that went all over the islands in which he said that the United States Government would help us to get our Independence, and you never contradicted it; and you knew that for several months we fought the Spaniards and drove them all around Manila Bay, and that we got our trenches right up in front of the city, and that we captured the water works; and then your soldiers came and took our intrenchments that we fought to get, and they took them without losing a man; and finally the city surrenders and your soldiers march in and shut the gates in our faces. . . ."

Our talk gave me a clearer idea than I had had before of how deep and determined was the Filipino feeling toward us. Up to that time I had seen nothing to make me really feel it. I had known that the American Troops were drawn up in a half circle around Manila that was nearly 13 miles long, and that they were facing the Filipino army; and I knew also that the individual American soldier called the individual Filipino "a nigger," and despised him. This talk showed me that per-

haps the Filipino hated the American. So it was not hard to imagine that, along those two parallel lines of Americans and Filipinos, there was a tremendous tension, like the tension between two clouds charged with opposite kinds of electricity; and it did not take very much reflection to convince me that at any instant there might come a violent disturbance of the equilibrium; then the whole charged system would discharge itself with sudden and tremendous energy, and war would be on hand. So that evening I told my wife that she and my daughter must leave Manila by the next steamer.

Throughout the period of coöperation between our naval commanders and the Filipinos, the latter believed—as all the facts coincide to prove—that the Americans had come to the Philippines to do for the people what they advertised their intention of doing for Cuba. In that spirit of trustfulness the Filipino set about the task of reorganizing the government of the Islands. The flag of the Philippines was formally unfurled and independence was proclaimed, amidst elaborate festivities on June 12, 1898, at Cavite, just five miles across the bay from Manila. This proclamation antedated by two months the entry of our military forces into the capital city.

The Revolutionary Government also took steps to formulate a temporary constitution pending the drafting of a permanent one by delegates from the archipelago regularly chosen and assembled. Events moved rapidly. On June 27 rules for the conduct of executive business were announced. On July 25 the members of the Cabinet were named, and on September 15 the Congress assembled in the town of Malolos, twenty-five miles from Manila. The Revolutionary Government was now ready to merge into the republic—as it actually did when the Filipino delegates gathered at Malolos adopted a constitution providing for a republican form of government based on the

peaceful suffrage of the people. The constitution thus approved by the Philippine delegates was not unlike the constitutions of present-day republics.

The salient prescriptions and prohibitions of this constitution are epitomized by Judge George A. Malcolm in his "Philippine Constitutional Law" as follows:

The Constitution opens with a preamble reading: "We, the representatives of the Filipino people, lawfully convened, in order to establish justice, provide for common defense, promote the general welfare, and insure the benefits of liberty, imploring the aid of the Sovereign Legislator of the Universe for the attainment of these ends, have voted, decreed, and sanctioned the following political Constitution." The Constitution then organizes a Filipino state called the Philippine Republic, sovereignty residing exclusively in the people. The national and individual rights of Filipinos and aliens are next specified. These provisions are, in the main, literal copies of articles of the Spanish Constitution. The Bill of Rights includes religious liberty; freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, a provision like that of Spain; recognition of what amounts to the writ of habeas corpus; sanctity of domicile; prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures; right to choose one's domicile; inviolability of correspondence; prohibition of criminal prosecutions unless in a competent court and according to law; protection of private property, reserving to the government the right of eminent domain; inhibition against the payment of any tax not legally prescribed; freedom of speech and press; right to form associations; right to petition; permission to establish educational institutions; compulsory and free popular education; right of expatriation; prohibition of trial under special laws or by special tribunals; prohibition against laws of primogeniture and the entailing of property; prohibition of acceptance of titles of honor or nobility from foreign nations without authorization of the government, and of the granting of such honors by the Republic. The Constitution also provides (article 28) that "the

enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not imply the prohibition of any others not expressly stated." On every Filipino there are imposed the obligations of defending the country and of contributing to the expenses of the state. A government is established which was expected to be popular, representative, and responsible, exercised by three independent powers called the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Profiting from prior experience, the church and the state are made separate.

The "Library of American History," published in 1900, gives a description, written by a Minnesota volunteer, of an audience with Aguinaldo:

I simply sent in word: "An American with a communication." Instantly a man came out . . . and, addressing me in good English, said, "Walk in, sir." Again I rubbed my eyes, for I was in a room of enormous size, crystal chandeliers hung from the ceiling; at one end was a piano, and all about were signs of great wealth and even royalty. My escort was most gracious; he was sorry to detain me, but the president had just returned from a three days' trip back in the mountains; he was sleeping, and I must wait until he should awake. He continued: "We are showing you great honor, as you represent the American nation. All others we keep waiting outside in the hallway." I thanked him in the name of Uncle Sam, and settled down for one of the most interesting talks of my life. The man was Aguinaldo's secretary. He said among other things: "We are grateful to your country for freeing us from Spanish rule. We do not want to fight you. We love and respect you. All we want are freedom and protection. The man sleeping in there [Aguinaldo] is our Washington. Yours made a great nation of you. Ours will do the same for us; but should you hand the Islands back to Spain, we will fight to the death." The time passed all too quickly. Another door opened and another gorgeous creature said: "President Aguinaldo will give audience to the American," and I entered what to these poor people is the Holy of Holies.

Seated on a sort of throne behind a desk most beautifully carved was Aguinaldo.

The narrative in the "Library of American History" gives an outline of Aguinaldo's preparations for the rebellion against Spain, and continues:

The explosion of the Maine he accepted as a presage of war between America and Spain, and all his prophecies were literally fulfilled. He wrote and spoke with intense and patriotic earnestness, which compelled the admiration of even his enemies. . . . In any event, Aguinaldo, as if acting upon the belief that help of the insurgents to expel Spain would be rewarded by an acknowledgment of their Independence, returned to the Philippines and inaugurated plans of campaign against the Spaniards at Manila and many other military posts on the Islands. He was also furnished many stands of arms and a large quantity of ammunition by the American government, and in other respects was recognized as our ally. During the war between Spain and America, it is admitted that the Filipino insurgents captured 15,000 Spanish soldiers and destroyed Spanish power in all the Islands, except Luzon.

While fighting Spain successfully at every point, Aguinaldo organized a provisional government, and on June 23, 1898, he was confirmed general-in-chief and president of the Filipino government, thus preparing the way to the Independence which he expected to achieve. In December Aguinaldo formed his second cabinet, and has since discharged the functions of an actual ruler, issuing proclamations, levying taxes, and collecting duties.

Because of the remoteness of the Philippines from the United States the American people's unfamiliarity with them, and the difficulty and expense of intercourse which might otherwise have kept us informed, we learned none of these details, then or for a long time thereafter. We were conversant with events in Cuba because Cuba was

close. Friction and bad feeling, foreseen by Admiral Fiske, grew in intensity, and on February 4, 1899, two days before the United States Senate had agreed to vote on the treaty of peace with Spain, the spark was ignited. What happened is related by General Otis in his official report:

An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment] refused to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece [killing the Filipino] when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened fire on our troops there stationed. . . . During the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between opposing lines for a distance of two miles. . . . It is not believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities at that time.

The next day Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff, under a flag of truce, to interview General Otis and to tell him that the firing by Filipino soldiers on the previous night before had been contrary to his orders, that he wished to prevent further hostilities, and that, to bring this about, he proposed to establish a neutral zone wide enough to keep the opposing armies apart. But to this request Otis replied that the fighting having begun must go on "to the grim end," and an American attack against the Filipinos followed. This attack, which General Otis characterized in his official report as "one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and one of vigorous attack by our forces," resulted in the killing of more than three hundred Filipinos.

The fighting to which this Nebraska volunteer's shot gave a beginning continued for more than three years. The relentlessness and ferocity with which it was carried on was not then fully comprehended by the American public, because those in power minimized the importance of the struggle and thus led the people here to

believe that but a small minority of the Filipinos were in revolt. In the course of the campaign the American army of occupation established approximately four hundred military posts throughout the Islands. Fighting was fiercest in the Island of Luzon, where General MacArthur was reluctantly compelled to admit that the whole population was loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he represented. Luzon at that time had nearly three and a half million inhabitants. The natives of the southern Islands, principally Samar, Bohol, and the Visayas, did their full share of the fighting.

Finally, in the spring of 1901, Aguinaldo was captured by General Funston and removed to Manila. In the course of his detention there he became convinced that the intentions of the Americans were more altruistic than he had been led to suppose. He took the oath of allegiance to the United States, and had ever since faithfully observed it. He then issued this proclamation to the Filipino people:

The time has come, however, when they [the Filipinos] find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force,—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy. The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood, enough of tears and desolation. . . . By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved Country. May happiness be thine.

Aguinaldo's acceptance of the sovereignty of the United States throughout the archipelago, and that "without any reservation whatsoever," could of course, bind only him—not all the Filipinos of his own and every succeeding generation.

On July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt proclaimed amnesty for all who laid down their arms and pledged obedience to the Government of the United States.

Dewey risked torpedoes in Manila Bay, and destroyed the Spanish fleet and the land fortifications without the loss of a single man. Manila later was taken by the joint action of American and Philippine troops, the sacrifices being only eight men killed and forty wounded. The Spanish casualties were reported to be one hundred and sixty killed and six hundred wounded. Seven thousand Spaniards surrendered. The war in Cuba, which had lasted only one hundred and eleven days, had ended. And so far as the Spanish were concerned, the war in the Philippines was also at an end in the midsummer of 1898. Thereafter began a new war. The first was a war of the United States against Spain. The other was a war of the United States against the Filipino people. Suppression of the news of what was happening in the Philippines, and a propaganda that ridiculed and libeled the Filipino, combined to produce a serious mental attitude among American soldiers who went to the Islands. To them the Filipinos were bandits, guerrillas, half barbarians, not deserving of the name or the rights of soldiers. Charges of cruelty and brutality were made by each side against the other. It would serve no useful purpose to rehearse these. The feeling of both the American troops and the Filipinos has changed. Our generals and commanders of that day soon forgot personal animosities. I could perceive none in the minds of Filipinos during my stay in the Islands.

This may be illustrated by an occurrence involving Colonel Pedro Guevara and Congressman Little of Kansas.

Congressman Little commanded an American regiment at Laguna; Guevara commanded a Filipino regiment in the vicinity of Santa Cruz, the capital of Laguna Province. One day Captain Little received a message from Colonel Guevara. It ran something like this: "You damned Yankee, you are afraid to fight. If you want to fight, meet me and my men 10 kilometers from here," describing the place, "and then we will have a real fight, if you are not afraid."

Captain Little was angry. He, with his men, went to the designated place, but they did not find Colonel Guevara. They returned to their regimental headquarters. A week later came another message: "You damned Yankee, I knew you were afraid to fight. Why did you not meet me and earn the money the American people pay you?" This and other insulting language. Again Captain Little marched out with his Kansans, and again they were unable to find Colonel Guevara.

This kept up for a number of weeks, the letters of Colonel Guevara becoming more and more insulting, and the anger of Captain Little mounting with the receipt of each new insulting epistle.

Years afterward this splendid American soldier was elected to Congress to represent a Kansas district. One day he was introduced to Colonel Guevara, Philippine Commissioner to Congress. Little asked: "Do you happen to be the Colonel Guevara who was stationed at Santa Cruz?" Colonel Guevara replied that he was. "Then," said Congressman Little, "I'm going to lick you. If I had caught you in the Philippines, I would have killed you. Why did you write me such insulting letters?" Commissioner Guevara replied: "Wait a minute. When you understand why

the letters were written, you would have done the same thing." "No," said Congressman Little, "there could be no excuse for such language." Commissioner Guevara replied: "Wait a minute, let me tell you. In that town lived my sweetheart. She was a very beautiful woman, and as long as you and your regiment were in that town I couldn't call upon my sweetheart." Congressman Little was somewhat mollified, but again said that was no excuse. The Commissioner Guevara finally stated: "She was not only a very beautiful woman, Captain Little, but she is now my wife. If you do not believe it, you come right down to the Raleigh Hotel with me and I will introduce her to you." They shook hands.

CHAPTER VI

MR. McKINLEY PRAYS; MR. BRYAN PERSUADES; THE SENATE DEBATES

LET us review here, in brief fashion, the events of the two years preceding the Spanish-American War and then we shall consider some of their repercussions on our internal affairs. Shortly before the expiration of his second term of office, President Cleveland had his attention directed to events in Cuba. Cuba, unlike the Philippines, which are a month's journey distant from the center of the United States, is close to the United States and easily accessible. Secretary of State Olney, who had previously challenged Great Britain's aggressiveness toward Venezuela, tendered to Spain and the Cuban insurrectionists the coöperation of the United States in the establishing of an autonomous government in the island. Mr. Cleveland, however, was soon to retire, and he left to his successor the final disposal of the question.

Spain had long before lost all her possessions in the New World except Cuba and Porto Rico. The latter had given the mother-country hardly any trouble. So the loss of Cuba involved consequences to her pride, to her world standing, and to her international relations much more serious than those ensuing from the loss of the Philippines, which had in fact been a burden instead of a benefit. Spain had at the time in Cuba a large army and in the adjacent waters two fleets. In addition, there was a larger native Spanish population in Cuba than there was in the Philip-

pires. On the other hand, the Spanish army in the Philippines was small and the Spanish naval forces few and weak. The insurrection—the attempt by the Cuban patriots to establish an independent government—had been resisted stubbornly. The Spanish commanders were changed frequently, with the purpose of finding one equal to the exigency. Finally General Weyler was chosen. He soon came to be described in the American press as the "Butcher." Weyler herded unarmed Cubans into concentration camps, fed them scantily and with unwholesome food. Their starvation and suffering became tragic. The American press teemed with sickening recitals of the Captain-General's alleged barbarities.

Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, owner of the "New York World" and the "St. Louis Post-Dispatch," advocated American intervention. William Randolph Hearst is reputed to have spent in all some three million dollars in the interest of Cuban independence. Later he visited the island in person. One of his newspaper representatives, Karl Becker, assisted in the escape of Señora Evangelina Gisneros, a young woman charged with political offenses, and brought her to the United States. This further agitated the minds of Americans. New York became the center of the Cuban Junta's activities. Privateers were outfitted there. Money was raised for the Cuban cause. The Spanish Navy captured the American schooner *Competitor*, operating as a "gun-runner." Petitions for the relief of conditions in Cuba were signed by the leading women of America and sent to the Queen of Spain. Pope Leo XIII was besought by another group of women to exert his moral influence in the same behalf.

Enrique Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister, wrote a letter declaring that "McKinley is weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a common

politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the Jingoës of his party." This fell into the hands of the press and was widely printed. The Minister's resignation followed quickly. Then in a little while came the destruction of the battleship *Maine* in the harbor of Havana. This horror—many Americans were killed by the explosion—unified public sentiment, and Mr. McKinley, at heart a pacifist, and a kindly, religious man, was forced by the public outcry to call for war with Spain.

The United States at the time had a regular army of fewer than 30,000 men. There were 100,000 in the National Guard, but these were under the direction of governors of States. After the fighting in Cuba was practically over, some 70,000 of these National Guardsmen were sent to the Philippines to put down the revolution there. That is to say, we raised an army of 40,000 men to help the cause of freedom in the Atlantic and used 70,000 men to defeat independence in the Pacific!

Our total losses in the Cuban War, both on land and sea, were 353. We lost 1,284 from disease. In the Philippines, seven thousand miles away, we lost 4,165 soldiers and expended \$185,000,000 in treasure. The war in Cuba lasted 111 days; fighting in the Philippines continued three and a half years. If, after destroying the Spanish fleet and the old fortress in Manila Bay, Admiral Dewey had sailed away, a Filipino Republic would have been established immediately, and would be flourishing to-day. That, at least, is my conviction founded on a careful study of the facts.

In April, 1898, the Teller Resolution was passed by the Senate. The fourth clause of this resolution recites, "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control

over said Island (Cuba) except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people."

And the United States kept its promise to the Cubans.

When General Leonard Wood was appointed Military Governor of the Island of Cuba, a census was ordered, and it was discovered that 66 per cent of the 1,600,000 inhabitants could neither read nor write. It was provided, therefore, that suffrage should be limited to those owning property, those who could read, and those who had served in the Cuban Army. Cuba to-day has a population of 3,600,000, the Philippines a population of 13,000,000. The American investment in Cuba is approximately \$1,066,000,000. The American investment in the Philippines is only about \$166,242,000. The indebtedness of Cuba, thanks to American diplomacy that relieved the Cubans from all Spanish indebtedness, is approximately \$210,000,000. The net indebtedness of the Philippines is \$82,550,700.

For thirty years Cuba has enjoyed the freedom we achieved for her. For the same long period the Philippines has remained an American satrapy. We have carried out our agreement to give independence to Cuba, who was helpless, but have only promised to give independence to the Philippines, though their revolution would have ended in their freedom had we not prevented. We have held them for thirty years; it is now proposed by some that we hold them for thirty years longer! In the Philippines, insurgents under Aguinaldo had driven the Spaniards almost out of the Islands and Spanish control in fact was confined to Manila when Dewey's fleet appeared there. The Spaniards had in Cuba 150,000 soldiers, and in the Philippines, only about 20,000 soldiers. Cuba was of great commercial value to the Spanish. The Philippines had

never proved profitable; they were indeed a liability. Mr. McKinley tried to avoid the war in Cuba, but was forced into it by public sentiment. Considerations of international policy also may have influenced Mr. McKinley's decision.

The German Kaiser was grieved and surprised at what he and other foreigners regarded as the oversea covetousness of the United States. Joseph Chamberlain, British leader at that time, wrote to Ambassador Hay that he did not care a "hang" what they would say about it on the Continent (alluding to the French and Germans); but made it clear that if we gave up the Philippines it would be a disappointment to the English. It was reported that Japan was interested in acquiring the Islands; it was hinted, too, that she might announce a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East and help the Filipinos as we had helped the Cubans; memoranda covering a division of the Islands were prepared; German warships were held in Philippine waters.

On August 12, 1898, came the protocol suspending hostilities between the United States and Spain, and providing for the appointment of five commissioners by this Government. After long negotiations, a treaty was agreed to and executed at Paris December 10, 1898. This date became exceedingly important, as subsequent events demonstrate. By the treaty, Spain relinquished sovereignty over her West Indian possessions, and ceded the Philippine Islands, and Guam. The United States covenanted to pay Spain \$20,000,000. The civil rights and political status of the natives of the territories ceded were to be later determined by the American Congress.

But it was not Congress that decided the destiny of the Philippines. Mr. McKinley was Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy. He proclaimed to the Army and Navy a new American policy, and precipitated a new war,

whose magnitude he did not visualize at the time. Seventeen years later—1916—Congress formulated a policy, but did not go far enough. When the American commissioners departed for Paris, the President had not instructed them with regard to his wishes in connection with the Philippines. He was undecided. William R. Day and George Gray, of the Commission, were opposed to acquisition of any part of the Philippines, and favored our withdrawal. Senators William P. Frye and Cushman K. Davis advocated the retention of a foothold in the Islands. Frye leaned toward annexation. The fifth member, Whitelaw Reid, publisher of the "New York Tribune," was from the first unhesitatingly and resolutely in favor of taking and keeping the entire archipelago. His persistence in this attitude and his ability in maintaining it later made converts of some of the other commissioners.

The disposition of the Philippines came up for consideration by the Paris Conference on October 31, and occupied its attention for an entire month. Johnson, in "America's Foreign Relations," states:

The American commissioners on November 21 presented a proposal that Spain should cede the entire Philippine Archipelago outright to the United States; that each country should relinquish all claims against the other on account of public or private losses through the insurrection in Cuba; that for ten years after the signing of the Treaty Spanish ships and merchandise should be admitted to the Philippines on equal terms with American; and that the United States should pay to Spain \$20,000,000 as remuneration not for the Islands but for permanent works and betterments bestowed upon them. This was in effect, if not in terms, an ultimatum. It expressed the irreducible minimum of American concessions.

Commissioner Day, who had been Secretary of State, wrote:

After careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the Commission are clearly of the opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands cannot be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed, Manila was not captured; siege was in progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require cession of the Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war.

Again Day wrote:

We have carefully examined all the leading textwriters and authorities, and find concurrence of opinion in the view that captures made after the execution of the agreement for an armistice must be disregarded and restored.

It was contended that at the time the protocol was signed, the Spanish had not surrendered Manila or the Spanish Army. That was still an open matter, and for that reason the Spanish commissioners demanded arbitration. Aguinaldo had driven the Spanish into Manila and held them blockaded there. Upon the arrival of the American troops the final attack on Manila was made on August 13, 1898. At that time the Spanish Army surrendered to joint pressure of American troops and Aguinaldo's soldiers. The protocol for the cessation of hostilities had been signed on August 12, the day before. The protocol ended the Spanish-American War. It lasted but 111 days. All Spanish ships had been sunk or surrendered, with few casualties on the American side.

The treaty of peace with Spain was sent to the Senate for ratification, and was vigorously debated. It was ratified on February 6, 1899. On the day before the treaty was ratified, the first serious collision between Aguinaldo's army and the American army under General Merritt

occurred. This undoubtedly hastened the decision of the Senate and was helpful in procuring ratification, which had been resisted both in the Senate and in the country at large. Andrew Carnegie, Carl Schurz, Moorfield Storey, and many other leading men urged that we withdraw from the Philippines and permit their people to organize their own government in their own way. Mark Twain, too, and other literary men pleaded for the continuance of the traditional policy, and deplored the adventure into colonial expansion.

Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, who headed the first American Commission sent to the Philippines, before accepting the post had the following conversation with Mr. McKinley: "To be plain, Mr. President, I am opposed to your Philippine policy. I never wanted the Philippines." "Oh," replied the President, "that need not trouble you. I did not want the Philippines either, and in the protocol to the treaty I kept myself free not to take them, but in the end there was no alternative."

Unfortunately, a presidential campaign was approaching. McKinley and Mr. Bryan had been the contenders in 1896. Mr. Bryan was still the titular leader of the Democratic party. Mr. McKinley was leader of the Republicans. It was foreseen that they would be opponents again in 1900. The real truth about events in the Philippines was obscured in the fog of politics. Reports published in the newspapers pictured Aguinaldo as little better than a bandit and predicted shortly he would be captured and the so-called insurrection crushed forever. Military censorship—imposed by orders of General Otis—kept the American people in ignorance for many months. It was not till years later that they learned the facts. Some of these facts are that at the outbreak of the revolt Aguinaldo had assem-

bled an effective fighting force of 50,000; that the Filipinos then for the first time had rifles and other arms, that the people of the Islands were unitedly back of their army in a war for independence. Nevertheless, the Philippine Republic was treated as a joke in the United States. Finally, newspaper correspondents who had gone to Manila to report the news of the insurrection, joined in a "Round Robin" denouncing the censorship. The "Round Robin" was sent to the papers in America and to the friends of correspondents. Eventually the censorship was modified, and trustworthy accounts of events in the Philippines reached the people of this country. But it was then too late.

Neither President McKinley nor Mr. Bryan could look far into the future. Moreover, at this crisis they were both of them concerned with the political alignments, the platforms, and the nominations of the forthcoming presidential campaign. Naturally, but unfortunately, the partizan rivalries of the moment inspired exaggerations on both sides. The case of the Filipino, seven thousand miles away, was submitted, along with issues of no concern to him, at an election of a President of the United States. President McKinley faltered. Mr. Bryan ultimately influenced the ratification of the treaty, though he afterwards opposed it as "imperialistic."

In "America as a World Power," by J. H. Latané, the onus of acquiring the Philippines is placed upon President McKinley in the following language:

The question has often been asked, who was responsible for the treaty of 1899, particularly for the acquisition of the Philippine Islands? Attempts have been made to fix the responsibility on Admiral Dewey, on the peace Commissioners, on the Senate, and on the American people; but the responsibility must, of course, rest upon President McKinley. . . .

Dewey had been criticized for not sailing out of Manila Bay as soon as he had destroyed the Spanish fleet. Aside from the fact that his instructions contemplated offensive operations in the Philippines, such a course was out of the question. . . . In fact, he got on better before the arrival of Anderson and Merritt than he did afterwards, for the presence of troops without the announcement of a clearly defined policy necessarily caused trouble with the insurgents. The parting of the ways was when President McKinley sent the first expedition from San Francisco to Manila.

McKinley accepted the advice of men in Washington who knew nothing about the conditions in the Philippines, had never been there, and had hurriedly gathered together ill-assorted and incorrect data. These advisers represented Manila as capable of being made a great Asiatic trading-post. Manila harbor was to be (in their minds) a powerful naval base, which would give the United States an Oriental stronghold equal to Gibraltar. The natives were described as half barbarian tribesmen, head-hunters, and bandits. In short, a picture was painted for partizan purposes.

In the contest of 1900 Bryan made "imperialism" the issue, and challenged the various proposals—they were scarcely policies—of the McKinley administration. Mr. McKinley defended those on the grounds of humanitarianism. A defenseless people (the Filipinos) could not be left as prey to one of the greater nations, he and his spokesmen said, and to return them to the Spanish was unthinkable. This alternative of restoring Spanish government in the Islands was one that it was neither necessary nor advisable to choose, as Aguinaldo's soldiers were a barrier to Spain's continuance in possession.

But to return to the situation existing at the time the treaty went to the Senate. Mr. McKinley was still un-

certain. To cure his indecision he resorted to prayer, he said, "on more than one night." The occasion of this revelation that he sought the coöperation of Providence was a visit made to him at the White House by a delegation from the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, at that time in session in Washington. His words are reported by Walter Millis as follows:

Hold a moment longer! Not quite yet, gentlemen! Before you go I would like to say just a word about the Philippine business. . . . The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. . . . I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.

And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed and slept soundly.

Mr. McKinley was a religious man. It is quite probable that he had prayed for divine guidance in our war for

the liberation of Cuba. The heavenly counsel he received then, if any was vouchsafed, must have moved him to free the Cubans from Spanish rule and aid them in founding their own republic. In addition to the directions that came to him from on high—again, if any—Mr. McKinley had in his possession also a rather important expression of opinion by Admiral Dewey. The latter had cabled from Manila this estimate of the Filipinos: "In my opinion, these people are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races."

If Divine Providence had sheperded him in the right way as to Cuban liberty, it is just a little strange that the same Providence did not suggest to him that his course in the Philippines meant the death of 4,165 Americans and approximately 16,000 Filipinos in our war of "pacification." The ways of Providence are passing strange, especially if and when mixed with politics.

And what of Mr. Bryan? He was all eagerness to present and press the issue of "imperialism" in the coming campaign. He appeared in Washington and, by persuasion, induced Democratic Senators to change their minds and approve the Treaty of Paris including its program of annexation of the Philippines. Even then ratification was accomplished by the narrow margin of one vote.

Mr. Bryan told these Senators the Democratic party could not hope to win the next campaign with free silver as the issue. "Imperialism" offered the better chance of success, he argued, according to the account I am quoting. Senator Pettigrew, describing the incident, stated: "I told him [Bryan] that he had no business in Washington on such an errand. . . . Others refused to follow his advice and urged to leave the matter to the Senate." Andrew Carnegie was in Washington opposing the treaty. Speaking

of this incident, he said: "One word from Mr. Bryan would have saved the country from disaster. I could not be cordial to him for years afterwards."

Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, who was leading the opposition to the treaty, saw the effect of Mr. Bryan's activities. "Mr. Bryan, in the height of the contest," wrote Senator Hoar, "came to Washington for the express purpose of urging upon his followers that it was best to support the treaty, end the war, and let the question of what should be done with our conquest be settled in the coming campaign. He urged upon them, as I was told by several Democrats at the time who did not take his advice, that the Democratic party could not hope to win a victory on the financial questions at stake, as they had been beaten on them in a time of adversity; and that they must have this issue for the coming campaign. He was besought by his wiser political associates to go away and leave the Senate to settle the matter. But he remained. After that it became impossible not only to defeat the treaty, but to defeat the policy which had inspired it."

Mr. Bryan complained that Senator Hoar's criticism was unjust. In a letter to Judge Elliott on November 9, 1915, we find this statement:

Senator Hoar's criticism of my position is unjust. He looks at the matter from the standpoint of a Republican, I from the standpoint of a Democrat. The situation was this: it might have been possible to defeat the ratification of the treaty, but it was impossible to instruct the commission, and of course, it was not proper according to the theory of our institutions that a minority should dictate to the majority how the treaty should be made. . . . Then, too, a great pressure was being brought to bear upon the government by parents to get their boys out of the army, the actual fighting being over, and this blame, too, would have been thrown upon the Democratic

party, the few Republicans being unable to commit their party or fasten the responsibility upon it . . . my advice was to ratify the treaty and at the same time promise independence by resolution. . . .

Mr. Bryan had his way. With his assistance the treaty was ratified. In keeping with his plans, he made imperialism the issue in the next campaign, but there was one thing he had not counted on. There were a great many people who remembered the campaign of 1896, when free silver was his dominant issue. While these disliked the program of the Republican administration, they disliked even more Mr. Bryan's previous record as a champion of free silver and voted against him on that ground. The battle against imperialism was fought with vigor and brilliancy under the leadership of Mr. Bryan, but the real issue was obscured by the free silver issue.

CONGRESSIONAL UNCERTAINTY

In the Senate the leadership on the question of retaining the Philippines devolved on the Senators from Massachusetts, George F. Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge, both Republicans. Mr. Hoar, the Senior Senator, put his whole heart into the opposition. He was well advanced in years, but his words rang. They were full of logic and vigor and weighted with American precedent. His attitude is described in his own language:

I would declare now that we would not take these islands to govern them against the will of the natives.

I would reject a cession of sovereignty which implied that sovereignty may be bought and sold and delivered without the consent of the people.

I would require all foreign governments to keep out of those islands.

I would offer to the people of the Philippines our help in maintaining order until they have a reasonable opportunity to establish a government of their own.

I would aid them by advice, if they desire it, to set up a free and independent government.


I would invite all the great powers of Europe to unite in an agreement that independence shall not be interfered with.

I would declare that the United States will enforce the same doctrine as applicable to the Philippines that we declared as to Mexico and Haiti and the South American republics.

The Junior Senator, Mr. Lodge, speaking in the Senate, stated his reasons for giving his vote to ratification: "I want to get this country out of war and back to peace. . . . I want to enter upon a policy which shall enable us to give peace and self-government to the natives of those islands. The rejection of the treaty makes all these things impossible."

Senator Hoar tells of an interview he had with President McKinley in relation to Hawaii in 1898: "I never at any time during this discussion of the Philippine question expressed a more emphatic disapproval of the acquisition of dependencies or Oriental empire by military strength than he expressed to me on that occasion." Early in the session, Senator George G. Vest of Missouri introduced a resolution which declared that, "The colonial system of European nations cannot be established under our present Constitution, and that if we acquired new territory, it could, therefore, only be with the purpose of organizing it into states within the union."

In the pages of Millis we read that even the House of Representatives, though it had no Constitutional function with respect to the ratification of treaties, nevertheless



Part of the 250,000 people in independence parade, Manila

became a forum for the discussion of the Paris Compact. "The House, of course, had no business with these great matters [Millis tells us], but it did not hesitate to discuss them, and Mr. John Sharp Williams, then a youthful Representative from Mississippi, found in an agricultural appropriations bill the text for a fiery assault upon Philippine annexation. Mr. Williams exposed the hypocrisy of our 'moral obligation' with all the irony of a tongue that was to be famous for a generation. 'We are not bound to have the Philippines!' he exclaimed. 'Why, six months ago men who talk that way did not know where the Philippines are!' And the House responded with laughter. The argument that we had to take the Philippines in order to save them from misgovernment was laid bare in a memorable sentence: 'Who made us God's globetrotting vice-regents to forestall misgovernment everywhere?'"

This is taken from Elliott: "'What do you suppose the Filipinos would do,' dramatically asked Mr. Choate, 'if we should withdraw the American troops?' 'Well,' drawled Speaker Reed, 'I don't suppose they would pursue us farther than San Francisco.'" The Speaker Reed of the story was Thomas Brackett Reed of Maine, noted parliamentarian and wit.

Millis also tells us of Reed's dissent:

Czar Reed was finished. He stayed by the party only long enough to see it through the crisis and then resigned the seat which he had so long held in the lower house, and went into a retirement from which he fired occasional shots. "Thanks for the statistics," he wrote to the clerk of the House Committee on Appropriations. "I have got to hunt all over your figures even to find out how much each yellow man cost us in the bush. As I make it out he has cost \$30 per Malay and he is still in the bush. Why didn't you purchase him of Spain F.O.B. with definite freight rate and insurance paid?" And

then he turned to amuse his leisure with the composition of imaginary letters from General Weyler to Congress, in which the General asked that body to give him due credit as the originator of its methods in the Philippines.

Senator Bacon of Georgia introduced a resolution, the second section of which is this:

2. That in demanding and in receiving the cession of the Philippine Islands, it is not the purpose of the Government of the United States to secure and maintain dominion over the same as a part of the territory of the United States or to incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of this government.

This resolution was defeated only by the deciding vote of the Vice-President. If it had passed, there would have been no Philippine-American War.

In "America as a World Power" there is to be seen the contrast between the positions taken by the Massachusetts Senators. I quote from this work:

Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, delivered a Constitutional argument which attracted much attention, declaring that the proposal to acquire and hold the Philippine Islands was in violation of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the whole spirit of American institutions. The opportunist view, which ultimately prevailed, was voiced by the junior senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, who said: "Suppose we ratify the treaty! The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to the conditions there to be able to say just what it will be best to do, nor, I may add, do I think any one is."

A great many senators felt as Senator Spooner, when he said: "This Philippine proposition is one of the fruits of the war. To me it is one of the bitter fruits of the war. I wish with all my heart we were honorably quit of it." He held, however, that the United States had the absolute right to acquire territory, and while as a matter of expediency he did not think that the best interests of the United States would be subserved by "permanent dominion over far-distant lands, and people" yet he thought it better to vote for the treaty than to continue the war.

After the defeat of Senator Vest's series of amendments, by a vote of 53 to 30, a resolution was offered by Senator McEnery of Louisiana. Le Roy tells us what it contemplated:

Mr. McEnery, of Louisiana, one of the Southern Senators who were supporting the treaty, not merely in spite of its provision for the annexation of the Philippines, but in part because of this opportunity to secure an Oriental outpost for trade, introduced a joint resolution declaring that, by the ratification of the treaty with Spain, it was not intended "to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States," but to establish there "a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants," to "prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands."

Senator Bacon attempted to amend the McEnery Resolution by a clause formally disclaiming "any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction or control." This embodied the thought of Senator Vest, but it would have thrown the whole treaty open for

reconsideration. The vote on the Bacon amendment was a tie. The Vice-President cast the deciding vote against it. The resolution was then passed by a vote of 26 to 22. It never reached a vote in the House of Representatives.

Let Le Roy describe the final vote:

The Sunday before the day set for a vote brought the news of the outbreak of fighting around Manila, and on Monday morning, before the vote, came more definite news of the Sunday battle, with its indication that a war of more or less seriousness had begun—a thing much hinted at in the United States, but not really expected, so optimistic had been the prevailing tone of comment, based in large part upon official news. The downright opponents of Philippine annexation were only more confirmed in their opposition. Those who were wavering between a desire not to reject the treaty in toto and an objection to having their country assume extensive possessions in the Far East now were inclined to feel that to reject the treaty was more or less refusing to vote supplies when their country was at war. The Senate consented to the ratification by a vote of 57 to 27.

At the time of the ratification of the treaty little was known about the Philippines. No one predicted or apprehended a long war with the Filipino Republic. That had been discontinued. There was a feeling that ratification meant the end of war, that ratification would bring our soldier boys back home. But Mr. McKinley had prayed, and Mr. Bryan had persuaded; we had a brand new treaty and had bought a brand new war in the Philippines!

CHAPTER VII

ARE THEY READY FOR IT?

THE vigorous and oft-quoted Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina never laughed longer or more heartily than during an argument in the Senate when it was asserted in 1916 that the Filipino was not yet fit for self-government. He called attention to the four million slaves of the South who had first been freed and then by Constitutional amendment given the same rights and privileges, the same political status, and the same participation in government as their former white masters. He argued that if the Negro when emancipated from slavery was permitted to participate in government, why should not the same privilege be accorded to the Filipino?

The difference between the Negro and the Filipino, Senator Tillman said, was that one was a black man who originally came from Africa, where there had been little or no government and a very low order of civilization, while the other was a brown man who came from Asia with a written language dating before the arrival of the Spanish, and boasting a Christian ancestry which had never been in slavery, but which, on the contrary, had fought many wars for national independence. The South Carolina statesman laughed, and even his opponents had to snicker.

"Are they ready for it?" That question concerning the Filipino people's preparedness for independence is more frequent than any other on this complex subject. The

inquiry comes from two different groups. One group asks the question honestly, intending to raise the point that our sovereignty in the Philippines should not be abrogated until we shall be confident that the Filipinos have attained such a measure of political development as will enable them to establish and maintain permanent, orderly government, and to assure their own welfare and happiness. The other group of Americans ask the question not to gain information but to voice their doubts about the fitness of these Islanders to govern themselves as well as we can govern them. It is their purpose to confuse the minds of Americans and of Congress. They are simply making a flank attack.

The Jones Law, the preamble of which is quoted in another chapter, promises that American sovereignty shall be withdrawn and Philippine independence recognized "as soon as a stable government can be established." Fortunately, there is a clear understanding regarding what "stable government" means. Our relations with the Latin American republics have furnished a satisfactory definition. As rapidly as these republics threw off the yoke of Spain and created governments republican in form, they were recognized by the United States as stable and sovereign. President Andrew Jackson clarified the matter. Fifty years later President Grant, in a message to Congress regarding an attempt of the Cuban people to liberate themselves, wrote this formula:

Where a considerable body of people, who have attempted to free themselves of the control of the superior government, have reached such point in occupation of territory, in power, and in general organization as to constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability, and equipped with the machinery for the administration of internal policy and the

execution of its laws, prepared and able to administer justice at home, as well as in its dealing with other powers, it is within the province of those other powers to recognize its existence as a new and independent nation.

Even before the time of President Jackson and President Grant, John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State in President Monroe's Cabinet, laid down certain rules with respect to this country's attitude to the Latin American republics then in process of formation: "In every question relating to the independence of a nation two principles are involved, one of right and the other of fact: the former exclusively depending upon the determination of the nation itself, and the latter resulting from the successful execution of that determination."

When President McKinley was confronted with the question of recognizing the independence of Cuba, he evidently borrowed from President Grant. This was McKinley's view:

The United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of Independence by a neutral state (to-wit, that the revolted state shall "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of all the elements of stability," and forming *de facto* "if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state"), has imposed for its own government in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away.

In his message to Congress in April, 1898, he said:

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take

measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the Island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

We come back to the case of the Philippines. Let us see how the rules that guided us in recognizing the independence of the various States erected in Latin America apply to the people of the Philippines. In his farewell message to Congress, President Wilson officially declared that the Filipinos had established a stable government. He said: "Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of Congress in their behalf, . . ."

President Harding, in answering the Filipino Mission, though he was far from interpreting for its members or the rest of the world the phrase "stable government," at least did not deprive the Filipinos of their hopes. There is kindness—something of his native sympathy—in what he told them. It was this:

Fate cast our relationship. No fixed intent, no thought of conquest, no individual or governmental design to exploit, no desire to colonize, brought us together. It was the revolution of the fates, wherein our assault against oppression at our very doors carried our warfare to yours, far away, and your liberation attended. No American statesmen had preconceived expansion to the Orient, no American industrial or commercial interests were urging the planting of the flag and our responsibility in distant lands. The fortunes of war revealed us to one another, and held us as your sponsors before the world.

If the words "stable government" mean a political system that preserves order and promotes the welfare of the people for whom it exists and operates, while at the same time it receives their sanction and support, then surely the Filipinos have made their régime fit the definition. They have demonstrated their ability to preserve law and order, and, so far as they have been permitted, they have fulfilled international engagements by affording security to the persons, rights, and property of foreign residents. Besides showing the capacity to establish and conduct a stable government they have shown ability to pay the cost of government. Congress appropriated for the first Taft Commission the sum of \$50,000. This was later repaid to the United States from the Insular Treasury. With the exception of \$3,000,000 appropriated by Congress to relieve the distress of the Filipino people as a result of the revolt, there have been no grants of money from the United States Treasury.

It has been told—but it deserves to be reiterated—that all the expenses of government in the Islands have been paid by the Filipinos. These expenses include the salary of the Governor-General, and of his several advisory commissions, the maintenance of his residence, and allowances for traveling expenses; the salaries of the Vice-Governor and the Auditor, the last remaining American officials. The capacity of the Filipino people to finance their own political household is increasing. While the American population of the Philippines is decreasing, the native population is growing rapidly. The Islands number more inhabitants than any of the Latin-American Republics except Mexico and Brazil. The following table gives the relative importance of the Philippines and of each of the Latin American countries in respect to area and population.

	Area in square miles	Population
Philippine Islands	114,360	13,000,000
Argentina	1,153,418	10,904,022
Brazil	3,285,319	40,272,650
Bolivia	514,595	2,952,139
Chile	281,820	4,364,395
Colombia	482,400	7,967,788
Ecuador	118,627	1,500,000
Paraguay	172,000	791,000
Peru	533,916	5,500,000
Uruguay	72,153	1,850,129
Venezuela	393,976	3,026,818

Of the foregoing group of ten South American countries all but one has a greater territorial area than the Philippines, but only one of them has a population as great.

	Area in square miles	Populations
Costa Rica	23,005	471,521
Cuba	44,164	3,607,919
Dominican Republic	19,325	897,405
Guatemala	42,353	2,119,165
Haiti	10,204	2,300,200
Honduras	46,332	773,408
Mexico	767,198	16,404,030
Nicaragua	49,200	638,119
Panama	33,667	467,459
Salvador	7,225	1,610,000

Among these countries there is but one—Mexico—with a greater area than the Philippines, and it is also the only one of them having a greater population. Of the twenty-three countries in Europe only nine have a greater area than the Philippine Islands, and only eight of them have a greater population. Few of them, if any, give as many evidences of progressiveness in government as the Philip-

pines. Sanitation and hygiene have for many years been under the exclusive control and direction of Filipinos. Activities in behalf of public health are carried on through the Philippine Health Service, at the head of which is a Filipino. In this service there are also 465 Filipino physicians and 2,278 non-medical employees. Various other agencies such as those of the Public Welfare Commissioner, the Bureau of Education, the Philippine General Hospital, the puericultural centers, and the 372 women's clubs scattered throughout the Islands, aid in realizing the general health and sanitation and public welfare program. With the exception of local and infrequent outbreaks of dysentery in a few provinces, the Philippines have been virtually free from epidemics for the last ten years. The health education of the masses, by means of lectures and demonstrations on the subject of health before public gatherings has not been neglected. A section of Publicity and Health Education under the Philippine Health Service was created in 1927.

At the end of the year 1928 there were in the Islands 37 government hospitals of various types in operation. There were also four insane-asylums. Many other such institutions are now in process of construction. There are, in addition, several private and charitable hospitals scattered throughout the archipelago. At the end of 1928 the public laboratories numbered 40, the puericulture centers 198, and the public dispensaries 1,067.

For many years General Emilio Aguinaldo has refrained from an elaborate expression of opinion respecting independence. His letter to me of July 25, 1931, covers almost the entire situation—at least all the highly controversial points of it. His letter is reproduced in full in the Appendix, for the purpose of preserving its text. On the particular subject of sanitation General Aguinaldo said:

It has been argued that with the advent of independence there will be a backslide in the sanitary conditions of these Islands. Nothing is more erroneous. The present sanitary service, which is a success, has been in the hands of Filipino officials for more than fifteen years. In case of independence, therefore, the danger is not in a possible backsliding, but in going ahead too fast, for then there will be greater desire to serve the country recently emancipated.

Some insight into the national government of the Philippines has been given, but before there can be a fair answer to the question of whether or not the people of the Islands are ready for independence, there must be a consideration of their municipal governments. With the exception of the mayor of Baguio, the administrators of municipal governments are Filipinos. Municipalities are divided into five classes, according to their receipts. Municipalities of the first class are those whose annual receipts have averaged fifty thousand pesos or more during the last three years. These have a council of eight members. Municipalities of the second class are those whose annual receipts have averaged thirty thousand pesos or more, but less than fifty thousand pesos during the last three years. Municipalities of the second class have a council of eight members. Municipalities of the third class are those whose annual receipts have averaged fifteen thousand pesos or more, but less than thirty thousand pesos during the last three years, and they have a council of six members. Municipalities of the fourth class are those whose annual receipts averaged five thousand pesos or more, but less than fifteen thousand pesos during the last three years, and these have a council of six members. Municipalities of the fifth class are those whose annual receipts averaged less than five thousand pesos during the last three years. These have a council of four members.

The Provincial Governor has a general supervision over municipal officers. The Philippine Legislature appropriated from the Philippine Treasury for the advancement of the so-called Moro districts; for the extension of the school system; for public works, including the construction of roads and trails; and for the development of natural economic resources and agriculture.

In the Philippine Civil Service there are at present 20,100 employees, but of that number only 494 are Americans, and virtually all of these are school-teachers. It is evident from the facts I have presented, here and heretofore, regarding Filipino participation in the municipal, provincial, and insular governments, that the only American officials in the Islands are the Governor-General, the Vice-Governor, the Insular Auditor, the five American Justices of the Supreme Court, and two judges of the inferior courts, two provincial governors, and a few bureau chiefs and technical experts who have been retained because of long and faithful service.

In the matter of education, the Philippines ranks high. Spain established the first university in the Philippines, the University of Santo Tomás, which antedates Harvard, our oldest university, by twenty-five years. Other institutions of higher learning also were established during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for women as well as for men. When the Americans arrived on the scene, they found 2,160 schools dispersed throughout the archipelago. To-day there are in the Philippines approximately 8,000 schools, of which 7,348 are public and 621 private. The latter, however, are subject to government supervision. Enrolment in these schools is nearly 1,250,000. English is the official language of instruction, and the teaching staff numbers approximately 30,000. Of this number only between 300 and 400 are Americans. More money

is spent for education in the Philippines than for any other activity of the Government, as is disclosed by the fact that nearly 32 per cent of the total government revenues is devoted to public instruction.

The better-known universities in the Islands, in the order of their establishment, are the University of Santo Tomás, with an enrolment of 2,500; the University of the Philippines, with over 7,000; the National University with nearly 6,000; and the University of Manila, with 4,000. All the recognized professions are taught in these universities, and their graduates who come to the United States to pursue further studies are given credit by American universities for the work which they have done in the Islands.

According to the census of 1918, people who could read or write were 49.2 per cent of the population over ten years ago. It is estimated that the percentage of literacy to-day is at least 60 per cent. This percentage is higher than that of Siam (10 per cent), Bulgaria (16 per cent), and Greece or Chile (50 per cent). It is higher than that of any of the Central American republics.

To-day education is almost a mark of caste; or, stated another way, one loses caste who does not send his children to school. Many privations will be suffered that this can be done.

The most recent observer, Mr. Sherwood Eddy, described the school situation as follows:

More than a third of all the children are already in school and sixty per cent of the population is now literate, under a better system of education than was found in many of our western states a generation ago. They already have a larger percentage of children in high schools than has England, France, Italy, or Spain. They devote 28 per cent of their entire budget to education, a larger proportion almost than any other country in the world.

Public order in the Philippines in recent years has been excellent. I asked one of the witnesses before the Senate Committee about the general conditions in the Islands with regard to crime. His answer came quickly that there were more crimes in Chicago alone than in all the Philippines. During the first years of American occupation, the United States maintained a force of approximately 70,000 men in the Islands. So large a force was necessary to hasten the pacification of the Islands then seething with revolt, but with the coming of peace the maintenance of public order gradually passed into the hands of the Filipinos themselves and to-day that responsibility rests on the local police forces and the Philippine Constabulary. A few Americans in the Manila police force excepted, Filipinos are in charge of the preservation of public order and safety.

The Philippine Constabulary or insular police, as distinguished from the municipal police, numbers 6,300 enlisted men, all Filipinos, and 398 officers, of whom 375 are Filipinos and only 23 are Americans. The head of this force for many years was a Filipino, but at his death the officer who followed him in rank succeeded him, and he, by chance, was an American.

There are in the Philippines to-day four American military garrisons where the American forces numbering approximately 4,106 men, and the Philippine Scouts numbering 6,477 men, are quartered, but they play little or no part in the maintenance of public order.

Justice is administered in the Philippines through a centralized system composed of the 865 justices of the peace courts already mentioned, 28 district courts or Courts of First Instance, and a Supreme Court sitting in Manila. There are 41 district judges at present, all but two of whom are Filipinos. They are appointed by the Gov-

ernor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The Supreme Court is composed of nine justices appointed by the President of the United States. The Chief Justice and three other members of this court are Filipinos. Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on writs of certiorari, but these are very small in number. The latest estimate is that during the last nine years only one half of one per cent of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

The capacity of both branches of the Philippine Legislature has been attested time and again by Governors-General, investigating commissions, and independent observers. The native legislators are nearly all educated men. To-day they have a preponderance of younger men, and virtually all of them are university graduates.

The English language is taught in all public schools. Newspapers are printed in it. Together with Spanish, it is made the official language of the Islands. The necessity for Spanish still continues because of the ancient precedents in court decisions, and because of the early records, all of which are in Spanish.

The Philippine Government provides for scholarship allowances covering cost of transportation, tuition, board and lodging, and other expenses. These scholarships are utilized in perfecting the education of some of the brighter students. For special studies, there are provided a College of Medicine, a School of Fine Arts, a College of Agriculture, a College of Veterinary Science, a College of Engineering, a College of Liberal Arts, a College of Law, a School of Forestry, a Conservatory of Music, a Junior College of Liberal Arts; indeed, there are all the modern schools required by the civilized nations. Only the Government's financial capacity limits the more rapid exten-

sion of educational facilities. But the capacity to enlarge this service does not depend on the United States, because no United States money has ever gone into the work of educating the Filipinos, and independence would not, therefore, change this situation.

There are more than two thousand libraries outside of Manila, and the formation of libraries in the different schools is being industriously stimulated.

Filipinos have their political parties and political leaders, but unfortunately both their parties and their leaders have their minds so diverted from economic subjects by the overshadowing issue of independence that these and other domestic concerns are frequently neglected. The Filipino politicians and leaders are just about the same as those in other countries. They attain their leadership sometimes because of political skill, sometimes through the gift of oratory, sometimes through the power of money, sometimes through class prejudice. The same elements that throw men into political leadership in other lands give men leadership in the Philippines, and the leaders exercise their power as their ilk do elsewhere. At this particular time the three men most prominent in political life are Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas, but right back of these are some very able Filipino leaders ready to take their place, just as in our own country. Of course, the fervent affection and long-continued esteem felt for General Aguinaldo collocate him in this group of leaders.

Political questions which affect or interest the Filipino people are discussed in pamphlets, books, speeches, and newspaper interviews. Extensive debates on a variety of subjects are conducted. The statement continuously made by those who oppose independence, that the issue is the creature solely of the politicians, is absurd as well as untrue. Elections have been carried on in an orderly manner,

comparing most favorably with those held in the United States. There has been little violence, no evidence of intimidation, and apparently the use of money for corrupt practices has not been developed in the Islands as it has in the United States. This opinion is not mine alone. It is held by American administrators and executives.

Those who say the Filipinos are not fitted for independence support this assertion with the still more gratuitous assertion that the Islanders do not understand, else they would not accept its responsibilities. But that argument is no more valid against the Filipino than it is against other peoples. To say that all Americans understand the tariff—a subject long debated in our country—or our foreign relations, or the League of Nations, would be an absurdity. Of course there are large masses of the Philippine people who do not understand what independence would bring, in responsibilities; in financial burden; in new problems. But most Filipinos are learning, have learned, the price they must pay for independence. They are endeavoring to equip themselves for the big task of being their own master. However, for some reason the fact that they are doing this thoroughly, conscientiously, and intelligently, seems to be hidden from American eyes.

A remarkable convention called "The First Independence Congress" was held at Manila from February 22 to February 26, 1930. It was composed of three thousand delegates representing every section of the Philippine people, geographically, economically, politically, and in a religious way too, for Catholics, Protestants, Mohammedans, and Pagans attended it. These three thousand delegates divided their theme, independence, into sub-topics, and assigned men and women to discuss a particular subject and to report back to the convention.

I have read very carefully the volume of 365 pages con-

taining a report of this convention. As the chronicle of an effort of thousands to acquire an intelligent understanding of independence, it is a remarkable human document, notable for moderation of statement, for the friendly words with which the delegates spoke of the Government and the people of the United States; for the clear perception of the responsibilities of nationhood, and for insight into the problems the future hold for them. Some paragraphs from addresses at the gathering I think well worth a place in this book, but first I shall give the text of the resolution adopted by the delegates:

We, members of the First Independence Congress, convened at the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, from February 22nd to 26th, 1930, on the initiative of private citizens, and composed of representatives of business and agriculture, directors of civic organizations, leaders in the various professions, publicists, educators, labor, religious and student leaders, municipal presidents, Moro chiefs, co-workers of Rizal and Del Pilar in Spain, veterans of the revolution, elective officials of the provincial governments, high officials of the former Philippine Republic, past and present members of the Philippine Legislature and Filipino members of the Council of State, after deliberating upon the problems of independence including national defense, finance and economics, as well as political, social and educational questions which would be faced by an independent Philippines, hereby make the following declaration: "While fully conscious of the debt of gratitude we owe to America for her benevolent policy in the Philippines, we are convinced that immediate independence is the only solution in consonance with the unalterable desires of the Filipino people. No matter how lightly an alien control may rest on a people, it cannot, it will not, make that people happy. The genius and potentialities of the Filipino people can only be developed in an atmosphere of freedom unrestrained by foreign rule. Differences in race, history and civilization render

difficult, if not impossible, a common life under one flag between the American and Filipino peoples.

"The uncertainty of our future political status hampers the economic development of the country: Our present trade relations with the United States are not conducive to the economic independence of the Philippines, and whatever may be the temporary advantages of such relations, we are willing to forego them for the sake of freedom. The longer we remain under America, the harder will it be for us to be freed from our political and economic dependence on her. We are now better prepared for nationhood than many independent states of today and we are ready to assume the risks and responsibilities of Independence. We are not unmindful of the fact that in the final solution and settlement of the Philippine problem, American and foreign interest must be adequately safeguarded. The establishment of a Philippine Republic today will but be the logical and just outcome of our long struggles for freedom and will be in keeping with America's history and traditions. Independence will make for closer friendship and better understanding between America and the Philippines, while retention fosters distrust and ill-feeling. In our solemn constitutional covenant with America she has promised to grant us Independence as soon as a stable government can be established. This condition has long been fulfilled.

"Therefore, in the name and in behalf of the Filipino people, we solemnly affirm, with full realization of the consequences and responsibilities of political independence, that our people should be allowed to live an independent life and to establish a government of their own without any further delay and without any condition which makes its advent uncertain; hence we respectfully reiterate our petition to the people and government of the United States to grant the Philippines immediate, complete and absolute independence."

Dean Maximo M. Kalaw, Executive Secretary, in opening the convention, said:

"The idea was started by private citizens; but when we

urged our legislative leaders to carry it out because they are the legal representatives of the people, we were told that, in order to give freshness to the movement and to attract other men and parties, citizens outside of active politics had better take the initiative. In that way, they further argued, the people of the United States would know that the independence agitation here is not limited to the political leaders. This is the explanation for the calling of this congress merely by a group of citizens."

The President of the Congress, Felipe Agoncillo, reminded the United States—and the world—of our pledge:

"We avail ourselves of the birthday of the immortal Washington, the founder of the great North American Republic, and on this day request the Government of the United States to give us the immediate fulfilment of the solemn promise made in the preamble of the Jones Law. It is a word of honor which America has given before the world, and because it is jealous of its national honor, should in no way elude its fulfilment."

Antonio de las Alas, Speaker pro tempore of the House of Representatives, said:

"In the Philippines, we are fortunate that we can always invoke the history and traditions of America to keep alive our sentiments of nationalism and accelerate its onward march. The facts still linger in our minds that the Pilgrims emigrated to America to enjoy freedom; that the Boston Tea Party was a protest against acts done by the British Government without the consent of the American colonists; that though few, ill-fed, barely clothed, poorly armed and untrained for military duties, the Revolutionary army, under Washington, continued fighting with might and main to attain the independence of America; that the Declaration of Independence lays down the ideal of government with the consent of the governed;

that the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated to close the American continent from colonization by European nations; that the Civil War was fought to give life and blood to the tenet that all are born free and equal; that the Spanish-American War was fought to save Cuba from further atrocities; and that America participated in the last great war to make the world safe for democracy and to compel each nation, including the small ones, to respect the rights of others."

Mrs. Rosa L. Sevilla de Alvero, on behalf of the Filipino women, fairly characterized the methods the Filipinos have employed in pursuit of their ideal:

"We, the women, are the first to condemn all violent measures, because no longer are we in the age of the cave-man, when right by might was necessary to enforce the law of righteousness, and because we have more powerful and persuasive weapons. And all those who prove themselves hostile to our legitimate aspirations, let them be ostracized to indifference and isolation. We are happily in a period in which reason predominates, in which in the struggles for principles and ideals he who has faith in himself and in his own convictions triumphs."

Juan Sumulong, at that time Minority Floor Leader in the Philippine Senate, impressed on the delegates:

"We do not aspire to be free on mere sentimentalism. We are convinced that in the degree of development reached by our country, the uncertainty of its definite political status is a positive obstacle to all real and durable progress. While the indefiniteness subsists, while it is made and planned our country will suffer from the evils of provisionality; timidity and vacillation will be the characteristic decisions of the nation and foreign enterprises; our commerce with the exterior will be restrained and limited; and the whole country, oppressed by the dark-

ness of the future, will continue to be like a man waiting for an unknown sentence which may give him back his liberty or deprive him of it forever."

Sergio Osmeña, President pro-tempore of the Philippine Senate, said:

"Our exact comprehension of the responsibilities, problems, and sacrifices which will bring independence will educate our intelligence and our character and will prepare us to be worthy of receiving it, and, above all, it will teach us to uphold and support it for us and for our children; for the natives and the strangers; for all men of good-will who want to live with us and who consider it an honor and a security to be under our flag. Determination, disinterestedness, the spirit of discipline, are qualities which, when united together in our case, will firmly conquer all obstacles."

The Honorable Rafael Alunan, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and National Resources, called attention to problems and difficulties which some opponents of independence declare the Filipino either does not perceive or wish to mention:

"The sensible people of the Philippine Islands can congratulate themselves that the leaders of public thought have realized the necessity of giving due attention to the economic aspect of the independence problem. One must admit that a free and independent existence necessarily brings with it many and serious economic problems. . . . There are two dangers involved in the solution of the Philippine problem; the first consists in our closing our eyes to the economic difficulties which are a necessary consequence of independence, attempting to ignore their existence. The second is to insist upon seeing things as we would like them to be or think they ought to be, but are not in reality, because they have bad sides as well as good."

Guillermo Gomez, Under-Secretary of the Department of Finance, also foresaw—and foretold—some of the offsets to independence:

“But there is no doubt that we can survive and even progress, if we know how to bear sacrifices and find the means of lowering the cost of production, contenting ourselves with smaller salaries and profits; introducing more scientific and economical methods in cultivation and harvesting, and uniting our efforts and coöperating with each other in looking for a more remunerative outlet for our crops: in a word, working harder than ever with our brains and brawn, so that we may successfully pass through the period of test resulting from our emancipation, a test which will aggravate the unfortunate coincidence of the restrictions to be placed on our market in America with the superabundance of tropical products throughout the world.”

Cornelio Balmaceda, of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, spoke in the tenor of Under-Secretary Gomez:

“The present free trade is a serious obstacle to Philippine independence. It has tightened and is tightening the commercial ties that bind us with the United States, and the longer we keep on with it the more economically dependent upon the ruling nation we shall become, and the more difficult it will be to sever our political relations with her. We must, therefore, work at once for the abolition of the free trade. But in order to make this necessary change in our tariff system less disturbing to our economic situation and to mitigate to some extent the economic shock that it would cause to our people, we should see to it that its abolition is effected gradually, if such an arrangement can be secured. A period of ten years may be fixed within which the present tariff arrangement may be abolished. After the first two years, we can shift to a preferential

tariff arrangement with the United States instead of free trade."

Honorio Ventura, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, said:

"It will be sufficient for me to state once more that our country has until now responded to all calls of duty as regards public order, obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of nationals and foreigners, and has at all times furnished the coöperation and services necessary for the maintenance of the constituted government and required by the public welfare, not only as an element subordinate to a foreign authority or supreme power, but as a factor indispensable to national existence, with moral and material powers and responsibilities of its own."

Dean Kalaw spoke thus for the Political Section of the First Independence Congress:

"The independence question itself is the greatest deterrent to the political development of the Philippines. So long as that question remains unsolved real political progress is practically impossible. Every other political issue is overshadowed by independence and no real party system is developed. Independence has been the one major issue of Philippine politics ever since our first election. . . . Under the circumstances, therefore, no real party system can exist and no other issues can become prominent enough aside from the issue of independence. . . . It is conceded that there are many other Philippine problems of political nature which must be studied and solved for the proper political development of the country. There is the problem of the system of government to be established. There is the problem of the relation between the central and the local governments. There is the problem of corruption in the government. There is the problem of elections. . . . In order, therefore, that the people may

cultivate proper respect and loyalty for the State, in order that they may develop self-reliance and self-sacrifice, in order that they may follow their own ideas and establish the forms of government adapted to their needs, in order that they may discuss freely their own political problems unmixed with the independence question, and in order that they might develop a proper attitude of vigilance and self-criticism toward their political leaders and social institutions, it becomes necessary that the independence question be solved, and be solved immediately. . . . A real love for American institutions will blossom in a republic born out of the generosity of the American people. The Philippine Republic will be the greatest monument to America in this part of the globe. It will be a veritable lamp which will be seen and admired from all corners of Asia."

Dean Francisco Benitez, of the College of Education, University of the Philippines, spoke thus:

"For the last fifty years at least, the fundamental concern of our people has been and is the struggle for the achievement of independent nationhood. After these years of efforts, our people to-day, an impartial observer will see, are as well prepared for it as any other people in the world that at present aspire for its independence. Ours is, in the first place, a homogeneous people, possessed of the same culture that has been the result of Malayan, Hindu, Chinese, Spanish, and American influences, able to communicate with one another in English and Spanish, the overwhelming majority of us being Christians united by a long history of sacrifices for liberty, and, thanks to the liberal policy of America, enlightened in the principles of good government and democracy. An impartial observer will further notice that the mind of our people is irrevocably made up on this question, not because we are un-

grateful to the United States, but because we realize that on account of fundamental differences in race and history and of our geographical situation, our people must work out their own destiny as a nation and in that way contribute their share to human progress and welfare. . . . With independence, we will be more conscious of our responsibilities and obligations as well as of our rights as an independent and self-respecting unit in the family of nations, and, with independence, there will be in our country a renaissance, a new determination to do and achieve all those things which will enable us not only to maintain and to foster progress and welfare among us, but to discharge all those duties that a civilized people owe to mankind."

Mariano H. de Joya, formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance, said:

"The diversity of races, religions, idioms, laws, institutions, and customs, however, are not obstacles to the formation of a great free and prosperous state so long as its basis be liberty. The ties that bind actually the hundred and twenty million inhabitants of the vast territories of the United States of America cannot be more artificial—men belonging to all races, professing an infinity of religious and political creeds, subject to diverse systems of legislation, with customs and traditions of all the circuits of the earth; but in spite of all that they constitute the greatest and most powerful nation of the world, where all the hatred and injurious rivalries are drowned, because they are firmly united by the same cause of liberty by the heat of which all nationalities are melted."

Filemon Perez, Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Communications, declared:

"If the realization of our political ambitions is really approaching, if it is true that there gleams in the horizon

rays of hope and that finally the Filipino people would be given the opportunity to live under their own determination, this is the moment of shaking and strengthening the civic conscience among our citizens. We should separate, when we treat of public questions, from party or regional considerations, in order to give preference to the common good. Let us go up so that from there we can have a more complete and comprehensive perspective of our national necessities and conveniences."

José P. Melencio, Representative of the Province of Cotabato, and son-in-law of General Aguinaldo, said:

"American and foreign capital . . . hesitates to make large investments in Mindanao because of the uncertain political status of our country. With the coming of independence we shall have to rely on Filipino capital and initiative for the development of Mindanao. But the government would have to extend the necessary encouragement in order to achieve something tangible. It will have to provide roads, shipping and docking facilities, and various means of communication from one place to another. Once these things are provided for, the rest will take care of itself."

Director Ludovico Hidrosollo of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, laid one of the ghosts with which foes of Filipino freedom are wont to frighten timid Americans:

"Mindanao is populated with Christian, Mohammedan, and Pagan peoples. Only two of the eight provinces which compose the island are predominantly Mohammedan. These two are Lanao and Cotabato. The Sulu Archipelago, which has a total area of one thousand and thirty square miles, is almost entirely Moroland. According to the latest estimates, there are only about six thousand Christian Filipinos in this province. . . . Fortunately, the Christian and Mohammedan elements of the population in Mindanao

and Sulu have managed to live together peacefully as a whole. In the annual report of the Governor of Lanao for 1928, I find these remarks: "The least that is said about the differences between Christians and Mohammedans and the more effort that is put forth to establish and maintain friendly relations, the more speedy will these differences, to a considerable extent, imaginary, be removed, and the relationship of man to man, give and take, live and let live, be established."

Sofia R. de Veyra, President, Federation of Women's Clubs, a woman of capacity and culture, said:

"We will not be called upon to lead an army, as was Saint Joan of Arc, nor will we have to take a gunner's place as did Molly Pitcher, but we are called upon to stand side by side with our men to face our country's needs and do our best to remedy them. . . . Our work must not consist in mere idle talk. We are attending this congress in order to discuss the best means by which we may co-operate with our men in their struggle for independence. . . . We must realize that once independence is granted conditions are bound to be different. There will be a time when we shall be called upon to face far greater problems than we discuss to-day. If independence is granted during our lifetime, we shall have the responsibility of setting on its feet a new nation among nations."

Miss Ramona Tirona, associate professor of the University of the Philippines, urged willingness to accept economic hardships, if such must be the concomitants of independent status:

"I suppose that we all agree that independence is cherished by all of us. There is no mentally sound Filipino who has not thought likewise. . . . If sacrifices are to be made for our independence, let us have them take place sooner. The torture of any expected pain that is slow in

coming is greater, indeed, than that of an intensive one that is immediately experienced. . . . It behooves, therefore, the Filipino women to exercise their influence upon those fellow-countrymen and women who are afraid of the future of the Philippines in the event of independence, in the cultivation and diffusion of a courageous sharing in the burdens that must be borne."

Japanese menace to a Philippine Republic was one of the subjects considered by Professor Seraffin E. Macaraig, of the University of the Philippines. He met the objection thus:

"The threat of a Japanese menace and the fears that have been entertained by the Filipinos themselves against a possible Japanese invasion in the Philippines are the products of a systematic propaganda, both in Congress and in the press, which the imperialists have been pounding into us, and have become a part of our thoughts and ideas. Japanese invasion, if such there be, is a political rather than a population menace. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that, with the declaration of independence in the Philippines, Japan would extend her imperialistic designs to the Islands, it still can be maintained that the population menace cannot become a reality. Conquest in the history of all colonization has brought into the conquered country not mass migration, but administrators and colonizers."

Union Labor had for its spokesman at the convention Don Joaquin Balmori:

"Philippine independence by virtue of economic readjustment which will come later on will give as one of its results the lessening of its public rent. Such, instead of terrifying us, should strengthen us and comfort us, and thus convinced that we should depend solely on ourselves in recovering the goal lost in the exterior market, we shall

feel compelled not to rest, if we do not wish to perish, absorbed by the stronger and the wealthier in the economic contest. And the element which will have the heaviest of this responsibility on its back is, without any doubt, the labor element. But the laborer, conscious of his duties, acquainted with all that he strives for, will not in any way neglect the important rôle which the Philippines has assigned him, if the working conditions be dignified and elevated, placing them, if not on the same basis, at least on one similar to those that exist in the more progressive countries of the world."

Mr. Felipe E. José, First Vice-President of the Labor Congress and former President of the Workers' and Peasants' Association of the Philippines, was eloquent in his interpretation of the feelings of the workers:

"The least doubt should never be entertained, for we are also prepared to die for our country's sake. We are saying plainly that if the rich and educated people think that the success of Philippine mission depends on us, right now we offer our lives to fight for liberty until the last. If it is the life of the laborers that America needs to recognize our right for freedom, we are here with hearts open to offer her what is in our power."

Assurances to American investors were proclaimed in the address of the Honorable Emiliano Tria Tirona, formerly Minority Floor Leader in the Senate:

"We should tell those augurers of disaster and bankruptcy that their fears are not well founded; that if we come to be independent, due to the recognition of our own worth by the Congress of the United States, the Filipinos, as a people and as individuals, would give to the capitalists, merchants, and American products greater protection than we now, in our state of dependence, receive for ourselves; and that, instead of considering them as our

bosses, dominators, and invaders, we would look upon them as our benefactors, and their investments would be guaranteed, not only with the might of the Philippine Government, but also by the might of the affection and gratitude of the whole people."

The Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, was absent because of illness. A letter which he wrote to the convention I give in part:

The attitude of any American or group of Americans who has been inspired with egoistic sentiments in his relations with the Filipinos, or the behavior of any ruler who has been interpreted by us as inspired by the proposition of ignoring our rights, has never represented, either the attitude or the policy in general, of the people and the government of the United States in their relations with the Filipino people. . . . To be independent is to be admitted in the family of nations; hence our acts now and our acts tomorrow as individuals and as a people should be such that would inspire the confidence and security, that we shall know how to live with other people and that we shall know how to manage our government not only for the benefit of the natives, but also for the protection and safeguard of those residing in our own territory.

President Rafael Palma, in an address which was the valedictory of the convention, drew attention to a fact that impressed me more than any other during my visit to the Philippines. That was the tremendous interest and enthusiasm for independence among the younger generation of Filipinos.

"What pleases me most on this occasion," President Palma told the several thousand delegates, "is the fact that the young generation whom we expect to continue our labors are so identified with our ideals and are so ready to fight more vigorously for the same principles for which

we have struggled as to leave no further doubts regarding the definite destiny of the Filipino people."

Here is a fitting place at which to hear once more the Nestor of the Filipino Iliad. I take these additional sentences from the letter written to me by General Aguinaldo and from which I have already quoted:

It is true that the concession of independence will usher in new domestic problems. But it is then that our statesmen could and will dedicate themselves to the consideration of those national problems, preferably the economic, which have been and will continue to be neglected and relegated to the background as long as our political situation is not defined in harmony with our age-long aspirations.

Dealing with predictions that internal dissensions and conflicts in the Philippines may ensue from independence—a favorite argument with the "exploiters"—Aguinaldo wrote:

The possibility of a civil war or of a general disturbance is not an impediment to the concession of independence. Civil wars and uprisings have in many cases been the price which independent peoples have had to pay in order to consolidate their institutions. If it is written that the Filipino people shall pass through such a terrible ordeal, they will not hesitate to do so, provided they could be masters of their destinies. Civil wars, however deplorable, are often inevitable when constitutional means are impotent to restore the reign of law. But, despite all that, I do not believe in the possibility of a civil war or general disorder if independence is granted. By nature we are a peaceful people, lovers of public order, and it is not hazardous to affirm that if we are declared independent, there will be a firmer union among the Filipinos, brought about by the sense of a common responsibility and desire to support and elevate the country redeemed. . . . With the termination of the present uncertainty in the relations between the

Philippines and the United States, public attention will be concentrated on our economic problems, capital will emerge from its retirement, and as a result, the material progress of the country will be emancipated from its present stagnation. I believe that a delay of twenty or thirty years in the concession of Philippine independence will work irreparable harm to the cause of economic and political progress, aside from the fact that in such a long period of time new difficulties might arise which would necessitate further postponement of the grant. . . .

On the other hand, if independence were granted now, it would stimulate our initiative as a nation. The idea of political dependence will disappear from our minds. We could begin to fashion the structure of our nationality in our own way. We shall grapple with our problems in accordance with our capacity and means, and we shall have an opportunity to be strong and really prosperous, a thing we never can accomplish under the tutelage of another nation. . . .

The present uncertainty, as I have stated above, retards the economic development of the country. Capitalists have said they do not care to make investments here in view of that uncertainty in our political status. If the uncertainty were terminated, the situation will change. . . .

It can be safely predicted, I believe, that once independent, we also can get desirable foreign capital invested here. Our industrious and financial growth will also be accelerated. The responsibilities attendant upon the changed status will be so great that our people will exert all their efforts to create more wealth with which to meet their obligations. This has been the experience of countries that have attained their independence, and the Philippines does not have to be the exception.

The demand for independence by the Filipino people will be more and more pressing as the years go by, not only because of the innate desire of peoples for self-determination, but also because of the assurances given by the United States through her legitimate representatives, both civil and military, that upon occupying these Islands America did not entertain

designs of exploitation, but of emancipation. The delay, therefore, in the concession of independence, serves only to accentuate the people's desire for liberation, and at the same time to aggravate the political and economic situation of the country.

There are more distinct—almost discordant—ethnic strains in the United States than there are in the Philippines. There are more diversities of language here than there. But there is this vast and everlasting difference between the population of the United States and that of the Philippines. To the extent of 90 per cent our people are descended from Occidentals, while the Filipinos are Orientals—Malays. Never can we change this difference between them and ourselves. Any argument by which the Filipinos can be denied the right to an independent government is valid against the admission of the Islands to statehood in our Union. For if they are not now fit or likely to be fit to order the affairs of government by Orientals for Orientals, they are certainly not competent to aid in the direction of an Occidental people such as we are. If the success of democratic institutions on Asiatic soil depends on the people's complete mastery of the customs and philosophies of Western—especially North American—nations, then no Asiatic nation will ever be ready for self-government or independence. But if we make due and proper allowance for the difference between their blood and ours, between their civilization and ours, we must come to believe that the Filipino—trained in the best school of democracy—is prepared for self-government; that is, for a government that shall be designed and directed by and for Filipinos.

We can not make a great nation of the Filipinos. That, they must do themselves. But they can not do it if we prevent them. The sooner they are placed upon their own responsibility, the swifter and surer will be their advance.

The Philippine Republic need not be an elaborate political mechanism requiring a big army, an expensive navy, a large and costly diplomatic establishment. Ministers in the capitals of the leading nations would be sufficient. The Philippine Consular Service could be entrusted to the nationals of those countries with which the Islands had trade relations. Some of the smaller nations have Americans as their consular representatives in the United States.

Some of those who seek to withhold independence from the Philippines, point to the cost of self-government there as a burden from which the Filipinos ought to be saved. That surely is a reversal and a repudiation of all our accepted theories. We can not now unteach what we have taught them of popular government. We can not tell them that the lessons they learned from us were false or futile. Still less can we recant, in the sight and hearing of the whole world, all our professions and promises. We can not say that democracy is good for the Occidental, but bad—or too good—for the Oriental. Not at this late day can we retain the turkeys for Americans and give the crows to the Malays.

We have gone too far to turn back, to recall our instruction and in its place teach that American ideals shall never be transplanted to the Orient. If a mistake has been made in the Philippines, it is our mistake, and we, not the Filipinos, should pay the price. Further economic development in the Philippines will not come until our future course is determined, and unless we give the people of the Islands independence they can make no great additional progress politically. It is related that Sir James Brooke, a wise English representative in the Indian Colonial Government, once said that it was his ambition to make his people "good Malays, not yellow Englishmen." There is a moral in that for us.

If we do not soon declare our final intention with respect to the release or retention of the Philippines, I think we may expect to see arise among the people there a bitter, though perhaps not violent, hostility and opposition to American rule. We could hardly respect the Filipinos if they remained abject and servile. No such people would be worthy of a place under the United States flag. Their desire and their demand for independence are at once the best proof that they deserve it and one justification for our granting it.

CHAPTER VIII

PROMISES, ASPIRATIONS, AND PERSISTENT EFFORTS

IN the light of history we have seen by what attitudes, utterances, and actions of ours, when first we entered the Philippines, the people of the Islands were impelled to the conviction that we intended not merely to liberate them from Spain but establish them—as we constituted Cuba—as an independent nation. We have read also in that same light how firmly and fervently (but fatuously and futilely, as some would persuade us to think) the Filipinos have clung to the belief that we will keep the faith they hold we plighted to them thirty-odd years ago and pledged anew many times since then.

It is necessary to a correct understanding of the Filipino's claims on us and it is vital to a right conception of our obligation to him to review the words and deeds by which we have at the least appeared to promise him the boon he craves most of all—independence. Whether it was advisable, from our point of view, to confirm and encourage the Filipino's aspirations is now beside the point. Whether our promise looked to the true welfare of the Philippines may still be a debatable question. But there is not a vestige of doubt that our assurances were received in good faith by the Filipino, and they can not now be withdrawn or revised without compromising and doing detriment to him.

Turn now to the long concatenation of statements by

Presidents, members of Presidential cabinets, representatives of the United States in the Philippines, spokesmen for business, agriculture, and labor—protagonists and antagonists of Filipino nationhood:

President McKinley, at the very outset of the American occupation, said to the American people: "The Philippines are ours not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government." And he expressed the hope that the American Commissioners would be received as bearers of "the richest blessings of a liberating, rather than a conquering nation."

Jacob Gould Schurman, President of the first Philippine Commission, was undoubtedly speaking the mind of President McKinley as well as his own when he said: "The destiny of the Philippine Islands is not to be a state or a territory in the United States of America, but a daughter republic of ours—a new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific, which shall animate and energize those lovely islands of the tropical seas, and rearing its head aloft, stand as a monument of progress and a beacon of hope to all the oppressed and benighted millions of the Asiatic Continent."

I have been unable to find any direct statement by William H. Taft when he was President, but he spoke pretty decisively on the subject when he was Secretary of War. In a report to President Roosevelt in 1908, Mr. Taft declared:

Shortly stated, the national policy is to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the Islands and gradually to extend to them, as they shall show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater and greater measure of popular self-government. . . . What should be emphasized in the statement of our national policy is that we wish to prepare the Filipinos for popular self-government,

This is plain from Mr. McKinley's letter of instructions and all of his utterances. . . . Another logical deduction from the main proposition is that when the Filipino people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government, maintaining law and order and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given it.

The foregoing was but a reiteration with strong emphasis of what Mr. Taft had said three years earlier:

What shall be done in the future . . . is a question which will doubtless have to be settled by another generation than the present, both of the American and of the Philippine people, to whose wisdom and generosity we may safely trust the solution of the problem. Should the Philippine people when fit for self-government demand independence, I should be strongly in favor of giving it to them; and I have no doubt that the American people of the next generation would be of the same opinion.

In 1908, President Roosevelt indicated, in a message to Congress, that the independence of the Philippines was a question to be determined by their inhabitants. "I trust that within a generation," he said, "the time will arrive when the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent."

The generation of which President Roosevelt spoke at that time has passed.

On another occasion—and eight years later—Mr. Roosevelt counseled prompt action in respect to independence:

The only good that has come to us as a nation has been the good that springs from knowledge that a great deed has been worthily performed. Personally, I think it is a fine and high thing for a nation to have done such a deed with such a purpose. But we can not taint it with bad faith. If we act

so that the natives understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live up to that promise. The Philippines, from a military standpoint, are a source of weakness to us. The present administration has promised explicitly to let them go, and by its actions has rendered it difficult to hold them against any serious foreign foe. These being the circumstances, the Islands should at an early moment be given their independence without any guarantee whatever by us and without our retaining any foothold in them.

Fifteen years after we came into possession of the Philippines, President Wilson took an advanced position in the matter of independence. In his message to the Filipino people, delivered by Governor-General Harrison in 1913, he said:

We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. Every step we take will be taken with a view to ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence.

Later in the same year he sent a message to Congress and in it he spoke this of the Filipinos: "By their counsel and experience, rather than by our own, we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision." Addressing Congress, in a message in 1920, the President used the following language: "Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as the precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of these Islands, by grant-

ing them the independence which they so honorably covet."

President Harding, in his reply to the Philippine Independence Mission of 1922, said: "I can only commend the Philippine aspirations to independence and complete self-sovereignty. None in America would wish you to be without national aspirations. You would be unfitted for the solemn duties of self-government without them."

On February 21, 1924, President Coolidge wrote to Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, and head of the Philippine Mission to the United States in that year, saying:

It is not possible to believe that the American people would wish to continue their responsibility in regard to the sovereignty and administration of the islands. It is not conceivable that they would desire, merely because they possessed the power, to continue exercising any measure of authority over a people who could better govern themselves on a basis of complete independence. If the time comes when it is apparent that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines from the point of view of both their domestic concerns and their status in the world; and if when that time comes, the Filipino people desire complete independence, it is not possible to doubt that the American Government and people will gladly accord it.

Thus far President Hoover has not expressed his own opinion, but he has admitted that "Independence of the Philippines at some time has been directly or indirectly promised by every President and by the Congress."

Whenever the Republican party has spoken on the subject it has recorded its sympathy with self-government for the Philippines. The Democratic party has several times committed itself to the cause of independence.

If at any time during the period of our responsibility

for the Philippines the President or other official of the United States had advocated our permanent retention and government of the Islands, we could now say with some measure of plausibility that our intentions had been proclaimed and that, therefore, American and Filipino promoters of independence were countering a definite and decisive American policy. But for more than a quarter of a century, almost a generation, there has been a general understanding—in one case taking the form of an Act of Congress—that the Filipino people should some day be free and independent. The Act of Congress which, by reason of the promise of independence it contains, imposes on us an ethical and moral, though perhaps not a juridic, obligation, is the Jones Law, passed by Congress in 1916. The promise is in the preamble, which I quote in full:

WHEREAS, It was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement, and

WHEREAS, It is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and


WHEREAS, For the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence:

Some opponents of independence hold—at least they assert—that because this statement of our purposes was not

in the body of the bill, it is not a binding promise. Though but few cling to this contention, I nevertheless think it deserves an answer. In the first place, there was no other valid way in which Congress might express its opinion. It could not have included in the body of the bill such a declaration as the preamble recites without first having fixed a definite date for the termination of American sovereignty in the Islands. Those who take refuge in the technicality—the triviality with which I am now dealing—might as well urge that our Declaration of Independence or the Monroe Doctrine was not binding because it was not put in the body of a bill. Not only the preamble but also the title of the Jones Act proclaims our policy in reference to the Philippines. And it is a rule of law that the title of a bill shall adequately describe its intent. Here is the title of the Jones Law:

“An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those Islands.”

This phrase “future political status,” especially when read in connection with the preamble and the provisions of the bill, is certainly clear enough. The words, “to provide a more autonomous government” indicate the temporary character of the enactment itself, and, still more, the transitory nature of the arrangement legislated into existence. That the purpose and effect of the preamble were fully apprehended, alike by friends and foes of independence, is patent in the debates on the bill, in Congress. The discussion of the preamble was almost distinct of the bill, is certainly clear enough. The words, “to proponents and objectors well understood that the preamble was not only a definition of policy but also a promise made in the name of, by the authority and with the con-



A Moro Band—Mindanao

currence of, the American people. One thing else: There was a separate vote on the preamble—and it was adopted by a considerable margin. Republicans as well as Democrats supported it.

The Filipinos shared the general view that the Jones Act was a pledge given to them by the American people. The Philippine Legislature, speaking for the inhabitants of the Islands, viewed the Jones Law as a program looking to independence and so acknowledged and accepted it.

Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, speaking on a bill (S.3379) contemplating Philippine independence, at the time of its introduction in the Senate during the Seventy-first Congress, referred to the Jones Law.

"There is no doubt in my mind about the obligation of the American people in this respect," he said. "No one can deny the obligation. The Jones Act of August 29, 1916, specifically promises that as soon as stable government can be established we are to withdraw our sovereignty from these far Pacific wards. . . . The fact remains that Congress indisputably has led the Filipinos to believe that they are to have their independence as soon as a stable government is established. The promise, furthermore, is written into numerous pronouncements by both Republican and Democratic Presidents of the United States."

Mr. Charles D. Orth, President of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, coincides with Senator Vandenberg. Mr. Orth, testifying before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, said:

"My version regarding the Philippines is that if Congress approves, they ought eventually to be made independent, because Congress has promised it to them. . . . I think that our promise to the Filipinos ought to be redeemed."

In a pamphlet entitled "The Philippine Question," pub-

lished and circulated by Mr. Orth's organization, there appears this statement: "It is true that successive Presidents, Congress, and various officials have promised eventual independence." I cite it here because the Philippine American Chamber of Commerce is resolutely opposed to independence for the Filipinos.

The Filipino understanding of the American promise was given to the Senate Committee by Manuel Roxas. I quote from his testimony:

"Granted the necessity of a final and definite declaration regarding the future status of the Philippine Islands, it is important to determine what that status should be. This question was formally and authoritatively defined by the Congress in the preamble of the Jones Act. That document states that 'it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.' This declared policy is in accord with authoritative pronouncements of American Presidents and other officials who could assume the right to speak on behalf of the American people. It is thus to be seen that independence is and has always been the goal and objective of America's Philippine policy. The Jones Act merely gave legal and constitutional sanction to that policy. . . . Its grant would be as much a fulfilment of that policy as the satisfaction of Filipino aspirations. It would be the happy outcome of the joint labors of two peoples undertaken with generosity on the one hand and with abiding confidence and faith on the other."

Other witnesses whose views are important because they are typical, as I believe, of a very large section of American opinion on the question, I shall quote briefly in succeeding paragraphs.

Mr. Chester H. Gray, representing the American Farm Bureau Federation, had no doubt of the meaning of the Jones Law.

"But I am frank enough to believe," he told the committee, "that whenever the Congress of the United States says a thing in a preamble it is practically as much of an indication of the Congressional policy as if it were in Section 1. . . . All of which indicates to my mind, and I believe to the general mind of Congress as well as of the citizens, the thought that the future status of the Philippine Islands was to be independence."

Mr. Frederick Brenckman, Washington representative of the National Grange, said:

"To go now to the other side of the question—that is, the pledge that we gave to the Philippines, to give them their independence as soon as a stable government can be established—I want to say that I, for one, feel that we are pledged, on our honor, to give it to them as soon as it is safe and practical to do so."

Mr. D. F. Webster, Vice-President of the Pacific Commercial Company, of New York, was more grudging in his admissions:

"We have a certain obligation to them. At the same time, there is a certain obligation that I think the United States owes to itself."

But in reply to a question by Senator Johnson of California as to what obligation we owe the Filipino people, Mr. Webster conceded we ought "some day, eventually, to give them their independence, if they want it."

In an article published in "Harper's Magazine," a disinterested and unprejudiced investigator, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, wrote this:

We, through our representatives, have made many promises to the Filipinos—many of which we have broken. The last

expression of the American people through Congress on the Philippines was in 1916, when we pledged ourselves to fit them for independence. It seems idle to say that Congress had no right to make such a promise, for the pledge was taken as such by the Philippines and the world in general.

Mr. Carter Field, another writer of note, in an article published in "The Forum," states:

No, the fact remains that the United States has promised the islands eventual independence—to be given, presumably, when Congress shall decide that the Islanders have fitted themselves for self-government without the danger of such mob violence as has brought front-page advertising to Herrin, Ill., and some of the New Jersey towns; without such wholesale graft as resulted in the parade of Indiana public officials to the penitentiary; or such mismanagement of funds as has now created a deficit of nearly \$5,000,000 for the State of Georgia.

In the foregoing pages I have cited but a few of the official statements and the testimonies of recent observers and writers. There is little need to multiply such documentations. There is an impressive consensus in behalf of independence. Most significant has been the absence of open advocacy of the permanent retention of the Philippines. Not one witness appearing before the Senate Committee proposed such a plan. Postponement of independence—that was the nearest to an outright repudiation of our pledges any witness ventured.

Every class and condition of Filipinos desires independence. Abundant attestation of that fact I found on my visit to the Islands. Chambers of Commerce, labor leaders, agricultural leaders, educators, bankers, the press, the legislature—all have petitioned for independence. There is no division among the people. Not one Filipino that I

met or talked with or questioned, opposed independence. The leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Aglipayan Church, the Moros, and the Pagans, divergent as their religious tenets are, nevertheless are alike in their conviction that independence is the due and the destiny of the Filipino nation. These and other groups may differ as to the time for it—whether it should come at once or in the near future—but there can be no doubt that they all want it and will accept it on any terms that we may specify.

This brings me to the consideration of a point I have promised my readers to discuss. Some Americans who have discussed with Filipinos this question of opportuneness have learned that the latter in not a few instances deprecate the words "immediate, absolute, and complete independence." It is true that some Filipinos regard these words as involving serious difficulties, such, for example, as the internal economic dislocation that would ensue from sudden application of the American tariff to products of the Philippines. From this reservation in the minds of certain Filipinos these Americans derive the impression that the natives are insincere in their talk of independence. The frank admissions by Filipinos that independence for the Philippines means sacrifice as well as advantage have stirred doubts and suspicions in the minds of many of our people.

Those American manufacturers and merchants who are exerting influence to defeat Filipino independence are inviting detriment to themselves. If, as now seems certain, the desire for an independent nation in the Philippines becomes more fervent and widespread, the Islanders may turn elsewhere for their needs. They could hardly be blamed for refusing to permit their own money to be a weapon against independence. It may as well be recog-

nized, also, that we can not offer the Filipinos material prosperity as a substitute for independence. I have come to believe they would rather be poor and free than rich and dependent.

We Americans have always exalted freedom and self-government above material welfare and luxury. We have put the same ideal before the Filipinos. Their intellectuals, especially the graduates of American universities, are aware that we have always and everywhere honored and encouraged the aspiration of liberty and democracy. We have welcomed every new member of the family of independent nations. More than once the American people have raised funds for the cause of independence in other parts of the world. Within thirty-five years after this Government was established we lent assistance to the struggle for independence in South America and guaranteed the liberty won there. In the last generation we have given our sympathy to the efforts of the Greeks to erect a republic, to the Boers in South Africa, to the Young Turks. Eighty years ago we cheered the struggles of Kossuth to make Hungary free. Our aid to Ireland continued for a century or more. All these historic facts, I repeat, are known to the leaders of the Filipino people.

Sometimes there is a contrast between our preachments about liberty and our practices in the Philippines. This is only one of the incongruities for which our excursion into imperialism has been responsible. The Filipino sees these discrepancies and wonders—if he doesn't laugh. What must his feelings have been on an occasion of which Governor Harrison writes. On a certain Fourth of July, an army officer read the Declaration of Independence to a large audience of Filipinos. They heard, of course, the whole catalogue of our ancient grievances against King George III:

He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. . . . For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us; for protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States; for cutting off our trade with all parts of the world.

And all the rest. The shade of Jefferson must have looked down with pain on that travesty.

But the Filipino's trust in us has not faded. He believes that we shall at the last be true to our principles and traditions, and that for the sake of these we shall clothe him with freedom. Accordingly he continues to work as well as hope for independence. Carmi Thompson, whom President Coolidge sent in 1926 to the Philippines to report on conditions there, testifies to the universality of the sentiment for independence. He informed the President: "All Filipinos who are interested in public affairs are openly for independence. . . . I believe that practically the entire voting population is for independence. . . . The independence movement is growing all the time."

CHAPTER IX

FACTS AND FICTION IN THE ORIENT

ARMY AND NAVY

WHEN the United States entered the war with Spain in 1898 to assist the people of Cuba to establish a republic, our declaration that we were to fight solely for liberty and humanity, with no expectation or thought of material benefit for ourselves, impressed itself deeply on the conscience of our own people and profoundly impressed the remainder of the world. As Americans came to understand that the people of the Philippines, like those of Cuba, had also been waging a war for their liberation from Spanish rule, there was everywhere in this country a disposition to be as generous and as chivalrous to the one as to the other. Our motto for the people of the Islands was "The Philippines for the Filipinos," just as our slogan had previously been "Cuba for the Cubans." But soon it began to be whispered that perhaps the Philippines might be made a commercial base from which we could operate in China and Japan—the entire Orient. Manila was to be the center of this trade—the point from which our wares and merchandise should be dispersed throughout Asia. Retention of the Philippines was of course necessary to this "penetration" of the Eastern Continent. This commerce would make us rich—and powerful. It was optimism begotten of ignorance. In the thirty years which have passed we have had the opportunity—the need—to review these prophecies. We know they have

not been fulfilled. Possession of the Islands has added little to our trade in the Orient, save with the Filipino people. Manila has not developed into a great international mart. On the contrary it has been, in maritime respects, a signal failure.

Still more recently it was predicted, as we remember that the opening of the Panama Canal would enhance enormously the value of our insular possessions in the Orient. The Panama Canal has been in use more than seventeen years—quite long enough to allow us to measure its effect upon Philippine trade and commerce. But commerce from the United States to the Orient still goes by way of China and Japan, and not by way of Manila. Still another justification of American ownership of the Islands was that Manila Bay, in our keeping, would enlarge our naval advantage in Far Eastern waters. No one at that time contemplated the Four-Power Treaty of 1922, into which we entered with Japan, Great Britain, and France, and in which we agreed not to further fortify the Islands while at the same time we permitted Japan to dominate the area that immediately surrounds them on the north, east, and south.

When we became masters of the Philippines the "prophets" naturally could not foresee the great World War, its cost to the belligerent peoples, the competition in armaments, the necessity for an agreement limiting expenditures for "preparedness," and the price which our Government was to pay in concessions to procure the ratification of such a compact. Neither had they or others prescience of the war between Japan and Russia, especially since the latter in 1898 was one of the great world powers, while Japan was yet striving for recognition. It was equally impossible for any one in 1898 to foreknow that Germany would shortly lose her "place in the sun," her

prestige in China. Most of the men who made these prophecies of our commercial advantage, our naval supremacy in the eastern Pacific, as the fruits of our control in the Philippines are now dead, but in their stead there is a new school of soothsayers who would frighten us with the bugaboo that independence of the Philippines would disturb the present balance of power in the Orient; that it might prompt the 320,000,000 dependent people of India, or the 60,000,000 dependent people in the Dutch East Indies to press for self-government. In short, these egregious Americans hold that we should do nothing that might inspire in the hearts of subject races a love and a longing for liberty!

Obligated by the force of events to abandon their plea of commercial advantage and then the claim of naval necessities as warrant for our taking and keeping the Islands, these protagonists of an aggressive—a provocative—policy, so far as trade and armaments are concerned, most inconsistently prefer British interests and Dutch interests to American interests in determining what course we should take in the Philippines. They advance the novel proposal that, not in our behalf, not for the weal of the Philippines, not in fulfilment of a national promise, but for the benefit of two European nations, we should decide the future of the Filipino people! Both Great Britain and Holland are our friends, but neither is our guardian. We are free from any legal or moral obligation to adopt their political philosophies, and thereby to renounce not only our traditions but our material welfare also. If Americans will for a little while withdraw their gaze from Haiti, at our door, and Nicaragua, to both of which countries we have sent our marines, and devote attention to the Philippines, the problem which these people present to us and to themselves could be adjusted more quickly and more

happily than it is likely to be adjusted otherwise. Once Americans come to realize that the Philippines are part of Asia; that their 13,000,000 people are Malays and Orientals; that the Islands are not in the trade route between the United States and China and Japan; that the distance from our coast to Manila is almost beyond the ability of our Navy or our Army to neutralize, they will deal decisively with the question of Filipino independence.

Our machinery has done more to influence Asia than our doctrines of religion or our notions of government have. It is Asia's economic life that we have affected by our mass production with machines that work more rapidly and cheaply than coolies themselves! Occidental machines, then, have made the conquest that Occidental armies, however multitudinous, could not achieve. Though our millions and our machines have wrought many changes in the Orient and are likely to work many more, nothing—neither money nor its products—can convert an Oriental into an Occidental. One thing I am sure we can never hope to see is the Oriental's abandonment of his language. It is too much a part of him—it is a pattern of his spiritual and intellectual life, of his habits of thought, of his very being. The Japanese have accepted much from the West, but have retained the language. The peoples of the East Indies have preserved their numerous dialects. Our attempt to induce 13,000,000 people in the Philippines to substitute English for their native tongues has failed. I doubt if we can ever succeed in doing more than making English the language of the intellectuals, of public officials, and of those in commerce. There is, of course, a very natural attachment for the mother tongue, however crude or primitive it may be. Language is the preservative of national spirit, of national tradition. There is little kinship, for instance, between the

Latin, the Teutonic, and the Slavic languages of Europe and the Mongolian tongues of Asia and Islands near that continent. These latter differ from the Indo-European languages because the peoples of the two regions of the earth—East and West—are utterly and, I think, permanently, incorrigibly different. This factor of language I underscore, because it is vital to a fair consideration of our policy in the Philippines or anywhere else in the Orient.

One thing else: We have introduced into Asia and its environs the creed of self-determination. We have likewise acquainted them with the plan of electing national rulers by vote of the people—in some places before the voters were rightly tutored in the use of the ballot. The old Asiatic governments by dynasties and inheritance are passing into history. Japan is thoroughly awake. China, with its hundreds of millions—and its nominal republic!—is only half awake. We may expect that her demand for a real enforcement of the “open door” policy proclaimed by John Hay will grow stronger. Her insistence, once her internal difficulties shall have been adjusted, may take the form of force. This may be a long time hence, but who can tell when it will happen? Notwithstanding present conflicts between Japan and China, they may nevertheless unite—possibly with Russia, which is also an Asiatic power—to promulgate a “Monroe Doctrine” which shall say, “Asia for the people of Asia,” as we declare to the world, “The Americas for Americans.” I remind my readers that, although we have for many years advocated the “open door” in China, that is, equal opportunities for all nations to trade there, yet we have closed the door in the Philippines, telling every one else: “This is for us. Keep your hands off. These Islands are our property. These people belong to the United States of America!” Moreover,

we long ago closed our own doors to the Chinese and the Japanese, by our laws denying them the privilege of entering this country save under many rigid restrictions. This policy I trust will be modified by legislation which shall place Chinese and Japanese on a like footing with other foreigners. That is, I hope we shall establish a quota for them as we have for Europeans and others. The present practice is humiliating to them and hurtful to us.

History informs us that Chinese have been in the Philippine Islands for centuries and, strange to relate, there are not so many Chinese in the Philippines now as there were over a hundred years ago. They are and have been the traders of the Philippines—shop-keepers, money-lenders, bankers. As they and the Filipinos are of the same ethnic strain they readily intermarry. Though the two peoples amalgamate easily there is little danger of a large emigration of Chinese to the Philippines. As far back as 1574 Chinese sought to establish a settlement in the Philippines. Frequently in the intervening years this attempt has been repeated. On one occasion 23,000 Chinese were massacred in the Islands. In 1639 there were 30,000 of them in the Philippines. This was a very large proportion of the population at that time. To-day only about 45,000 reside there. The Filipinos have no fear of colonization by the Chinese. They could control Chinese immigration into the Islands by means of a quota or some such plan as is now employed by the Philippine Government. It is the "Manila American" or some like theorist that continually raises the bogey of "peaceful invasion" by the Chinese and Japanese.

In 1870 there was a small colony of Japanese in the Islands. But they have not become numerous. They do not like the country. The climate is not congenial to them. They are not able to work continuously in the fields in the

Philippines as they are in their own more northerly islands. A Japanese invasion of the Philippines is negated by the facts. It would now be very difficult for the Japanese to colonize in the Philippines, peacefully or otherwise. All the Filipinos, except a minority of Mohammedans and a few Pagans, are Christians. They take their religion seriously. Japanese expansion in some other direction would meet with a more congenial atmosphere, so far as religion is concerned, than exists in the Philippines. The Japanese do not intermarry with the Filipinos. They retain their own customs, their own habits, their own food, and they conduct their own schools for the education of their children. They take little part in the social life of the Philippines. They, like the Chinese, have been in the Philippine Islands for centuries, but there has been no significant increase in their numbers in recent years, although they are permitted by law to come and settle freely in the Islands. One thing must be remembered, however. That is, that the Chinese and Japanese at home see our treatment of the Filipinos with the eyes of their brethren in the Islands. Other Orientals near the Philippines are equally watchful of our principles and methods of government in the Islands, because they will remember promises of independence we gave to the Filipinos. I speak of the natives of Java and India. These Javans and East Indians will observe whether we keep the faith. They will measure our political honesty by the fidelity with which we fulfil our political contracts. The retention, therefore, of the Philippines under our sovereignty will not be helpful to the Oriental situation. Moreover, our continued possession of the Islands makes us parties to the perilous problems of the Orient. It may foment at any time an acute resentment of our "overlordship." The danger, then, is not so much that of our

disturbing the balance of the power in the Orient as it is that of our presence there at all.

Should the United States, in pursuance of formal promises, permit and assist the Filipinos to establish an independent government, it would be quite easy, in my judgment, to negotiate a general treaty looking to the preservation of a Philippine republic. Japan and China would, I am sure, agree quickly. England and France could not well refuse. We should then have all the protection that a Republic of the Philippines would require, and could thereafter relieve ourselves of any responsibility for it.

In its report of June 2, 1930, the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs adverts to these questions. Since this report was drafted only after the Committee had heard and weighed the testimony both of proponents and opponents of Filipino independence, I quote from it here:

Keen interest is evoked by one theory advanced at the hearings; namely, that to grant Philippine independence might disturb the peace of the Orient by inspiring in other peoples there a desire to free themselves from European control. It is asserted that the granting of independence to the Philippines will stimulate a desire for independence on the part of these other dependencies. To give weight to such a theory would be to recognize an unsound philosophy or policy repugnant to the very best traditions of our Nation. We are proud that our experiment in self-government has been imitated by all the nations in South America and by many of the nations of Europe. The finest pages of our history are those recording the conflicts that have followed our own departure from colonial dependency.

We entered the Orient as the protectors of a down-trodden people and later assumed to guide them to the level of Occidental civilization. That Occidental civilization finds its highest expression in national independence.

At this date of our supremacy over the Philippines, 30 years after our occupation of the Islands, to assert that our granting their freedom would be unwise because of the stimulus it would give to other nations cherishing like hopes, is to validate a theory which will have but little weight with real Americans.

We can hardly justify a course which began with the object of establishing a democracy in the Orient and which is to end in colonial control.

As will be verified by current events, there are eastern colonies now endeavoring to assert their aspiration for national identity and moving toward independence, wholly without regard to our attitude in the matter of the Philippine Islands. Our presence in the Orient in these instances has not deterred desires for national self-expression.

Furthermore, our treatment and disposition of the Philippine Islands will largely be the measure by which the Orient will weigh our international honesty. We are told that our retention of the Philippine Islands has a beneficial effect on our intercourse and trade with the Orient. But there is no evidence to conclude that a continuation of our sovereignty over the Philippines will be conducive to Oriental friendship. If the Philippine people, actuated by the statements of our executives and by the promises and pledges made in our statutory law, demand, as they do, their independence, and we deny them that independence, it is not likely that our attitude will present a favorable aspect in the Orient.

As time goes on and we retain the Philippine Islands in complete sovereignty, it is scarcely probable that the Oriental conception will credit us with those altruistic principles in which we take great national pride. The result may reverse what the advocates of retention now call our strategic position for trade in the Orient.

The holding of the Philippines for mere trade advantage in the Orient seems one-sided in its application, for the reason that while the Philippines offer to the United States a development of foreign trade, the status in which the Philippines find themselves is not conducive to the development of their own

foreign trade. It must be recalled that while their trade with the United States increases, their markets in the Orient are narrowed.

Leaving the field of prophecy, fiction, and surmise, we can turn to certain established facts, matters about which there is no uncertainty. Any one who knows our Army must be proud of it. During the three weeks I spent on an Army transport going to Manila, I saw men of the Army and their wives and families voyaging from the United States to the Philippines to reside there for a period of two years. The officers of higher grades had all previously seen service in the Philippines. These were men of real ability, of long experience, students and observers—all of them with interest and pride in their profession. In the course of my sojourn in the Islands I found that the older officers were discreet and tactful. They did not draw the "color line." They realized that the Americans in the Philippines are few and the natives are many; that it is a Filipino country. They attended the various functions of the Filipinos, and there was no sign in their speech or bearing that they regretted or resented the necessity of sustaining social as well as official relations with the Filipinos. There were, however, a few lieutenants and their wives who were painfully "superior" to the Filipino, although—and shall I say also because?—they had seen very few natives except those in the domestic service. They had not met the intellectuals, the leaders. They had founded their judgment of the whole people on the character of a few domestic servants. Undoubtedly their wider mingling with Filipinos of the higher social levels will give these younger men and women of the Army in the Philippines the fairer view held by their seniors.

Visits to Fort William McKinley, to Fort Stotsenberg and to Corregidor impressed me with the efficiency of

every one and everything in connection with them. Our general in command of Corregidor looks like a soldier, thinks like a soldier, acts like a soldier. His assignment pleases him, and it is safe to say that, should the emergency arise, he could hold Corregidor against all comers, provided food and other supplies could be furnished to him and his garrison in sufficient quantities and for a long enough period. This brings me to the recital and interpretation of certain practical facts. In 1898 we had but 2,500 American troops in the Philippines; in 1899 their number had risen to 32,215; in 1900 there were 71,528; and in 1901, 50,074. In the last-named year we began to reduce our forces in the Islands and later we created an organization of native Filipinos called the Philippine Scouts, who to-day are a marvel in drill, in efficiency, in marksmanship. Their number in 1902 was 5,036. They have since continued at approximately that figure. They now total about 6,000. After the Scouts were put in service, there was a drop of 5,000 in Army personnel in 1903. In 1904 there remained 12,723 American troops. There are at this time only 4,046 white troops, which is about half the number of the police force of Chicago or New York, and 6,474 Philippine Scouts. The Scouts outnumber the white troops by about 2,500. For the use of our military contingents in the Philippines, we have in the Philippines 3,156 horses and mules, and 764 motor vehicles. In addition, we have our field and coast artillery, our planes, and other equipment. The Army has invested for barracks, quarters, other buildings, and utilities, including land, \$13,514,153.

The naval shore activities in the Philippines engage a personnel of 108 officers and 639 men. The Asiatic Fleet, which is in the Philippines for certain periods of the year, has 6,042 officers and men. The Navy Yard at Cavite is

equipped to make major repairs on all types of vessels in the Asiatic station, and employs about 3,500 civilians, mostly Filipinos. The total investment of the naval establishment is \$10,815,936. All together, then, our military and naval investment in the Islands is only \$24,330,089, or less than the cost of the battleship Colorado, commissioned in 1923.

It is estimated that our naval and military expenses in the Philippines since our occupation amount to \$485,000,000. We have appropriated in behalf of the civil needs of the Islands only eight million, five millions of which was for the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and three millions for various forms of relief.

Neither the Army nor the Navy has been employed in any active duty in the Philippines since 1902. There has been nothing for them to do but maneuver and drill. The Scouts have performed such military duty as has been necessary in recent years. The necessity has been infrequent. During the World War practically all of our Army was withdrawn from the Philippines. The Scouts served in the Army's place as a garrison and an effective force against disorders. A highly useful, but not very expensive organization, these Filipino Scouts. In 1902 their cost was \$684,958.08, that is, about \$136 a man a year. In 1930 the estimated cost was \$4,078,141.

In 1922 we entered into a Four-Power Treaty with Japan, Great Britain, and France. Paragraph (3), Article XIX of this treaty enumerated "the insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean" as "The Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire." Then, in the same Article and Paragraph it was declared:

"The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified, that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace."

Apparently the American Government had as its motives for calling the conference from which this treaty emerged, first, the desire to establish the principle of limitation by international agreement; second, the hope of equalizing, to an extent, the British and American Navies; and third, the wish to initiate the ratio principle in naval construction. But whatever may have been the prospects of advantage for us and the world in general, the outcome is that Japan has immediate control of the Asiatic side of the Pacific. Army officers of experience agree that the treaty prevents us from increasing our fortifications in the Philippines. Without such defenses our retention of the Islands could not be assured—in a conflict with a great power—except by a tremendous expenditure of money and blood.

Under this treaty we cannot build, without violating our obligation, a fortification of any kind, not even a concrete trench. We cannot so much as replace obsolete guns with those of a larger caliber. In short, we can do nothing in the matter of increased efficiency, except to substitute new guns for old, and then only if the substitutes do not exceed their predecessors in the caliber or the efficiency of those of 1922, when the treaty was signed. By the terms of this

treaty we have abandoned, from both a naval and a military standpoint, the chief means of effective resistance in the Philippines. We reserved from the agreement limiting fortifications all the coasts of continental United States and those of Hawaii, but so far as the Philippines are concerned, and as respects improvements, we have bargained to stand still on the spot we occupied in 1922. Army officers know that we could not for any considerable time halt an invasion of the Philippines by a first-class power of the Orient unless we maintained permanently in the Islands a mobile army of 60,000—one half the size of our present standing army. We could defend Corregidor against attacks from the sea, but it would be possible to place guns back of Mariveles, unless the kind of army I mentioned were on hand to forestall such a flanking of our batteries. Manila has no defensive works, and under the treaty we cannot now erect any there.

The northernmost part of the Philippine Islands is only sixty-five miles from the southernmost point of Formosa, a possession of Japan—one which she took from China in 1895. Our army and navy in the Philippines are 7,000 miles from our American base, and 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii. Our nearest base would, therefore, be Pearl Harbor. The effective cruising distance for naval vessels without transport service for refueling is 2,000 miles. A map prepared by the Geographic Society divides the Pacific Ocean into zones represented by different colors. The Japanese zone extends to the north, to the east, and partly to the south of the Philippines. There is an American zone surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, but it is not connected; there is no passageway marked out or designated for the United States between the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands.

It may be said that, as a step toward disarmament, the

Four-Power Treaty was wise and salutary, but its effect certainly has been to expose the Philippine Islands. The conditions imposed on us render the usefulness of our army in case of an invasion very dubious. We could not hold them against a powerful nation. To lose them to a foreign foe would inflame all America. Our people would never be satisfied until they were recaptured. If Japan were the conqueror of the Islands our fight to repossess them would have to be waged in a region where the advantage would be on the side of Japan. It was stated in the Senate during the debates on the question of Philippine independence that the presence of our army in the Philippines might in itself be a detriment to the Islanders, in that it might become the object of attacks by enemies who would not otherwise enter the Philippines. In brief, our military strength there might become a provocation to make the Islands a battleground for the settlement of issues or controversies which did not strictly involve the Philippines at all, but which arose from causes with which the Philippine people had no concern. Thus—to apply the argument concretely—if Japan, for example, out of antagonism to us attacked the Philippines, she would thereby choose the theater for the fighting and we would have to meet her there. To carry the war to her we should be compelled to move our troops seven thousand miles, requiring a voyage of twenty-one days and the protection of a powerful navy, and still be at a great disadvantage. That we should ultimately recover the Islands there can be little doubt, but our success might cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and vast sums of money.

The Philippines is therefore, from a military point of view, perhaps the weakest spot in our armor. Corregidor could hold Manila Bay and protect the naval approaches to the metropolis, if the defenders could be provisioned

with food and ammunition, but there could be little hope of safeguarding even Manila from a military attack by land. Corregidor is the one spot in the Philippines we could defend and hold for any considerable period in the face of a powerful enemy, but we should be obliged to relinquish it also if it were cut off from military reinforcements from the United States. Dewey, as we recall, having destroyed the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay and the fortifications on shore, still was compelled to wait three months for the arrival of American troops before he and the commander of our army could take the city.

Obviously the maintenance of an army in the Philippines for several years after the conclusion of the Philippine-American War was a precaution and a defense against an uprising of the natives. The Filipinos, however, though they crave freedom, hope to have it through the fulfilment of our promises and the merit of their cause. There is no need for a great garrison of American troops there. To-day the Philippine Scouts—Orientals, natives of the Islands, and friends of independence—out-number our army of Americans in the Philippines. If there were an outbreak against American authority, the Scouts indubitably would suppress it.

It has been suggested by some that in the event of a war between the United States and a first-class power in the Pacific, we should quit the Philippines and force our adversary to a great naval battle or to an engagement on the land at some place which we should select, and then (so these strategists propose) after these trials of strength, return to the Philippines and take them over again. My personal belief is that this course would be most objectionable to the American people. Seeming surrender of the Islands to an enemy would humiliate them—even if scientific warfare dictated it. If Japan really possesses the

diplomatic astuteness with which she is credited, she must perceive that her invasion of the Philippines, whether as a military move of only temporary import or as the prelude to their permanent occupation, would impel us to fight, but at such disadvantages—our remoteness from the theater of war, the difficulties of transport, the consequences of exposing our soldiers and sailors to a tropical climate—as would cancel our superiority in wealth and numbers.

Japanese expansion into the Philippines would not be very helpful to the land of the Mikado. She probably would not colonize her people there. Her statesmen are shrewd; they doubtless know that a colonial adventure in the Philippines would be an expensive undertaking, holding little hope of compensations. It would mean for the Japanese a new and costly attempt to govern another people—a dangerous addition to the burdens they have assumed on the mainland of Asia. On the other hand, the erection of an independent nation in the Philippines would increase Japan's opportunities for trade. The Philippines, as a colony, were unprofitable to the Spanish, and have proved unprofitable to us. They are a liability to us and might become so for Japan also. Japan now has all of the former German possessions (the Caroline Islands) lying between the United States and the Philippines. Under the terms of the mandate she may not fortify them, but should she go to war with us she could quickly build replacements and mount guns there, for she is near them and we are 7,000 miles away. These islands, too, make natural bases for hydroplanes, airplanes, submarines, and transports.

In their quest for arguments against independence, spokesmen of special interests assert that the treasury of a Filipino republic could not support a standing army and

a navy. If the United States could not hold the Islands against an invader by means of extensive fortifications and a standing army of 50,000 to 60,000 men, what chance would the Filipinos have? The answer is that the Philippine Scouts, all native Filipinos numbering about 6,000 men, and the Philippine Constabulary, equally numerous, would be a standing army quite as useful to an independent Filipino republic as it is to the present insular government. The Scouts might well continue in the service of the new republic. If it were advisable to diminish their number, a reduction could be effected by some method which should provide for the men mustered out, and for their families.

Now for any analysis of the argument that the upkeep of a navy would be a ruinous charge against the resources of a Filipino republic: First of all, no one who knows the facts regards a large Philippine navy either as imperative or appropriate. Without question the republic would require for the facilitation and the protection of its inter-island communications a service similar to the United States Coast Guard, supplemented possibly by some steamers for the transportation of troops to and from their posts in the different islands or for moving them to points where local disturbances arose or threatened. That naval provision would suffice. Indeed, one of the sources of strength to the Filipino republic would be its very weakness. It could not attempt to compete with any of the great naval powers. It should depend on the pledges given by the nations to recognize its independence, on its own neutrality agreements and on the good-will of the world. Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, all of them much less in territorial extent and in population than the Philippines, held aloof from the World War, though it raged all about them.

The island of Guam, 1,500 miles east of Manila, came into our possession in the same unexpected way as did the Philippines. It has an area of about 225 square miles and a population of 16,000, including our naval force. We have been gradually removing our airplane defenses from the islands, which we can not further fortify under the Four-Power Treaty. A humorous story tells how we took possession of Guam. The *U.S.S. Charleston*, on its way to the Philippines, stopped to seize and garrison the Islands. Without any preliminaries, it is related, the *Charleston* fired on the defenses of the port. Shortly after the firing ceased, the Spanish governor came out in a small boat and boarded the *Charleston*. He apologized very courteously and profusely for the fact that he was unable to return the salute (as he believed it to have been) because they had temporarily run out of powder. It was then he learned for the first time that the United States and Spain were at war. Admiral Coontz was present at the capture of Guam in 1898, and was later its eighth governor. Like Dewey, and other naval officers of that day, he seems to have had misgivings about the retention of the Philippines. One of the best buildings in Guam is named for him, and I discovered there the most pleasing recollections of his administration.

In October, after the *Charleston* had reached Manila, she was sent to Iloilo. Admiral Coontz, in his new book, "From the Mississippi to the Sea," recalls an incident of that time and place.

I think we were at Iloilo in November when word came that it was the intention of our government to hold the Philippines. There was much discussion of this matter, in the ward room mess, as it was felt that if we did retain the Islands, we would become a full-fledged world power, with all its atten-

dant responsibilities. I saw some officers weep when they learned of this report.

Guam is but a speck of land in the limitless waste of waters that surround it, and worth in itself not a minute's worry, yet it symbolizes a serious problem and a grave duty that challenge us in that far region. So I thought when I stepped ashore at Agana. We must either respect and fulfil the Four-Power Treaty (which expires in 1932, and which is the result of our own diplomacy), or we must ask for its amendment or termination. While this treaty binds our honor—and our hands—we can take no means to make our strength in the Orient equal to the risks and responsibilities we have accepted and continue to assume by our occupancy of the Philippines. In the absence of this treaty or some engagement like it, we should be compelled to begin the construction of great defensive works and to enlarge our naval detail in the Far East or else remain unprepared against an attack on the Islands. The following summary contained in the Senate Report No. 781, seems conclusive:

The question of Philippine independence in its relation to the Orient in general has been investigated, but as the result of such inquiry no fundamental reason is found for refusing independence to the Filipino people because of correlated Oriental problems.

We attach hereto as part of this report the 3-party agreement or treaty which limits our fortification of the islands as a matter of defense. In the absence of fortifications precluded by this treaty, no naval or army authority will deny that the Philippine Islands could not be held against a strong enemy for any reasonable length of time.

To attempt to fortify the Philippines for defense, if we hold them for the future, would require a change in the treaty

which now regulates our military and naval operations in the Pacific. There is serious doubt as to their utility to us in the event of armed conflict. They probably would be a liability so long as the 3-power treaty is operative.

It was asserted at the hearings that a foreign nation would hesitate to engage this country in conflict at the present time because of the ultimate disaster which such a war would mean to such aggressor. But admitting that no foreign power at the present time has any designs upon these Islands or any desire to take them, there is still a possibility that they may involve us in disputes with a foreign power.

In their present state of preparedness the Philippine Islands would be useless as a post of defence. The army personnel in the islands at present is limited to some 4,000 Regular Army men and to some 6,400 Philippine Scouts. There is also limited equipment.

These islands, once they were captured, it is generally agreed, could hardly be retaken by us for at least two years, and then only at the cost of an immense amount of money in war expenditures and after the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives of American sailors and soldiers. These islands lie within 30 hours' sailing from the Asiatic coast, they are practically part of Asia, as much so, in fact, as Cuba is a part of the American continent, and they are 21 days' sailing, by the fastest ships, removed from the Pacific Coast of the United States.

The 3-party treaty with Japan was a far-reaching decision and leaves the Philippine Islands, so far as the Army and Navy of the United States are concerned, in an unprotected condition which can not be changed while this treaty remains in effect.

The only possible expansion of military preparedness in the Philippines would be that effectuated in the mobile military forces of the islands. But to extend the mobile military force to the point of adequate defense would require from sixty to eighty thousand trained men, or a body nearly as large as the standing Army of the United States.

CHAPTER X

SELFISH FACTORS: TRADE AND FINANCE

GREATLY complicated, and obscured by issues of a purely private and selfish character, is the problem of the Philippines. Without criticism, express or implied, we may properly list as "selfish interests" certain groups and institutions that have their peculiar motives for advocating or opposing independence for the Filipinos. No one can justly quarrel with the representatives of such private interests for properly giving expression to their particular point of view in an honest effort to protect their rights or their welfare so far as these are involved in the fate of the Philippines.

Some of these groups and institutions are detrimental primarily because they are so thoroughly organized as to be able at times to divert public attention from the fundamental facts of our national responsibility and to center the popular mind on their particular troubles or disadvantages, thus creating confusion and indecision with respect to the main question. It is difficult, therefore, to appraise the claims of these conflicting elements, arrayed some of them for and some of them against proposals affecting the future of the Islands, and to discuss the issue solely on the basis of our national promise, our national defense, and the aspirations of the Filipino people themselves. Both the advocates and the adversaries are for the most part actuated by special motives which take small account of the larger aspects of the problem.

Broadly speaking, the groups favoring independence of the Islands are: (1) Three nationally organized farm organizations, with State branches; (2) the Coöperative Milk Producers' Association, and the National Dairy Union, nationally organized and with effective State branches; (3) the American Federation of Labor, probably the best organized of all the national factors and with efficiently managed and operated State and municipal affiliations; (4) certain fairly well organized interests in nineteen beet-sugar growing States and eight cane-sugar growing States; (5) an element, independent of the labor organization, favoring the exclusion of Filipinos from the United States for the same reasons that Japanese and Chinese have been excluded; (6) American investors in Cuban sugar; (7) a disorganized but somewhat assertive element in the population whose concern is that the continued free entry of Filipinos into this country may permit them to compete with our Negroes in certain labor to which during many years the latter has been deemed specially adapted.

Opposing independence will be found: (1) The "Manila American," to which group I have referred; (2) bureaucrats who fear the loss of their positions or the curtailment of our governmental activities in the Islands; (3) some American manufacturers who have found in the Islands a free market for their products; (4) importers of Philippine products which are not taxed under tariff laws as similar products from other countries are; and (5) Americans who have investments in the Islands. It is possible, thus, to group these contending forces and also to analyze with reasonable accuracy their relative numerical and financial strength; but before I do this I shall consider the amount and the influence of American capital invested in the Philippines. The aggregate was \$166,245,-

000 in 1930, and virtually all of it invested in the Islands from ten to twenty years ago.

For our purpose it is proper to treat the Philippines in this particular study as a foreign field, without reference to the legal interpretation of this term. And it is worthy of note that, while the American investment of capital in the Philippine Islands, even under our own sovereignty, is \$166,245,000, we find that the American investment in the United Kingdom is \$640,892,000; in the British Empire as a whole, \$5,179,945,000; in France, \$471,334,000; in Germany, \$1,420,957,000; in Japan, \$444,639,000; in China, \$175,768,000; in South America, about \$3,000,000,000. In Mexico the American investment is \$810,571,000.

Among the fundamental causes of American capital's lack of interest in Philippine investments are the prospect of changes in the tariff and doubts respecting the continuance of American proprietorship of the Islands, both of which matters are in the hands of Congress and subject therefore to its moods and mutations. American capital, in fact, has refused to enter the Philippines on a large scale; and foreign capital, realizing that the future of the Islands, in the absence of a well-defined American policy, is so fraught with uncertainty, is equally reluctant to assume risks there.

General Aguinaldo, who perceives and pictures the obstacle, writes:

The present uncertainty as I have stated . . . retards the economic development of the country. Capitalists have said that they do not care to make investments here in view of that uncertainty in our political status. If the uncertainty were terminated, the situation will change. Even in Bolshevistic Russia, and in China with its continuous civil wars, foreign capital keeps pouring in. . . . I would prefer the opening up of world markets for our products. We have many tropical products

which are in great demand not only in the United States but also in other lands. If we could place those products in the markets of other lands besides, it would surely be to our advantage. With the possible exception of cotton and steel and machineries, we could produce the things we need locally. We do not need much for our daily living. Foodstuffs we could produce in abundance. The raw materials for the primary manufactures are here also in abundance. We could be in a position to compete in the markets of the world.

The free trade relations we now have with the United States were established by the Congress. I do not remember that we have asked for this arrangement. It has been beneficial to the Islands to be sure; but from the point of view of our national destiny, it has deprived us of other markets and hence other chances.

The result of this free trade arrangement is as follows: Encouraged by the demand in the American market we have produced more sugar and we have also increased our production of oil and other products. But this increase is not now looked upon with favor by American agricultural interests and we are being told to restrict our output, because we are competing with American products in the United States. At the same time we are told to develop our country economically if we desire to be free. It would seem, therefore, that we are between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Let us return to the subject of the so-called "selfish interests." The three farm organizations favoring independence are the National Grange, the National Farm Bureau Federation, and the Farmers' Union. If they properly and accurately represent the opinion of the farmers of the United States, they may be said to speak for 6,297,877 Americans. But if they do not represent all the farmers, they are certainly entitled to speak for the membership of their respective organizations; that is, for 3,950,000. Furthermore, the farm value or agricultural in-

vestment represented by these American farmers is \$52,747,000,000. The American investment in the agricultural industry in the Philippines, and the number of Americans engaged in farm work in the Philippines are virtually negligible. The Coöperative Milk Producers' Association and the National Dairy Union represent approximately 360,000 dairy farmers who sell \$375,000,000 worth of dairy products annually. The interests of the farmer and the dairyman are essentially identical, and we may properly group these two elements together.

Closely associated with these two interests are the producers of sugar-beets in the following nineteen States: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, California, and Washington, and the producers of sugarcane in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. The sugar industry in the United States represents an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars and furnishes employment to many thousands of American citizens.

The farmer and the dairyman see in our permanent retention of the Philippine Islands a serious menace to their interests. Already faced with the problem of overproduction, the farmers and dairymen look across the Pacific and visualize the Philippines developed to the fullness of their vast agricultural possibilities, and dread the consequences which such a development would heap on American farm and dairy products. They see cheap Philippine labor working in the fields, its products transported free of duty to the United States; and they are unable to understand why their government should on the one hand warn them to curtail production as a means of increasing prices and, on the other hand, aid the development of Philippine agri-

culture through American supervision and education, and permit its products to compete with their own in the American market.

One may not in justice criticize the American farmer's foreboding at the prospect of further Philippine development and the continuance of free trade between the Islands and the United States. The farm and dairy industries have not been profitable in the recent past. Struggling, as has been said, with the problem of vast acreage and overproduction, our farmers and dairymen are obliged to contribute a portion of their taxes to the building of dams and the financing of other projects for irrigating deserts and draining swamps so that larger areas of land may be devoted to agriculture, and thus to enhance the burdens which they now carry. Who shall censure them for aiding Philippine independence and the enactment of tariffs on Filipino products as two measures of protection for their own well being?

There may be a few American farmers who contemplate with equanimity the thousands of idle farms; the numerous failures of rural banks; the fallen prices of agricultural products, and the multiplication of mortgages and the onerousness of taxes in the agrarian sections; there may even be farmers who are willing to prolong the present status of the Islands without reference to their own interests, but on the whole, I think, the 6,297,877 intelligent American farmers and dairymen believe that destructive competition with the Philippines confronts them, and they are overwhelmingly in favor of divorcing the Islands from American sovereignty and including them with other foreign countries against which we protect ourselves by tariffs.

Next let us consider sugar. We find that Americans have invested in Cuban sugar \$544,012,000. Most of this invest-

ment is represented by stocks held throughout the United States. Selfish motives doubtless prompt these interests to seek preferential treatment in the application of American duties to their product, but it is also true that American investors in these Cuban concerns have a right to question the fairness of a policy which allows Philippine sugar to enter the United States free while it taxes Cuban sugar, which is almost as much an American commodity as it could be were it produced within our own borders.

Now comes the American Federation of Labor. This organization, representing the workers of the United States, opposed at the outset the annexation of the Philippine Islands, and in its national conventions has regularly urged independence for the Islands. The Federation is at least one champion for independence whose selfish interest is tempered by devotion to the principles of freedom, self-government, and self-determination. Back in 1895 and 1896, the American Federation of Labor endorsed the struggle of the Cubans for freedom, and Samuel Gompers recommended in 1898 that it assume the same attitude toward Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands. The recommendations of that sturdy old leader of labor were adopted and the Federation resolved against departure from our time-honored traditions and protested against "forcing our system of government upon an unwilling people." While frankly endeavoring to serve the interests of American workers by shielding them from the lower wages and inferior standards of other lands, the Federation has nevertheless steadfastly adhered to the principle that the Filipinos, if they desire freedom, have a right to be free, let the cost be what it will.

With the eyes of intelligent self-interest, however, the Federation looks across the Pacific to the Philippines where laborers work for 30 cents a day, minimum;

miners for 87 cents a day; mechanics for \$1.20 a day, minimum, and for a maximum wage much below that of the American worker. And the Federation can find no logic to sustain the theory either that the products of such labor should be suffered to compete with the products of American labor, or that such low-priced labor should be permitted free entry into the United States to take the places of American workmen for hire upon which the latter could not maintain his standard of living. The American workman, therefore, represented by the American Federation of Labor, opposes the entrance of the Filipino into the United States as unfair and destructive to the American wage standard and for the same reasons he would exclude the product of cheap Philippine labor.

The Federation's fear of the evil results of the immigration of cheap Philippine labor has been realized on the Pacific coast, where already serious labor troubles have arisen from the belief that Filipinos are being imported to supplant American workmen in field and shop. No one can justly hold that the American workman, represented by the American Federation of Labor, is guilty of un-American conduct in attempting to shelter himself from the competition of cheap labor from any country whatsoever. On the contrary, this great body of workers has a right to combine pragmatism with idealism in its campaign for Philippine Independence.

Another group on the side of independence are those Americans who would restrict immigration to the United States, from whatever quarter. Their opposition to the free entry of Filipinos is quite consistent. They would be unfaithful to their principles if they worked to admit English, Irish, German, French, Italian, and Norwegian immigrants by quotas and yet consented that Filipinos should come here under no limitations. One may quarrel

with the doctrine of these exclusionists, but granting their premises, their program in so far as it applies to the Filipinos is logical and practical. If independence for the Islands will serve their purpose, they are entirely justified in favoring such course.

It is a powerful group, this. It has adherents throughout the country and has been respectfully heard by Congress on many occasions. Its efforts to exclude the Filipino were endorsed by the American Legion at its 1931 convention. The following resolution recites the Legion's views:

WHEREAS, The experience of California has demonstrated that Filipinos are not biologically assimilable with Caucasians in this state; intermarriage between the two races is forbidden by state law, and the presence of Filipinos in numbers has created grave economic, racial and political problems; and

WHEREAS, Our obligations to Filipinos as "wards of the nation" can be best discharged, in their interests and in ours, by fitting them for permanent residence and management of affairs in their own country, now therefore

BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Legion in National Convention Assembled, urge that entrance of Filipinos to continental United States be confined hereafter to those coming for temporary residence only, as students and visitors.

Certain American manufacturers complain of unfair competition of Philippine-made commodities with American-made goods. Importations of manufactures from the Philippines are small compared with the total American production of similar articles, but our theory of government contemplates that a manufacturer who feels that his output produced under our American standard of wages and conditions is being jeopardized by the cheap labor and low costs of the Philippines, is free to appeal to his government for protection from such danger or damage, just as he is entitled to petition for governmental safeguards

against destructive competition from other regions of the earth.

I have referred to all of these as "selfish factors" in the problem presented in the Philippines. I repeat that I so characterize them in no spirit of criticism. I have tried to make plain that they have a right to show their individual relationship to Philippine independence. I believe it is manifest that these interests form a powerful element and will exert a corresponding influence in the final solution of the Philippine problem. It is the duty of Congress, however, to preclude, so far as possible, any undue influence on the part of the private interests and to consider the question of independence solely in the light of actualities.

There are selfish factors in opposition to Philippine independence, and these, too, may rightly claim a hearing. But the difficulty for any student of the problem—and for Congress—will be to divide the honest opponents of independence from those whose selfish interests have little or no bearing on the future welfare of the United States or any material portion of our population. First and foremost of the opponents of independence is the active group of "Manila Americans." The second category of objectors comprises those persons or manufacturers who export their commodities to the Philippines and who desire to retain their present practical monopoly of trade with the Islands, which are a market for a portion of their exportable products. Normally they are entitled to desire customers to whom they can sell American goods at American prices. The question is whether the sale of these particular goods in this monopolized market is, from a purely trade standpoint, of sufficient weight to counterpoise all of the rest of America's private interests—those of the farmer, of labor, and of the American manufacturers

whose products are competed with by Philippine products.

Furthermore, there must be a satisfactory answer to the question whether, in the event of Philippine independence, any barriers shall be raised in the Islands which will tend to eliminate them as a market for American products. The very opposite would seem to be the logical conclusion. The Filipino, according to a number of authorities, has learned to like American products. He probably prefers them to other products obtainable at the same cost. For thirty years he has been using them largely. He has extended his purchase of them and has made his contracts with the producers of them, and there is no ground for the assumption that merely because of independence the Filipino will debar American commodities from the Philippine markets. But should a Philippine tariff operate against the same American products in the Islands, it would coincide with theories of protection entertained by most of those Americans who now sell to the Islands in a free market.

American textile manufacturers, whose goods are used in the Islands, are themselves among the most ardent supporters of a high tariff in the United States, to protect their domestic industry against cheap foreign products. With the exception of the automotive industry and perhaps one or two others of lesser importance, the American industries having any considerable volume of trade in the Philippine Islands, including the manufacturers of textiles, steel plants, machinery and equipment plants, etc., are among those who demand—and receive—protective legislation against all countries but the Philippines. Besides these there are the American manufacturers whose products are made from raw materials imported, free of duty, from the Philippines. These manufacturers foresee in independence for the Philippines the possibility of an

American tariff on the importation, or a Philippine export duty on the exportation of these basic materials. Soaps, oils, substitutes for butter, and other commodities, are in the list.

Other Philippine products, such as abaca, constitute a material portion of the Islands' export trade, but these are not now affected by our tariff laws. As such products, regardless of their origin, are on our free list, there is no contention that their status would be altered by independence. They do not compete with articles grown or manufactured in the United States and therefore are not subject to our tariff provisions.

We come now to a very powerful contingent of the forces ranged against Philippine independence. It is comprised of those Americans who, having investments in the Philippines, fear that upon the withdrawal of American sovereignty their property rights or their businesses may be endangered. They deem their interests safer under American control and direction than under Philippine control and direction.

It has been pointed out that the total American investment in the Philippines, according to figures compiled by the United States Department of Commerce, is \$166,245,000. Of this total, \$77,000,000 is represented by Philippine bonds, including those issued by the insular, the provincial, and the municipal governments and held in the United States. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, in any program for withdrawal of American sovereignty, would dispose of the question of protecting the investors in such bonds, as they are strictly Philippine Government bonds.

We may deplore the motives of these groups which seek to further or to frustrate independence, and declare that bigger, broader, and more fundamental principles should

decide the question of independence, but these interests can not be ignored. They are part of the problem. Their influence is more likely to grow larger than less as time drifts away. Meanwhile, the Filipino, thoroughly conversant with the motives of these two elements, is fettered by them. He feels that his political future is clouded by the conflict of interests that has continued ever since the United States acquired the Islands.

Moreover, this clash of American forces has resulted in humiliation to the Filipino—as, for example, when one of them urges his exclusion from the domain of the very power which governs him and claims his allegiance! He has carried his American flag loyally. He proffered his services during the World War. He did his part in the Liberty Loan drives and in other patriotic undertakings. He paid his way, and he is paying his way. And yet he finds his destiny dependent in large part on the outcome of a struggle between two great selfish groups, both alien to his native land.

Free trade between the Philippines and the United States was not initiated by the Filipinos. They opposed it because they believed and declared before it was legalized that it would create exactly the situation which confronts them to-day. They felt that trade relations with the United States on such conditions would ultimately make the Philippines a mere American market-place and the people of the Islands just so many customers. These presentiments have been verified.

They did not desire to develop their islands solely with a view to the American export market. They saw in such a policy the hazards of isolation. But free trade with the United States, rightly or wrongly, has conditioned the development of the sugar industry in the Islands, and the people there have adjusted and reconciled themselves to

it. If, however, they had to choose between the continuance of profitable trade with the United States and the achievement of independence, I am confident they would sacrifice the former.

They are quite willing to ratify any agreement promising a solution of the problem of sugar. One suggestion is that a definite limitation be imposed on exportation of sugar to the United States and that during the period that the Filipinos believe should be allowed to them for economic readjustment following independence, the exports be restricted to their present volume. Recalling that the United States, following our acquisition of the Philippines, accorded to Spain ten years in which to adjust commercial and economic conditions to the new order of things there, the Filipinos believe they have a right to expect the same or similar treatment in the event of our withdrawal. On their side, it is reported, they are willing, during that period of readjustment, so to limit production of sugar as to prevent it from working an undue hardship to those in the United States who have invested in the competitive products.

The Filipino people have the conviction that if the date of independence were precisely and irrevocably fixed their representatives and those of the United States could soon jointly—and amicably—evolve a plan for the adjustment of all the disagreements and difficulties incident to the cessation of our sovereignty in the Islands. These Islanders are aware that every day's delay tends, by that much, to maximize the problems. They fear that the growth of American investments and other commitments in the Philippines may be successfully pleaded as so many justifications for our reconsideration of the promises we have given them.

Connoted in this question of tariffs and revenues is the

cost of government of the Philippines. Unfortunately there is a popular misconception in America that the United States is spending vast sums of money in the Philippine Islands for public works and for the maintenance of Government, and this inspires the false notion that were we to withdraw from the Islands we should leave them bankrupt. This might be dismissed as a silly delusion if it were not a fabrication intended to deceive the American people. I compress in a sentence the truth about the cost of government in the Philippines:

Except for the maintenance of the United States Army and Navy in the Islands, the salaries of the two Resident Commissioners of the Philippines, and a portion of the cost of the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the Islands, every expense for governmental operations—central, provincial, and municipal—in the Philippines, comes from the tax sources of the Islands. Even an allowance of fifty thousand dollars for the expenses of the Schurman Commission which President McKinley sent to the Islands was later repaid to the United States from the Philippine Treasury. So far as the Filipinos are concerned, the cost of our military and naval establishment in the Philippines is a useless expenditure. In more than thirty years there has never been need either for the Army or Navy to put down colonial revolt, riot, or other outbreak.

Under powers given by Congress, and with but few limitations—among them, of course, the Presidential and the Congressional vetoes—the Philippine central government and the provincial and municipal governments raise by taxation the revenues they require, formulate their own financial policies and pay every cent of the cost. The governmental affairs of the Philippines have been and are being well managed. The administrators are almost without exception all natives.

There was a time when permanent works in the Islands, paid for out of current revenues, were pushed forward with such rapidity that it was charged financial disaster was threatening. But the speed of construction was lessened. This occurred in the early years of American occupation. Extensive bond issues for public works were prevented by our representatives, and there was then an attempt to pay for such improvements out of current revenues. Under such a policy, however, it was manifest that public works would have to be prosecuted at a very moderate pace.

There has been criticism that the taxing of the present generation for improvements benefiting posterity has retarded the development of the Islands. Of the merits of this controversy I need not judge, except to remark that the case is not peculiar to the Philippines. The point to be remembered is that the Philippine people, since the American occupation of the Islands, have paid the bills for all of the developments completed. That the Filipinos are thus meeting the costs of their various governments, and setting aside funds to retire their indebtedness, is a tribute to their ability no less than to their desire for advancement.

The Filipino method of levying and collecting taxes is not so intricate as the American system. The Filipino authorities obtain revenues by means of a poll-tax of two pesos on males between the ages of eighteen and sixty years; from a documentary tax; from a tax on business or occupation; from certain taxes on industrial products, on bank resources, on insurance company receipts, and corporation receipts; from a tax on forest products; from income taxes collected in the Islands by authority of Congress; and from fees for testing weights and measures.

By authority of Congress, the Islands have minted their



Sultan and dattos of Lanao ask for independence

own coins under standards which Congress established and the largest banking institution of the Islands, the Philippine National Bank, was organized by and is controlled by the Philippine government itself, with a minority stock ownership held by individuals, including Filipinos. The creation, conduct, and policy of this government-controlled bank have been the subject of no small commendation. The most recent report on the institution points out the developments in the period between 1923 and 1931. It states:

Instead of borrowing to meet daily cash requirements, the Philippine National Bank has repaid its reserve with the government and is reported to have its full required cash reserve of 13 million pesos, plus 9 million pesos excesses and a second reserve of more than 22 million pesos in negotiable government bonds, bank acceptances and commercial paper. Official authorities refer to the bank's solvent condition as gratifyingly contrasting with the early "wild-cat" days of the institution.

The gold standard and decimal currency came in pursuance of the recommendation of the Philippine Commission. They were brought into being by an Act of Congress in March, 1903. The power of note issue is lodged at the present time with the Philippine National Bank and the Bank of the Philippine Islands—the latter being a reorganized institution that emerged from the old Spanish government bank which at one time enjoyed a monopoly in the issuance of notes. In the development of sound banking policies and governmental fiscal policies, the Filipino has had the valuable counsel and advice of certain directing heads of government appointed by the President of the United States. But the Filipino has intelligently coöperated in this program and values it. The withdrawal of American sovereignty would not mean that the

Filipino should scrap the institutions which he has helped to build, and revert to the disastrous practices of a long-ago misguided colonial administration.

Every merchant, broker, banker, and importer in the Islands understands thoroughly that were independence granted and present trade relationships with the United States disrupted, his business and the business of the Islands as a whole would be so adversely affected as possibly to require reorganization. Nor has the Philippine leader, adept at discerning the selfish motives inseparable from competitive trade relationships, attempted to keep from the Philippine people the seriousness of the facts. It was my personal observation in the Islands that the Philippine people, while desirous of gaining their independence under a program of gradual severance of commercial relationships, would accept independence at all hazards, even if it became necessary to cut immediately the trade ties that bind them to the United States.

Tariff problems are not new to the Filipinos. Through many years following the occupation of the archipelago by Spain, begun in 1564, the Islands have undergone changing policies and programs affecting their export and import trade, just as have all of the colonial possessions of the great powers during the varying phases of colonial tariff policies. After 1898, under the terms of the treaty of peace, the United States permitted Spain ten years for the readjustment of her economic relations with the Islands. During that period, therefore, the Islands did not enjoy the present trade relationship with the United States, so that for one third of the thirty-year period from 1899 to 1929, there were duties on products exported to the United States from the Philippines and a Philippine tariff on American goods entering the Islands.

After ending the preferential policy toward Spanish

goods entering the Islands (in 1898), the American Congress took no steps looking to preferential tariff policies until March, 1902. The relationship between the Islands and the United States was identical with the relationship between our country and any other foreign power, including a Philippine export duty on products destined for the United States. The act of March, 1902, gave the Islands a 25-per-cent preferential rate on all products coming within the scope of the tariff act of 1897. And the Philippines in turn were ordered to discontinue the export duty on products destined directly to the United States, if those products entered the United States under the free list. The same act continued the Philippine import tariff which had been ordered by the Philippine Commission in 1901. Further acts in Congress in 1905 and 1906 revised the Philippine import tariff. The act of March 8, 1902, continued the exemption of Philippine trade from the provisions of the United States coastwise shipping laws.

In a discussion of the Philippine problem, it is noteworthy that our tariff attitude toward Porto Rico as early as 1900 tended to indicate our permanent retention of Porto Rico, while our trade relationship with the Philippines indicated no such policy up to 1909. By the Congressional act of 1909, we entered upon a limited free-trade treatment of the Philippines, but wrote into our tariff acts quantity limitations on certain commodities of Philippine production, such as sugar and tobacco. And we did not include rice among the duty-free articles. In addition, we established a 20-per-cent foreign material content as to products shipped from the Philippines. It was manifest that our quantity limitation on certain Philippine products had for its purpose the prevention of too great a competition with American products. It was not until October, 1913, that we removed the quantity limitation on

Island sugar, cigars, and tobacco, admitted free of duty. We have not removed the foreign-material content limitations on Philippine products. Subsequent tariff acts made complete the free-trade relationship of the Islands and the United States.

The benefit to the Islands of free trade with the United States with regard to products on the dutiable lists has been enhanced from time to time by increases in subsequent United States tariff acts. Our unique relationship to the Islands is emphasized in the fact that while we desired to grant them, from time to time, the advantage of more nearly perfect free trade, we had no desire to take from the Philippine Treasury a substantial portion of its income. Thus, in providing against the levying of export duty from the Philippines, thereby reducing the insular revenue, we felt they should be given something in return. The act of 1912 required that internal-revenue taxes, collected in the United States on Philippine tobacco, be returned to the Philippine Treasury and this requirement has been retained.

In 1899, Philippine exports to the United States were less than \$4,000,000, and Philippine imports from the United States \$2,347,000. The United States furnished to the Philippines only 9 per cent of Philippine imports, and the Islands sent to the United States only 18 per cent of their total exports. Philippine imports to the United States in the period from 1909 to 1914 jumped from a previous average of \$4,927,000 to \$21,056,000. In the five-year period previous to 1909, the Islands purchased from us only 17 per cent of their total imports; but in the 1909-to-1914 period they purchased 42 per cent of their imports from us. The exports of the Islands to the United States jumped from 18 per cent in 1901 to 35 per cent for the five-year period 1905-1909, and increased to 43 per cent for the

five-year period 1909-1914. They have continued to increase until, for the year ending January 1, 1929, about 75 per cent of Philippine exports come to the United States, while 62 per cent of Philippine imports come from the United States.

Of course, as trade with the United States developed, Island trade with the rest of the world diminished. In the period of 1899 to 1901, Philippine imports from the rest of the world outside of the United States constituted 91 per cent of Philippine imports, and the Islands shipped 82 per cent of their products to the rest of the world, exclusive of the United States. At the present time only 25 per cent of Philippine exports go to all the world outside of the United States, and less than 38 per cent of her imports, come from all the rest of the world. However, while Philippine exports to the United States increased from \$3,800,000 to \$115,500,000 in the thirty-year period, the exports to the rest of the world increased from \$16,900,000 in 1899 to \$39,460,000 for the year ending January 1, 1929.

With all the advantages of free-trade relationship with the United States, the value of exports from the Islands to the rest of the world increased in thirty years by \$23,000,000. The increase is not large. Compared with the increase of commerce between the Islands and the United States, it is small, but it indicates that at least a portion of the growth of the trade of the Islands with the United States is attributable to a normal increase in the business done by the Islands with all the rest of the world.

Similarly, the Islands, developed under our direction, began to purchase to a larger extent, and while the purchases from the United States increased from \$2,300,000 to \$83,800,000 in the thirty-year period, the Islands purchased from the rest of the world \$28,000,000 more in 1928 than they did in 1899. Our total exportations to the

Philippines in 1910 were \$16,832,000 and in 1928 \$79,805,000. Of our total exportations in 1910, our exports to the Philippines amounted to only .965 per cent, and in 1928 they amounted to but 1.56 per cent.

Our largest exports to the Philippine Islands are machinery, vehicles, non-metallic minerals, metals, and manufactures (except machinery and vehicles), chemicals, and related products, textiles (excepting cotton, wool, and vegetable fibers), wood and paper, and manufactures of agricultural products.

The percentage of products purchased by the Philippines from the United States and the relation which these products bear to the total of Philippine importations may best be portrayed by the following table taken from the latest available records of the Department of Commerce.

Import item	1929 per cent total P. I. import value	1929 per cent purchased from U. S.
Cotton goods	18	58
Iron and steel products	15	81
Mineral oils	7	85
Automotive goods, including tires	5	99
Meat and dairy products	5	54
Wheat flour	3	86
Silk goods	3	44
Paper and its products	3	72
Electrical machinery and apparatus	2	84
Tobacco products	2	96

It is manifest that a sudden termination of existing trade relationships would carry with it hardships for the Filipino and at least some curtailment in the export of those American products principally used in the Islands. Compared with the total trade of American manufacturers, the loss of business suffered by our manufacturers and dealers would be relatively unimportant, but not without its

effect. The significant point made by the Philippine leaders is this: That if America is to keep her national promise and ultimately grant complete sovereignty to the Islands, the seriousness of the trade problem will be increased rather than diminished each year that the present trade ties are continued.

Nothing substantiates this theory more convincingly than the figures of growing trade between the Islands and the United States. If the free-trade relationship of the Philippines and this country is to be broken at any time, the problem of establishing new markets will not be removed, and the Filipino believes that it will be easier to meet the problem to-day than fifteen, twenty, or thirty years hence.

In the prophecies of those who visualize trade disaster in the Philippines as an inevitable consequence of separation, there is one premise to which the Filipino offers decided objection. This premise on the part of the "prophets" is that the Filipinos, immediately upon separation, or immediately upon the disruption of free trade with the United States, would be forced to invade other markets of the world in order to exist. There are able economists among the Filipinos who find no such immediate necessity. They realize that a gradual development of foreign trade with the entire world will be necessary in order to promote the best interests of their nation, and to provide those funds necessary to a complete development of their resources. But such a development is not universally conceded to be an immediate necessity. Governmental economies in the Islands, and the possibility of an increase in insular taxation revenues, are deemed by some economists as sufficient for the time being to enable the Philippine Government to retain its present financial stability.

In at least one serious conference, an attempt was made to estimate in dollars and cents the loss which economic separation would entail. In this particular conference, José L. Celeste and Lorenzo Tañada, discussing the first-year budget for an independent Philippine Government (at the conference of the Harvard Club of the Philippines, held June 24, 1931, in Manila), took the 1930 figures of the value of Philippine exports and divided them into their respective commodities and figured out a probable decrease. The resulting table is interesting. I subjoin it:

Exports to U. S.	Total	Probable decrease
Sugar	P. 104,077,000	P. 50,000,000
Oil	37,924,000	8,000,000
Copra	21,309,000
Hemp	15,276,000
Embroideries	7,088,000
Tobacco	6,706,000	2,000,000
Desiccated Coconut...	5,917,000	3,000,000
Lumber	2,695,000
Hats	1,963,000	780,000
Cordage	1,683,000	1,200,000
Manufactured shell ...	776,000
Copra meal	656,000
Gums and resins	495,000
Maguey	408,000
Kapol	23,000
Others	3,698,000
	<hr/> P. 210,684,000	<hr/> P. 64,980,000

These Filipinos point out that the United States Tariff Act provided for a duty on sugar, tobacco, embroideries, oil, cordage, desiccated coconut, manufactured shell, and hats. The other items, regardless of origin, are on the free list. It will be noted that among the duty-free items is

what is known as Manila hemp (abaca), an agricultural product of the Philippines, the exports of which to the United States in 1930 amounted to 15,276,000 pesos. The exports of Manila hemp constitute 17 per cent of the total exports of the Islands; and of the total Manila hemp exported, 43 per cent comes to the United States, according to figures of the Department of Commerce. Abaca, or Manila hemp, is not grown commercially in the United States. Copra, exported duty-free to the United States from the Islands, amounting to more than \$21,000,000, is not calculated among the losses, as it comes under the free list. The largest loss, in fact 80 per cent of the entire loss in export trade, is ascribed to sugar, where a fifty-million pesos decrease is listed as probable.

Those who discussed the matter frankly admitted that if United States customs duty were collected on this product, producers in the Islands could not compete with those in other countries, since the cost of production of Philippine sugar "is about 9 pesos per picul and the duty is 4½ centavos per pound, or 6.25 per picul." In handling the sugar problem, those who prepared the data on total losses gave it as their opinion that the stock of sugar would have to be sold even at a loss and that presumably the exportation would have to be continued at a loss until such time as more modern methods and cheaper production could be brought about and a favorable competitive market obtained. It so happens that the Filipino does not believe the Orient favorable under present conditions as a market for Philippine sugar, in competition with production costs in Java and Formosa.

The solution, however, according to those who discussed these losses in the Philippines, is not to be found in the immediate regaining of the export trade, which they admit would have to be built up over years of effort,

but would be found, instead, in economies of governmental expense and in the revision of tax revenues from Philippine sources. Elaborate figures follow the discussion of the financial governmental problem of the Philippines resulting from a loss of American trade. The economists ultimately concluded that if insular government expenses continued at their present average, the first annual deficit would be about ten million pesos. They concluded their study by stating that under sound budgetary practice and strict economy, the reduction in income could be offset and a surplus provided for contingencies. Such figures, however, are only relatively important, in that there is little likelihood that free-trade with the Philippines would be cut precipitately.

Any discussion of the future financial stability of an independent Philippine people must take note that the government finances of the Islands are at present sound. At the beginning of 1929, there was a surplus of 14.20 million pesos and the income for 1929 was 89.44 million pesos. In 1930, the income dropped to 82.65 million pesos, with a surplus at the beginning of 1930 of 11.00 million pesos. Expenditures for general items in 1929 amounted to 71.40 million pesos, which sum was increased in 1930 to 72.50 million pesos. The capital outlay dropped from 9.30 million pesos in 1929 to 6.40 million pesos in 1930, and the sinking fund from 12.90 million pesos in 1929 to 4.00 million pesos in 1930. So that the surplus at the end of 1930 was 10.75 million pesos.

The Philippine budget for 1931, using as a basis the 10.75 million pesos and estimating an income of 77.65 million pesos, contemplates a total expenditure of only 77.90 million pesos which would leave a surplus at the end of 1931 of 10.50 million pesos. The total indebtedness of the Philippine Government at the close of 1930 was

slightly in excess of 172.5 million pesos, with a sinking fund of 67,557,863 pesos. The gold-standard-fund Philippine Government reserve at the end of 1930 was 10.4 million pesos in Manila and 23.7 million pesos in New York; the Treasury Certificate Fund reserve was 16.7 million pesos in Manila and 81.2 million pesos in New York, making a total government reserve fund of 132.0 million pesos.

The statistics of monetary circulation most recently available are as follows:

Close of Year	Millions of pesos in Philippine currency in circulation			
	Coins	Treas. Cert.	Bank-notes	Totals
1930	20.5	97.0	17.0	134.5
1929	21.6	83.4	18.8	123.8
1928	21.7	84.1	23.9	129.7
1925-29 av.	21.3	76.2	29.8	127.3

The revenue of the Philippine Insular Government derived from taxation, not including United States customs duties and internal revenue transferred to the Philippine Insular Treasury, for 1903 totaled \$8,912,665, or \$1.17 per capita. Of this sum, in 1903, \$5,225,000 was raised through import duties and represented 58.64 per cent of the total taxation revenue of the Islands. Export duties levied by the Philippines in 1903 on export Philippine products returned \$536,282 to the Insular Government, and only \$3,150,385, or 35.34 per cent of all taxation revenues was raised through taxes other than export and import duties.

For the year ending January 1, 1929, the total taxation revenue of the Philippine Insular Government had risen from \$8,912,000 in 1903 to \$31,560,000, or \$2.50 per capita; but import duties which were after 1913 assessed by the Philippines only on products imported from countries other than the United States amounted to only \$9,588,688, an increase in the 25 years of but \$4,300,000. While in 1903 the revenue to the Insular Government from import

duties was 58.64 per cent of the total taxation revenue, in 1928 it amounted to but 30.36 per cent of the total taxation revenue of the Islands.

The Islands had an export duty on products at the time of our occupation, which, in 1903, represented a total of 6.2 per cent of their total taxation revenue. In 1913 the export duties levied by them amounted to \$1,003,975, or 7.80 per cent of the total taxation revenue of the Islands. Under the Congressional Act of 1913, the Islands were forbidden to assess any export duties, and all such duties have been abolished since that date. The total Insular revenue raised from taxation other than export and import duties, which amounted to only \$3,150,000 in 1903, in 1928 reached the grand total of \$21,971,000 and constituted 69.62 per cent of all of the revenue of the Insular Government.

There is one hopeful factor in the tariff and trade policies affecting the Philippines, and that is that the American tariff relationship with the Islands is not a subject of contention between the two dominant political parties in the United States, whose views regarding tariff problems in general vary widely. The Tariff Act of 1913 establishing free trade with the Islands happens to have been enacted under a Democratic administration, but has been continued under Republican administrations, including the Tariff Act of 1930, for which the Republican party was responsible. No attempt has been made to delve into all those delicacies and intricacies of Philippine world trade, to which attention must ultimately be given by those agencies of the government that will ultimately participate in the adjustments necessary under a severance of present relationships.

I have sought to confine this chapter to a frank admission of the facts as they exist, and to an analysis of the

interests that have a direct and intimate concern in the factors of trade relationship. And I have endeavored to point out that primarily all of these questions are matters fully recognized by Philippine leaders, both political and commercial, and that no attempt has been made to minimize the seriousness of the problems with the Philippine people themselves. The path to the future development of the Islands as an independent nation will not be strewn with roses, but the Filipino knows this. He sees the impending hazards. He faces them with an admission of seriousness but a conviction that he will be able to meet them. And essentially, therefore, while it is indeed proper and just that, as a benefactor nation, we should expend every effort to help the Filipino meet his future problems, the fact remains that when he demands his independence with a consciousness of the future it holds, such problems become his own.

CHAPTER XI

UNCERTAIN MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT OVER THIRTY YEARS OF CHANGE

RESPONDING to the suggestion of Admiral Dewey, in 1899, President McKinley sent a Civil Commission to the Philippines, to make inquiries and recommendations, but they arrived too late to be effective, for fighting had already begun, and blood had been spilled. The Filipinos believed that they could not achieve sovereignty and self-government for their country without war. They had expected something better than the substitution of an American for a Spanish master. At this crisis of their history, the Filipinos were fairly well armed. It is estimated that they possessed some fifty thousand rifles and a considerable supply of ammunition. They were, besides, quite determined to fight, if no peaceful adjustment of the controversy were possible. The fact that they, an agricultural people of nine million, must challenge the most powerful nation in the world, with a population of a hundred million; that they, poor as they were, must withstand a rich and resourceful government, seemed not at all to dishearten them. They threw down the gauntlet and battled bravely for three and a half years. Approximately sixteen thousand Filipino soldiers were to lose their lives before peace came.

Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, who later became successively our minister to China and ambassador to Germany, was chairman of this first commission. His col-

leagues were, Admiral Dewey, Major-General E. S. Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester. Dr. Schurman opposed the acquisition of the Islands. This opposition he had voiced to Mr. McKinley at the time of his appointment. He was hopeful that negotiations with the Filipinos should be undertaken. In that direction, he thought, lay peace. Save that it brought to the study of the problems involved in the annexation of the Philippines the fine mind and earnest endeavors of Jacob Gould Schurman, the Commission was a futile device. It was unable to accomplish pacification of the Islands by civil means and returned home. It must be observed that other members of the Commission did not share Dr. Schurman's views. If they had coincided with him, their work might have been more fruitful. The earlier appointment of the Commission would have been a still more favorable omen. The Army, with its preconceptions born of propaganda, was already in the Islands. The Army's viewpoint, as we have seen, was hostile to the natives. The Commission was appointed by the President without authority from Congress, and presumably in the exercise of his war powers. Its members landed in Manila March 4th, 1899, one month after the first shot had been fired in the Philippine-American war. Its general instruction was to give the Filipino people the largest participation in insular government compatible with the sovereign rights of the United States.

After the failure of the Schurman Commission, the President appointed another Commission of which Judge Taft was Chairman and the following very able men were members: Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and Bernard Moses of California. This Commission was authorized by the Spooner Amendment, approved March 2,

1901. This amendment was attached to an Army appropriation bill. Its grant of power to the President was without precedent in the life of our Government. It provided that: "All military, civil, and judicial power necessary to govern the Philippine Islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."

On July 4, 1901, Judge Taft was inaugurated as the Civil Governor of the Islands. This title was later changed to "Governor-General"—a very unusual American title for a civilian executive. The new Commission inaugurated the work of introducing civil government in place of military government. It was a difficult, delicate task. In the main, army officers coöperated with the Commission, and gradually civil authority became supreme and universal. Judge Taft proved himself a sympathetic and intelligent administrator. He constantly met with opposition from the American civilians in Manila. Most of them craved a military rule.

The temper of our soldiers in the Philippines was a hindrance to quick reconciliation of the Filipinos to the new order. Some of these soldiers had been under fire, and had seen comrades wounded or killed. They were impatient. The fighting had been to their liking, but when not engaged in war they wrote songs. One of the songs they wrote in a humorous mood became very popular among Americans in the Philippines, and, by the same token, very detrimental to good relations between the two peoples. The refrain of this derogatory ditty went like this:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,
Pock-marked Khakiac ladrone;
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag
And return us to our own beloved home!

And Judge Taft's kindly reference to the Filipinos as our "little brown brothers" was repudiated in this wise:

He may be a brother of William H. Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine!

At this period there were two American newspapers in Manila. One has since been discontinued. These American-owned newspapers, supported by "Manila Americans," resented and resisted every movement to grant a larger measure of autonomy to the Philippines. Their propaganda to sway public opinion and official action in the United States began then and has persisted to this day. Judge Taft complained of these papers' conduct in an article which he wrote for the "Outlook" of May 31, 1902. His characterization is still appropriate:

There are in the City of Manila American papers owned and edited by Americans who have the bitterest feeling toward the Filipinos, and entertain the view that legislation for the benefit of the Filipinos, or appointment to office of Filipinos, is evidence of a lack of loyalty to the Americans who have come to settle in the Islands. Accordingly, they write the most scurrilous articles impeaching the honesty of Filipino officials, the Filipino Judges, and the whole Filipino people, as a basis for attacking the policy of the Commission.

The first Philippine Commission was exclusively American in its personnel. In an act of 1902, however, Congress provided that, at the expiration of two years after a census had been taken and published a Filipino Assembly

should be convened, and there should be joint administration of insular affairs by the American Commission and the Filipino Assembly. Congress at this time also authorized the President to designate a department of the Federal Government to continue in joint administration with the civil government in the Islands. The President selected the Secretary of War to perform these functions. It was an unusual selection, in violation of all American precedents, and contrary to the practice of the great colonizing governments of Europe. Neither England, nor France, nor Holland, nor Germany—not even Spain—left the function of civil administration in the hands of military authorities. Investigators and independent magazine writers familiar with the subject of colonial governments elsewhere have all called attention to the anomaly in the Philippines.

Our organic law provides that military power shall be subservient to civil direction. The power to declare war is lodged in Congress. Upon the declaration of war the President becomes the active Commander-in-Chief of both the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion of hostilities the terms of peace are negotiated by the civil representatives of our Government, though the surrender of General Lee on conditions fixed by General Grant (but doubtless previously approved, if not actually dictated, by President Lincoln) may appear to have been an exception to the rule and the practice. The Army and the Navy have had no authority or participation in the civil administration of our States or our Territories, except during a period of armed conflict, and when acting under the joint direction of the President and the Congress.

In keeping with the military complexion which has been given to our stewardship of the Philippines, the Bureau of Insular Affairs is composed exclusively of army officers

who are designated for this service. The Chief of the Bureau has the rank of brigadier-general. He has for his assistants a colonel and a major, and a small civilian staff. The original act establishing the Bureau authorized the Secretary of War to detail an officer of the army, with the rank of colonel, as its chief. Subsequent legislation provided that an officer of higher rank be selected. The duties of Chief of the Bureau resemble those of a permanent "Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies." The personnel of this Bureau has always been of a very high character, and there has been little complaint of its officers, their capacity, or their administrative ability. The present Chief, has had, in addition to his military experience and training, diplomatic service. He speaks Spanish fluently, and this familiarity with the language of many thousands in the Islands adds to his usefulness.

The Bureau handles large sums of Philippine funds—totaling as much as \$70,000,000—which are deposited, at its direction, in various banks in the United States. To it are referred all matters concerning the Philippines. All communications subsequently issued by the Secretary of War are, in the first instance, prepared by the army officers of this Bureau. Here is an illustration: In response to a request from the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs there came from the Bureau of Insular Affairs a statement regarding the Islands. This was followed by a letter from the Secretary of War. The communications were almost identical in the recital of facts and in the presentment of conclusions. The argument was the same in both. They were clearly the work not of the Secretary of War, but of the army officer temporarily detailed to the Bureau.

This Bureau is now the one intermediary in matters of administration, between the civil government of the United States and the civil government in the Philippines.

Congress probably permits it to continue pending the bestowal of independence on the Filipinos or the erection of a new form of colonial government for the Islands. Some army officers by reason of their experience are fitted for valuable service in civil administration, but they should be freed from military direction. This freedom many of them would welcome if a permanent status in a civil department of the insular establishment were assured to them. Civil administration is no proper activity of the War Department, and should be divorced from military control and associations. Such domination and direction of the Bureau of Insular Affairs account for many of the inconsistencies of our management of the Philippines.

Elihu Root, as Secretary of War, formulated the principles and the instructions which governed the Taft Commission. The Commission's policy was that of realizing the doctrine of "the Philippines for the Filipinos, under a government based on American, as distinguished from Spanish, principles." The early Commission made its own laws and rules, which were submitted to the Secretary of War for approval. Congress was not consulted as to the wisdom or fairness or constitutionality of these regulations for the government of nine millions under the American flag. The Commission indeed was given powers so broad that it might, had it wished, have regulated commerce, levied taxes and spent them, passed *ex post facto* laws, or taken almost any other action that, if attempted in the United States, would have been unconstitutional. But it did none of these things. It did not abuse its power. Mr. Taft's policy evidently was to give the government into the hands of the Filipinos as soon as possible. The legislative power formerly exercised by the Secretary of War was in effect transferred to the Commission, which thereafter devised its own rules.

Willis describes the Organic Act of 1902, under which the people of the Philippines were to be governed for several years:

As originally drafted and presented by the War Department, this measure consisted of 111 sections. Sections 1-5 ratified the instructions of the President, as conveyed in the orders of April 7th, 1900, and June 21st, 1901, confirmed the acts already passed by the Commission, and vested large powers of control for the future in the President, and under his orders, the Commission. Sections 6-12 regulated the conditions under which certain lands might be disposed of, and provided for the disposition of public property inherited from the Spaniards. In Sections 13-49, forestry regulations and an elaborate system of mining laws were laid down. The purchase of the "friar lands" was authorised in Sections 50, 51, and 52. Certain appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States were provided for in Section 53. Sections 54-61 regulated the issue of municipal bonds for public improvements. Sections 62 and 63 dealt with the granting of franchises. In Sections 64-109 an elaborate system of money and banking was outlined. Section 110 placed the Bureau of Insular Affairs—an administrative mechanism created in the War Department to deal with insular conditions—on a permanent basis, and the final section was merely the usual paragraph repealing all inconsistent legislation.

It thus appears that the measure for the government of the Philippines of which so much had been heard could only in a Pickwickian sense be termed a "civil government bill." It said practically nothing whatever about government in any form, except in the few bare sections confirming the power of the Commission and providing for certain appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.

The first actual participation in administration by Filipinos was authorized in the presidential order taking effect September 1, 1901. Three Filipinos were then added to

the Commission. They were Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Señor Benito Legarda, and Señor José R. de Luzuriaga. This recognition of the Filipinos in the administration of their Islands, scant as it was, notwithstanding, raised the usual howl among the "Manila Americans" and incited the opposition of the two American newspapers. To-day, with the exception of the Governor-General, the Vice-Governor, the Auditor, and five members of the Supreme Court, all important offices in the Philippines are held by Filipinos. President McKinley's instructions that the Insular Government was "designed not for the satisfaction of the American people but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the Filipinos," and his direction that "their customs and habits, even their prejudices, were to be considered," were in general followed. There was an immediate and significant improvement upon the military government which the civil régime superseded.

The first Congressional enactment concerning the government of the Philippine Islands was that of July 1, 1902—the so-called Philippines Bill. This act accepted the Commission's outline of general and local government, including the creation of the office of Civil Governor. The new law extended and more clearly enumerated a bill of rights for the Islands. The Bill provided for the taking of a census, and for the establishment of a Philippine Assembly two years after this enumeration of the inhabitants. The Assembly was established in 1907. In the period between 1901 and 1907 the five Americans who constituted the Commission were the civil government of the Philippines. In those years also most of the judges of the inferior courts and the majority of the members of the Supreme Court were Americans. Filipinos had few posts, and these of secondary importance. From 1907 to 1916 the Filipinos were permitted a larger share in the government.

The Philippine Assembly became the lower branch of the new legislature. Its members were elected by the people. Filipinos were also appointed to the Philippine Commission, which, beginning with a membership of five, later was enlarged to a membership of seven and, eventually of nine. The Filipino members of the Commission were in the minority until 1913, when President Wilson appointed five Filipinos. Under the form of government thus established, the Civil Governor was without veto power except in so far as he might prevail upon the majority of the Commission to refuse to sanction the Assembly's enactment of measures to which he was opposed. The Commission's administration was humane, intelligent, and constructive, and on the whole showed sympathy with the natural aspirations of the Filipino people. Though the Commissioners possessed extraordinary powers, there is no evidence that these were abused. The gradual extension of Filipino participation in the administrative and legislative control of their Islands was approved and appreciated by the Filipino people and by all thoughtful Americans, except those resident in the Islands.

Governor Taft was very early confronted with two problems difficult of solution. More than 400,000 acres of land belonged to three different religious organizations: The Dominicans had 161,953 acres; the Augustinians had 151,742 acres; and the Recoletos 93,035 acres. These properties the friars had acquired under Spanish rule by royal grant, by concession of the Spanish Governor, or by purchase. The friars had been driven from possession of the lands, so they had transferred the property to be held in trust by individuals or corporations. But tenants refused to pay rent and opposed the return of the property to the Orders.

The Commission, inspired by Governor Taft, proposed

the purchase of these lands by the Philippine Government and, by the Act of July 1, 1902, was authorized to acquire them. But the price asked for the holdings was too high, and for a long time the negotiations were resultless. Finally Governor Taft visited Rome to deal directly with the highest ecclesiastical authorities of the Catholic Church, and, in 1903, he purchased 410,000 acres for \$7,239,000. The Taft plan and that of the Commission was to sell this land to tenants. This raised a new difficulty because the tenants contended that the land belonged to them and not to the friars, and they refused to buy it. The problem is slowly working out. The matter of titles and possession has been adjusted in many cases, but many other difficulties remain. Proposal to sell the land to the tenants in installments spread over long periods, and on the basis of a moderate rental has been carried into effect. The Bureau of Public Lands has this matter in charge, and has devised an arrangement by which a board, including a representative of the tenants, is to be organized.

In the Act of 1902, authorizing the disposal of the friar lands and other public property, Congress also provided for the sale of these various properties to tenants, at the same time limiting the acreage which could be sold to any one person or to a corporation. Willis gives an interesting insight into the plan and the difficulties it encountered:

The central feature of the latter (law) was the limitation imposed upon the amount of land to be granted. Section 15 read as follows: "That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said islands, such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands of the United States, in said islands, as it may deem wise, not

exceeding 16 hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than 1,024 hectares to any corporation or association of persons."

This provision was the outcome of a lengthy struggle in which certain interests (which by this time had crystallized) sought to secure the substitution of provisions largely increasing the amount of the land grants. Some of the proposals sought to secure grants of 20,000 acres and leases for ninety-nine years on Philippine lands. Two very different forces co-operated to oppose any such proposals. The sugar interests, very active in Washington during the session of 1901-02, regarded the Philippine land question as a phase of the general sugar problem. They did not wish to see large areas opened to sugar culture in the Philippines, for they foresaw the pressure for free trade with the United States certain to result therefrom. On the other hand, opponents of the colonial policy opposed a system of large land grants as likely to be prejudicial to native well-being. The combined result was as just indicated. Shortly before the passage of the bill, however, interests desirous of carrying out the exploitation policy, secured an amendment to Sec. 75. That section as passed read as follows: "That no corporation shall be authorized to conduct the business of buying and selling real estate, or be permitted to hold or own real estate, except such as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it is created, and every corporation authorized to engage in agriculture shall by its charter be restricted to the ownership and control of not to exceed 1,024 hectares of land, and it shall be unlawful for any member of a corporation engaged in agriculture or mining and for any corporation organized for any purpose except irrigation to be in any wise interested in any other corporations engaged in agriculture or in mining."

During Mr. Taft's career as Governor he was plagued by many who, like the "Manila Americans," clamored for a declaration of permanent possession of the Islands by

the United States; by those who favored an increase of control by the natives; and also by those who advocated outright independence. His idea was that of gradual preparation of the people for independence by a corresponding enlargement of their part and responsibility in their Government. His record was excellent, and satisfied all but those Americans who have never been able or willing to recognize that our policy in the Philippines should not be one of exploitation for our exclusive benefit.

Governor-General Taft was succeeded by Luke E. Wright for two years and then followed H. C. Ide for a short period; James F. Smith for three years, and W. Cameron Forbes for four years. Finally came the long and epochal administration of Francis Burton Harrison. His successor was the then Vice-Governor Charles E. Yeater, who, strangely enough, as acting Governor-General was popular with both Filipinos and "Manila Americans" and was indorsed for appointment by both Democrats and Republicans of the Islands. But President Harding appointed General Wood.

General Wood's administration was marked by controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos. These resulted ultimately in the resignation of the Council of State and the Cabinet. An appeal for Governor Wood's removal from office was made by the Filipinos, but President Coolidge retained him. Henry L. Stimson, now Secretary of State, succeeded General Wood. He was tactful, and apparently sympathetic with the idea of ultimate independence. He frankly stated to the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs that he opposed immediate independence, and seemed to doubt that the Filipinos desire it. He was no less frank in saying that if the people of the Islands really wish independence they should have it. The colloquy between Mr.

Stimson and me in the course of his testimony before the Committee may be worth reproducing:

Senator Hawes: Mr. Secretary, I am quite sure that every member of this committee, the same as yourself, wants to do the best he can for the Philippine people and for our own people. I want to ask you this further question which I asked you in executive session. Do you favor the ultimate independence of the Philippines?

Secretary Stimson: I can best answer that by saying what I have said, many times here and in the Islands. What I favor is a carrying out of our duty to the Philippines, which was, as I understand it, to fit them for democratic self-government up to the time when they are fit to stand on their own legs and be independent, if they want to; and if they then want to be independent, I should certainly not prevent them by force from being independent. . . .

Senator Hawes: Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, then, you do favor the ultimate independence of the Philippines under certain conditions?

Secretary Stimson: If they desire it.

As Governor-General Mr. Stimson took pains to restore the Council of State. He did not imitate Governor Wood's inflexibility. It was during Mr. Stimson's administration that the Philippine Legislature made an appropriation of 250,000 pesos a year with which to pay the salaries of civilian advisers of the Governor-General. The present Governor-General, Mr. Dwight F. Davis, has followed the policies of Governor-General Stimson. He has insisted that only men of ability be selected for public office. He has recommended the economic development of the Islands and to this end has urged a legislative program. Mr. Davis appeals to the Filipinos as a sportsman. He entertains them, and his administration so far has been noticeably free from friction and controversy.

No Governor-General, while in office, is expected to make a clear-cut statement either for or against independence. If he should declare against independence he would be doomed immediately to lose the regard and the support of the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives. This would mean forfeiture of Filipino coöperation. If, on the other hand, he should publicly favor independence, he would immediately become the target of the Manila American newspaper and the "Manila Americans" that view the independence of the Islands as in some fashion an act of treason against the United States. They would retaliate by attempts to discredit the administration, at least socially. The Governors-General, therefore, with Governor Harrison as the sole exception, have neither advocated nor discountenanced independence. Even General Wood on one occasion told Filipinos at a Y. M. C. A. gathering that they should fix their eyes constantly on the ideal of independence. On other occasions he praised the ideal as worthy, but attainable only in the far future. Judge Taft was friendly to a steady increase in the Filipino's participation with the United States in the government of his native Islands. Slowly in the beginning, but nevertheless progressively their autonomy was extended under Mr. Taft and under him they served the first years of their apprenticeship in self-government.

The administrations of Messrs. Wright, Ide, and Smith were on the whole modeled upon that of Governor Taft. Governor Forbes, too, followed his early predecessor's example. As a business man, Governor Forbes gave a great deal of his time to attempts to interest American capital and American enterprise in the Philippines. He was able to accomplish little because of the law limiting the ownership of land—a subject I have already mentioned. The tariff was another deterrent. Governor Forbes in his two-

volume work, "The Philippine Islands," in which he has assembled material of great historic value, has contributed authoritatively to the presentation of the Philippine problem. I can not accept all of his conclusions, but I can say that he has sought to be fair.

Governor Harrison's term was marked by what might well be called revolutionary innovations. Chief of these was the replacement of Americans by Filipinos in various posts within the insular establishment. This was Governor Taft's policy carried almost to its farthest limit. General Wood, immediate successor of Harrison, reversed the trend. He attempted to take power from the Filipinos; and at the same time increase the power and prestige of the Governor-General. Governors Stimson and Davis pursued a course lying between the liberalism of Harrison and the conservatism of Wood.

The régime of Francis Burton Harrison is the bone of so much contention between the friends and the foes of Philippine independence, that I purpose to give a brief sketch of him as a man and an estimate of him as administrator of a very difficult office. Harrison was a Representative from New York City when President Wilson appointed him as Governor-General of the Philippines. Two historians have described him as a Tammany Congressman, leaving thereby the implication that he was a man of limited capacity and training, merely a politician selected for partisan reasons. This is very far from the truth. Harrison comes from a very old and distinguished Virginia family. He is a man of broad culture, a traveler, a student. He did not seek the position. It was given to him not as a political reward but in recognition of his capacity.

One is led to believe that Mr. Harrison went to the Islands with instructions from President Wilson. While

there he carried into effect a policy that, if it were not immediately directed by President Wilson, at least had the President's full approval, as it unmistakably had the approval of Congress. That Congressional sanction was given by the enactment of the Jones Bill of 1916. On his arrival in the Philippines he delivered what he called a message from President Wilson.

"We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands," he said. "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence, and we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken, experience will guide us to the next."

In order that the removal of the Americans from civil posts in the Philippines—in pursuance of Governor Harrison's policy—should work the least possible hardship on them, a sort of bonus was paid to those who resigned voluntarily. The Philippine Legislature provided by statute what might be termed "a gratuity by reason of retirements to officials and employees who had rendered satisfactory service during six continuous years or more." Under this law, the Governor-General might approve the retirement of all officials except those detailed for service by the Army or Navy and those in the civil service of the United States. All those who had served ten years could receive three equal annual payments amounting each to thirty-three and one third per cent of the salary last received, with lesser sums for shorter periods of service. This act expedited the replacements.

Harrison openly advocated independence. In private conversations he was a quite outspoken champion of Fili-

pino freedom. Naturally he became a prime favorite with the Filipinos. They liked him because of his attitude on independence, and quite as much for his pleasing personality, his unfailing sportsmanship, and his judicious impartiality as between the Occidental and the Oriental. He undoubtedly did much to inspire the young Filipinos to prepare themselves for political positions. He transformed a government of Americans, aided by Filipinos, to one of Filipinos assisted by Americans. During his years in the governorship the Filipinos enjoyed the largest autonomy they had, and all the while the relations between the executive and the legislative branch of the insular government were harmonious.

At this juncture there was created by the Governor-General a Council of State "to aid and advise the Governor-General in matters of public importance." The body was to consist of such Filipinos as might be appointed or summoned by him. Its members were the Governor-General (who was also presiding officer), the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the six members of the "Cabinet" or heads of the six executive departments. This Council, General Wood attempted to abolish, but it was later reconstituted by Governors Stimson and Davis. The quick and general substitution of native for American personnel—to which I have alluded—resulted in some inefficiency because of the inexperience of the Filipinos, but its compensations were many and important. The Filipinos learned the arts of administration; they took pride in their new character of public servants; they improved their opportunities.

Let me summon as a witness, Marcial P. Lichauco, native Filipino, graduate of Harvard, author, and now Assistant Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands. The advancement made by the people following the admission

of Filipinos to posts of responsibility from which they had previously been excluded he illustrates by a statistical statement:

Under the Forbes Administration the attendance in public schools had reached 440,000, but in 1921, when Governor Wood came to assume his duties he found that the Filipinos had provided accommodations for over 1,100,000. Only 7,512,000 Pesos had been spent annually for education in 1913 when Governor Forbes left; in 1921 over 22,000,000 Pesos were employed to provide for the increased attendance in schools. Of course, the number of schools rose in proportion as well, from 2,934 in 1913, to 5,944 in the course of Filipino administration, while the number of Filipino teachers kept pace accordingly—from 7,651 to 17,575.

In the field of transportation the material progress effected was just as convincing. First class roads increased from a total mileage of 2,035 kilometers in 1913 to 4,698, or an increase of over 100 per cent in eight years. So with inter-island coast-wise traffic—from 680 vessels with a net tonnage of 54,396, the number rose to 3,044 with a net tonnage of 99,376.

In 1913 there were no public dispensaries giving free medical treatment, but within eight years the Filipinos established over 800 such institutions. There were then also only two insular and six provincial hospitals, but that was increased under Filipino "misgovernment" to eleven insular and eleven provincial hospitals. There was only one organization for infant welfare when the Filipinos took charge unhampered by an American Governor-General. Here was clearly a large field for improvement as infant mortality in the Islands had in the past been unusually heavy. They proved themselves equal to the task, however, for by 1921 there were 615 institutions functioning for this purpose. Death rates thus fell from 32.28 per thousand for the periods of 1908-13 to 28.62 from 1914-19, despite the fact that an epidemic of influenza had ravaged the Islands in 1918.

In the course of Governor Harrison's administration, the Philippine National Bank was established. Money was lent by this bank to sugar planters. Railroads and public utilities, also, were assisted.

Individuals and corporations undertaking to develop the national resources, to increase the output of oil and coal, to build more shipping, and to stimulate the sugar industry, were borrowers of the bank's funds. Some of these enterprises proved successful. In other cases there was collusion and misappropriation. But those officials who were found corrupt were tried, convicted, and imprisoned for their offenses.

This instance of Filipino maladministration was not to be commended of course, but it was by no means novel in the world. There have been thousands of failures of banks in the United States. Even institutions which State Bank Examiners and Federal Bank Examiners had scrutinized have collapsed within a few days or a few hours after such official visitations, with immense losses to depositors. Our penitentiaries house not a few American bankers who have been false to their trust. We can not justify the sins of the Filipino bankers by citing the misdeeds of his American contemporaries, but neither can we make the wrong-doing of a few men in the Islands an argument against the honesty or the competence of the whole people. I dwell on this point because some have sought to offer the mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank as a reason for denying independence to the Filipino nation!

The cost of administration in the Philippines increased very largely between 1913 and 1920. The like was true in the United States. The wages of our labor were ascending; new bureaus and commissions were constantly being created. The cost of government in this country went

bounding forward at a rate never attained before. That there was a rise in nearly all governmental expenditures in the Philippines is a favorite topic for "Manila Americans" who would like to recall the old order, under which all the offices were filled and practically all authority was exercised by Americans. Be the cost of the insular government large or small, taxpayers in the United States are in no wise affected. Philippine taxpayers bear the burden, heavy or light. They pay all the bills—including the salaries of their American rulers.

In 1916 it was becoming increasingly evident that the United States would be forced to participate in the World War. It seemed impossible for us to remain aloof. The people and Congress had by that time come to anticipate the declaration of war that came in 1917. It was in that mood and in the midst of preoccupations that the Congress undertook the discussion and passage of the Jones Law. The title and the preamble of the bill, because of their asseveration of our policy with regard to the Philippines, have a special importance to my present purpose. The title of the Jones Law is this: "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those islands." It is remindful of the Preamble of our Constitution!

The preamble of the bill, recording and reaffirming the conditions under which the Philippines were acquired by the United States and promising independence to the Filipino people, I reproduce because of the objection that these recitals and pledges are in the preamble, not of its body and substance, and are therefore not binding on the honor and conscience of the American people. Let us see. Here is what Congress said:

Whereas, it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and Whereas, it is, as it always has been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and Whereas, for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence:

The details of the bill, including the statement in its preamble, were discussed in both Houses. At the opening of the Sixty-fourth Congress, Mr. Jones in the House, and Senator Hitchcock in the Senate, each introduced a bill. The Philippine Assembly at the same time passed a resolution. This resolution read:

We again reiterate in the name of the Filipino people the national desire and purpose set forth on many former occasions. We wish to assure a stable future for our people. We desire an increase of the elements of our national life and progress. We ask yet more, and for that reason, in reiterating, as we hereby do reiterate our urgent petition for liberty and independence for the people of the Philippine Islands, we, the elected representatives of the Filipino people, express our confidence that the efforts of the President of the United States to secure the fulfillment of his promises and the realization of our lawful hopes will obtain early and complete success.

In the Senate the debate on the bill presented by Senator Hitchcock centered on the preamble. It is patent in the chronicle of the discussions that it was the understanding of the Senators and every one else's understanding that the preamble promised independence to the Filipinos and thereby imposed an obligation upon the government and the people of the United States. Senator Clarke of Arkansas gave notice that he would amend the Hitchcock bill by pledging independence in two years, and instructing the President to negotiate for neutralization treaties with foreign nations. The President opposed the proposed amendment because, as he explained, he believed that it would be unwise to set a definite and irrevocable date, since no one could look so far into the future as to determine what our situation might be at the end of two years. Yielding to President Wilson's suggestions, Senator Clarke changed his amendment to read, "effective in not less than two nor more than four years," with a provision that the President might extend the time to one year more, and again submit the subject to Congress. This revision seemed to satisfy President Wilson. The first part of the Amendment was in this language:

The President is hereby authorized and directed to withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippines, and he shall on behalf of the United States fully recognize the independence of the said Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, and full power to take the several steps necessary to institute such government is hereby conferred upon the said Philippines acting by and through governmental agencies created by this Act.

When the vote on the amendment was taken, the result was a tie—41 to 41. Vice-President Marshall cast the deciding vote affirmatively, and the amendment was adopted.

The debate on the Hitchcock bill and the Jones bill of 1916 was marked by a kindly feeling toward the Filipinos. Seventeen years had made a great change. Some Senators and Congressmen meantime had visited the Islands. Senator Shafroth of Colorado said:

Some people who are opposed to Philippine independence often refer to photographs of natives in a semi-nude condition as examples of Philippine civilization and ask if such beings are capable of self-government. Such pictures are exceptional and are usually of what are termed the uncivilized inhabitants, which in population bear no greater proportion to the Christian Filipinos than the American Indians did to the people of the Colonies at the time of the Revolutionary War. . . . The Philippine people are capable of self-government because they have a deep interest in their country and great love for her and possess a large highly educated class, thoroughly identified with the best interests of the Islands, who under the educational qualification now prescribed by law will be elected to legislate and administer the affairs of government.

The debate took cognizance of a statement by ex-President Roosevelt, made in January, 1915, when he gave this warning: "The Philippines from a military standpoint are a source of weakness to us. The present administration has promised explicitly to let them go, and by its actions has rendered it difficult to hold them against any serious foreign foe. These being the circumstances, the Islands should at an early moment be given their independence without any guarantee whatever by us and without our retaining any foothold in them." A number of Senators discussed this point of view. Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of

Illinois saw in our liberation of the Philippines an escape from burdens. He said on this point: "Before this nation can enter upon an era of preparedness of the United States, there must first be determined what are the limits of your nation, what country have you to prepare for, what particular part of your country is now to be excluded from the expense and obligations of preparation. Then," he added, "by releasing the burden of the Philippines, we save the full sum that is essential for the completest navy that has been suggested for our immediate and modern necessities."

There was vigorous objection to the proposal to fix a definite date for independence, and to leave some discretion to the President. The grounds of this objection were stated by Senator Lippitt of Rhode Island.

"It seems to me," Senator Lippitt said, "that there are just two positions that can be taken by the Senate of the United States: one is to give these people their independence now and the other is to say nothing about the question of their independence. . . . We have not the power to promise the Philippine people that some succeeding Senate will grant them their independence."

Senator Borah of Idaho sought decisiveness. "We ought to adopt the amendment which the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Clarke] has submitted or we ought to eliminate once for all, all discussion of independence," he told his colleagues. Senator Lodge of Massachusetts likewise called for a clear-cut decision. He said: "If we are to go, we ought to go; and if we are to stay, we ought to stay and keep the power."

Senator Clapp made the point that our schoolmarms and teachers had long been preparing the minds of the Filipino people for independence. "The moment we reached the Islands," the Senator declared, "we carried to

those people the American history and the American school-book—the American history replete with the traditions of freedom and of independence; and American history fails in its mission to teach its lesson if seventeen years of study would not develop in the minds of any people a desire for independence and a desire for freedom.” A prophetic statement this!

Sixteen additional years have drifted into the great ocean of past time since the words were uttered—sixteen additional years of education in American history and in the creed of American patriots and statesmen. It was the Filipino children’s familiarity with American history that explained their presence in the processions I have mentioned, bearing banners, blazoning Patrick Henry’s deathless utterance, “Give me liberty or give me death.”

In its original form, the Jones Bill provided for independence in 1921, but, as I have indicated, President Wilson deprecated the provision both as an attempt to bind a succeeding Congress and as an undertaking to determine the events and circumstances five years in the future. It was only after earnest and able consideration of the Jones Bill by both Houses of Congress that it passed. Its terms and intent were clear to every member who supported it and to the opposition. The whole country knew its meaning. Mr. Jones, its author, said of it: “For it not only bestows upon the Philippine people a measure of self-government such as they have never enjoyed under the sovereignty of this or any other nation, but it established what to them is dearer than all else—the everlasting covenant of a great and generous people, speaking through their accredited representatives, that they shall in due time enjoy the incomparable blessings of liberty and freedom.”

The new Organic Act provided for a Legislature of two branches: the House and the Senate, to replace the

Assembly and the Commission. Members of both Houses are elected by popular vote, except two Senators and nine Representatives who are appointed by the Governor-General to represent the districts populated chiefly by non-Christians. Executive power is vested in an American Governor-General, appointed by the President of the United States. He has "general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of the government" and is "commander-in-chief of all locally created armed forces and militia." The Vice-Governor and an Insular Auditor are similarly appointive. The former is also head of the Department of Public Instruction, which includes the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Health. The Auditor is empowered to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source of the Philippine Government and of the provincial and municipal governments of the Philippines.

The Act extended the powers of internal self-government by granting new powers to the central government and by the creation of an elective Senate. It defined the nature of the relations between the Philippine Government and that of the United States. It gave to the Governor-General limited, and to the President of the United States absolute, veto power. While it authorized the Philippine Legislature to provide its own customs duties, it prohibited this insular body from making any change in the trade relations between the United States and the Islands. The Act also circumscribed the power of the insular government in other respects. For example, there can be no change in the currency and coinage laws without the President's approval; there can be no alienation of timber, mineral and other lands without his approval. The President reserves the final veto power on all legislation, and there is absolutely reserved to the Con-

gress of the United States the right to annul any and all legislation enacted by the Philippine Legislature.

In my opinion, the Jones Act either went too far, or it did not go far enough. If one takes the view that the Congress, in 1916, contemplated the retention of the Islands under some form of colonial government, then it went too far, because it not only gave the Filipino people greater autonomy and responsibility in respect to the insular government, but also it led them to believe that independence was their certain destiny. If it was the design of Congress to grant independence at an early date, we did not go far enough. A time for independence should have been fixed in the bill, and that definitely; else we were merely making a promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope.

Governor Harrison, even prior to the Jones Act, as we have seen, had proceeded to Filipinize the government of the Islands by the substitution of Filipinos for Americans. He had encouraged to the fullest extent of his power the Filipino people's active participation in all affairs of government, and had reduced American participation to the minimum. With the passage of the Jones Act he received additional power to realize Filipino control and direction of the insular affairs.

Notwithstanding its liberal provisions, the Act did not fully satisfy the Filipino people. They came to expect a definite declaration for independence, either immediately, or at a date fixed and determined. It was, nevertheless a step forward. It placed more power in the hands of the Filipino people and gave them, through representatives of their own choosing, the exercise of these powers in the legislative and administrative business of the insular government. After the lapse of sixteen years the Filipinos do not wish to continue under our flag. They prefer to live under their own flag—for they have one and are per-

mitted to display it. Sixteen years of waiting have only intensified their desire for independence. This longing grows steadily in strength and sincerity.

The present government of the Philippines resembles Great Britain's colonial system in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but long since abandoned everywhere in the British Empire. Our satrapy in the Philippines is almost precisely like that which our forefathers overthrew in the Revolution. Each year the Filipino Assembly appeals to our Congress to make changes in this archaic and un-American system. For one reason or another these petitions are ignored. Government under the Jones Law is satisfactory neither to Americans nor to the Filipino people. It is illogical in its blending of executive and legislative functions, for instance, and in its lodgment in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a branch of the War Department, of a large power and authority, including that over fiscal affairs. The administration of the insular government is left partly to the War Department, in part to the President, and in excessive measure to the Governor-General appointed by the President. Over and above all these divisions of power and initiative the Congress of the United States has power to annul the laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature. In short, the Jones Law operates only by reason of the good sense and the good will of those in the two governments. Americans and Filipinos do the best they can to make it work despite its incoherences and inadequacies. The Governor-General must supply in tact and good judgment the defects of the Act. If he lacks *savoir faire*, finesse, there will be no teamwork; government will default.

The Jones Law clothes the Governor-General of the Philippines with more power in the Islands than the President possesses in the government of the United States


or the governor of any of our forty-eight commonwealths wields. The chief executive of the Philippines serves at the pleasure of the President. The Filipinos have no voice in selecting him and no means of removing him. We in the United States can rid ourselves of a President who displeases us. We have the ballot. The Filipinos must take their government largely from an official who owes his appointment and his tenure to a superior in the United States, not in the Philippines. "He [the governor] shall annually, at such other times as he may be required," says the Jones Act, "make such official report of the transactions of the Government of the Philippine Islands to an executive department of the United States to be designated by the President."

Besides the Governors of four provinces, nine members of the House of Representatives, two members of the Senate, the Governor-General appoints also the Mayor of Manila, metropolis and capital of the Islands, the Chief of the Police and Fire Departments, and the Mayor of Baguio. He can remove from office any official in the insular household and can veto any measure passed by the Legislature, and his veto can not be overridden even by a two thirds vote of both branches unless the President of the United States approves such majority. Thus, the Philippine Legislature may pass a bill by a majority vote, then by a two thirds vote, only to have it vetoed by the President of the United States, or changed—even reversed—by the Congress. First, the Governor may veto; secondly, the President of the United States may veto; and, thirdly, the Congress of the United States by its act, may veto. The acts of our colonial legislatures, say in 1773, were subject to fewer vetoes than the Philippine Legislature's are to-day, a hundred and fifty years after the Revolution.

The legislative branch of the Government is divided

into eleven Senatorial Districts and eighty-six Representative Districts, whose Senators and Representatives are elected by popular vote. There are in addition nine Legislative Districts for which representatives are appointed by the Governor-General, who also appoints the Senators from one Senatorial District. In all, therefore, eleven members of the Legislature are appointed, not elected. At present the opposition political parties in the Philippines are not violently controversial. This is due to the fact that the members and leaders of every party and faction have their minds fixed upon the predominant, perennial issue— independence. Suppose, however, that two parties should arise, and that they should be as strong relatively as the major parties are to-day in the United States Congress, where a change of one or two votes in the Senate and of three or four votes in the House would completely change the organization of both these bodies, carrying with this reorganization control of the great outstanding committees which report to the floor of each branch all the legislation that Congress is called upon to consider. Suppose such a situation should arise in the Philippines. With this appointive power vested in the Governor-General, he would be able, if he were prone, not only to shape the administrative policy, but, by picking and choosing his associates in the Government, also to control the legislative as well as the executive branch, and thus be an arbitrary ruler, without check on his actions. No such situation has yet arisen; probably it will not arise, but in creating the offices and allocating the powers of government, any opportunity for such an abuse should be forestalled.

Rarely, if ever, does the Governor-General exercise the despotic and un-American power given to him. None of our Governors-General have abused it. There is one brake on the Governor-General, but unfortunately it could be



Legislative Building, Manila

applied only with the certainty of stopping the whole machinery of government—even progress. That is the refusal of the Philippine Legislature to function except upon its own terms. For, as Garet Garrett remarks, “Neither the American Governor-General nor the American Congress may enact a law in the Philippines, nor can the Governor-General administer even the Filipino-made laws except through executives approved by the Filipino Senate.”

And a concluding observation by the same author is this: “The American Government could abolish the Philippine legislature; it could abolish the Malay state entirely and restore in the Philippines a commission form of government, as it was in the beginning. But to do so would be an exercise of absolute power, with the implication of force behind it, and that is the kind of solution the white race now is loath to consider.”

Some of the other powers and functions of the Governor-General are worth mentioning at this point. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Militia and Constabulary and of all locally created armed forces. He may deport undesirable aliens; he is authorized to grant pardons; he may order investigations into the conduct of any person or persons in the government service; he may determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands; he is the departmental head of the Bureau of Civil Service and of the Bureau of Audits; he can with the approval of the Philippine Senate, and for the purpose of protection and keeping the peace, order the concentration of the inhabitants from outlying barrios in small communities; he has the supervision of the issuance of passports to citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States who want to go abroad; he has charge of all extradition cases; he supervises the correspondence

touching the foreign relations of the Philippines, such as correspondence of the Bureau of Insular Affairs and United States Consuls abroad, and the foreign Consuls in the Philippine Islands; he confirms the election of Insular and Provincial officials; he appoints the Judge and clerk of the Municipal Court; the Justice and Auxiliary Justice of the Peace.

Besides these multifarious powers and duties, the Governor-General also appoints the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of the City of Baguio. The City Council of Baguio is composed of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and three other members, two of whom are elected. The third member of the Council, as well as the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, is appointed by the Governor-General. This gives the Governor-General control not only of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor—the executive department—but also of the City Council—the legislative branch—of Baguio. Those he appoints he can also dismiss. This is indeed sultanic sway. There is what is called an Advisory Council of the City of Baguio. Five Igorrotes constitute it. Its meetings are held at the request of three members transmitted to the City Treasurer, or may be convened by the Mayor. The Mayor or another member of the City Council is president of the meetings. It is the duty of the presiding officer to explain to the Advisory Council all actions proposed or taken by the City Council regarding ordinances, public improvements, and other matters of general interest to the people of the city, to ascertain its views on those subjects and to hear suggestions and recommendations from them for the guidance of the City Council, but no member of this advisory committee has the right to vote. He may express an opinion, but no one is bound to accept or respect it. He may listen to the advice of the Mayor, then his work is done.

In this matter of veto, the Governor-General of the Philippines has an advantage over his legislature such as neither the President of the United States nor the governor of any commonwealth of the Union has over his law-makers. The chief executive of the Philippines has the right to veto a part of an appropriation bill, and when he does so his action automatically revives the previous year's appropriation for the items as to which he expresses his official disapproval. So both branches of the Philippine Legislature might year after year change particular appropriations; yet, by repeating his veto, the Governor could practically reenact the original provision. If the Governor-General does veto, and the Philippine Senate and House pass the bill over his veto, the President of the United States may veto it, after waiting six months, if he likes. Congress, too, may annul acts of the Philippine Legislature.

I wish to emphasize that the process of Filipinizing the personnel of the Insular government can be carried very little farther. It had progressed almost to the maximum even in General Wood's time. He has given us some particulars:

The legislature is wholly Filipino. Of the 6 Secretaries who are the heads of the executive departments, through whom the Governor-General exercises to a large extent the executive authority vested in him by the organic act, 5 are Filipinos and 1 an American. Of the justices of the supreme court, 5 are Americans and 4 Filipinos, the chief justice being a Filipino. The attorney-general and the solicitor-general are Filipinos. The fiscals (prosecuting attorneys) throughout the Islands are all Filipinos. Of the 55 judges and auxiliary judges of first instance, only 2 are Americans. Of the 893 presidents of municipalities, none are Americans. Of the 48 governors of Provinces, only 3 are Americans (these are in the non-

Christian provinces). Of the many hundred justices of the peace, all are Filipinos excepting two or three on United States military reservations. Of the officers of the Philippine Constabulary, the only force of the insular government for the maintenance of law and order, only 3 per cent are Americans. Of the 28 bureau chiefs only 4 are Americans. The personnel in the bureau of civil service, bureau of the treasury, and the coast-guard service is entirely Filipino; the personnel of the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts is more than 99½ per cent Filipino, and that of the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Internal Revenue is 99 per cent Filipino. The teachers under the Bureau of Education are more than 98½ per cent Filipino, and more than 96 per cent of the civil service employees in the Bureau of Health are Filipinos. The insular Auditor is an American, the Deputy Auditor is a Filipino, and the District auditors throughout the Islands are Filipinos. The officials of the Treasury Department are all Filipinos. In other words, outside of school teachers there is only a handful of Americans holding positions in the insular government.

The Council of State of the Philippines is a unique political development. The body was created by Governor-General Harrison, and it may be observed it was the occasion of bitter contention during Governor-General Wood's administration, and was for a time practically abolished. It was restored by Governor-General Stimson, and has been perpetuated by Governor-General Davis. Included in its membership when the Council was first established were the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the six departmental secretaries. Such a body, consisting as it did of the responsible leaders in the government, obviously exercised great influence. It not only helped in localizing responsible leadership, but it coördinated and harmonized important elements in the government. The

organization functioned smoothly and effectively throughout Governor Harrison's administration.

Governor-General Wood, who took the place of Governor-General Harrison, was not in sympathy with increasing the autonomous powers of the Filipinos as intended in the Jones Law. He sought to curtail the prerogatives of the department heads, and exercised the power of veto freely. Clashes with members of the Council of State were frequent. He felt bound neither by the Jones Law nor President Harding's promise. He either ignored or flouted the Filipino officials, and particularly those in the Council of State. A crisis was inevitable and the break came on July 23, 1923, when the Filipino members of the Council and Cabinet members resigned *en masse*. The Council of State thence until the end of General Wood's administration remained virtually abolished.

Upon the death of Governor-General Wood, former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was appointed Governor-General. A student of constitutional governments, Mr. Stimson clearly saw the necessity of restoring confidence in the Government and coöperation between the Executive and the Legislature. He sought and achieved an understanding with the Filipino leaders. A better spirit became manifest, especially in the appointment of Filipino Department Secretaries. Governor Stimson consulted the leaders of the party that triumphed in the general elections. The men subsequently appointed as department heads were therefore officials in whom Filipinos expressed confidence. They had, in addition to this popular approval, the recommendation of the leaders of the party in power and the sanction of the Philippine Senate. One of Governor Stimson's appointees was Honorable José Abad Santos, Secretary of Justice, who, with others, had resigned in Governor Wood's administration.

Chief among the contributions which Governor Stimson made to the renewal of the former cordiality of American-Philippine relations was the rehabilitation of the Council of State by an executive order which read:

Manila, August 30th, 1928. A Council of State is hereby created to advise the Governor-General on such matters as he may from time to time lay before it. He shall be the presiding officer of such council of state and it shall consist of such persons as from time to time may be appointed and summoned by him. Until otherwise ordered by him, it shall consist of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority floor leader of the Senate, the majority floor leader of the House of Representatives, and the heads of the six executive departments. Signed HENRY L. STIMSON, Governor-General.

As the executive order itself informs us, the Council as re-created included in its membership not only those who were comprised in the body which had served during Governor Harrison's administration, but also the floor leaders of the majority party in the Philippine Legislature. This large Council continues to function under Governor Davis. Mr. Stimson suggested to the Philippine Legislature that authorization be given for the employment of technical and professional civilian advisers to the Governor. The Legislature enacted the following bill:

SECTION 1. A standing appropriation of two hundred and fifty thousand pesos per annum is hereby made out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the payment of salaries, travel and other expenses of such technical personnel and civilian assistants, as the Governor-General, or the Secretary of War on the recommendation of the Governor-General, may see fit to employ or call into service on contracts calling for whole time or part time service: Provided, that the amount herein appropriated cannot be ex-

pended to increase the salary of any officer or employee of the Government of the Philippine Islands, whose salary has been provided for in the Appropriation Act. In case of epidemic, public calamity, or other grave emergency, the amount thus appropriated may also be made available by the Governor-General for the payment of salaries, travel and other official expenses of such emergency personnel as may be then required, as well as of such other expenditures in connection with said purposes that in his judgment may be necessary.

This legislation (approved August 8, 1928) gave Governor Stimson the sum of 250,000 pesos (\$125,000) annually to be expended according to his own judgment in the employment of American civil advisers. Since that time the Governor-General has had as aids and counselors the heads of the six executive departments, the Council of State, and the corps of technical advisers costing more than the aggregate paid to the members of our President's Cabinet. Governor Stimson won the coöperation of the Filipinos by a sympathetic understanding of them and their problems and by his success in making the most—and the best—of a very defective governmental mechanism. Governor Stimson gave his Filipino associates credit for this considerable improvement in the administrative system. At the close of his term of office, he made a grateful—and graceful—acknowledgment of their initiative and collaboration.

The present machinery of government in the Philippines will operate with a small degree of success only if all those to whom it is intrusted work together in good understanding and especially if at its head there be a man of ability, prudence, tact, and patience. But should a government that affects the prosperity, the happiness, and the liberties of 13,000,000 people be dependent for its success on a single personality?

CHAPTER XII

WHAT SHALL IT BE?

BEFORE I propose what I regard not only as a quittance of our pledge and our responsibility to the Filipinos, but as also a means of ridding ourselves of a problem having serious political, sociological, and economic implications, I wish to deal with two of the numerous objections to Philippine independence. These objections have little merit, but they have had a considerable currency and perhaps have exerted no little influence on public opinion. The first is that we ought not to release the Islands, if at all, until their people shall have served at least fifteen additional years under our tutelage. The second is that no matter what we promised with respect to the Philippines, we must retain them because the Constitution forbids the alienation of any part of the territory of the United States.

From the first days of our occupancy of the Philippines, there have been those who urged that a limit be set on the continuance of our sovereignty. The duration of our proprietorship, it was argued by this school of opinion, should not exceed five years. This subject was debated in 1916, when the Jones Bill was under consideration. The proposal to fix the term of our sovereignty was rejected as an attempt by one Congress to bind another. Judge Elliott, in his comments on the debate of that bill (in 1916), very properly states: "The question would have to be settled by a Congress the members of which were not yet elected,

and any attempt to bind it would not only be nugatory but also impertinent."

In a previous chapter I have quoted to the same effect the words of several Senators who participated in the debate. While there would be no legal validity in a Congressional declaration, by resolution or statute, that the independence of the Philippines should begin on a given date, it certainly would have a moral force which might well commit succeeding Congresses, especially if the interval were short. No witness that appeared before the Senate Committee in 1930 recorded his opposition to the proposal of ultimate independence for the Philippines, although it was quite apparent that some favored permanent retention but were ashamed to say so. First, they knew they faced the historic fact of an American policy that bound the United States to independence; second, they were conscious that independence had been expressly promised; and third, they perceived that the suggestion of our permanent possession of the Islands, against the will and welfare of the Filipinos, would be repugnant to all American traditions.

As a compromise between frank advocacy of retention and an open recognition of the Filipinos' right to independence these witnesses counseled postponing the fulfillment of our promise to a date in the distant future. And even on this they are divided. Some think the postponement should be for five years; others, for ten; some, for fifteen; some, for twenty; and a few of the manufacturers and certain investors in the Philippines, for as much as thirty years. The Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs has before it now the King Resolution proposing immediate independence; the Hawes-Cutting Bill making the interval five (really seven) years, and the Vandenberg Bill deferring our withdrawal for ten years.

The only plausible argument advanced for the prolongation of our control of the Islands for fifteen, twenty, or thirty years was that new American capital by amortization could be guaranteed a profit in the long period. Most of the investments in the Philippines to-day have run over a period of fifteen or twenty years. The billions of American capital invested in other foreign lands do not require and do not receive a guarantee of this kind. It is obvious that no business man who has the benefit of legal advice or who knows the Constitutional provisions governing Congress would believe that legislation seeking to guarantee profits to individuals or purporting to circumscribe the powers of Congress could have any color of validity or effect. Surely a mere statement by Congress, subject, as it would be, to repeal by succeeding Congresses, would not be a guarantee sufficient to justify a large investment anywhere.

At the time the original investments were made in the Philippines, a large section of the American press and many public men spoke against permanent retention; but American capital went there, notwithstanding. Of the billions of dollars invested abroad in recent years, as I have said, only one sixteenth of one per cent of it has gone to the Islands. Business men understand this now. A change of sentiment has come about.

General Aguinaldo in his letter to me makes a statement that may be accepted as expressive of Filipino opinion:

At present the country is literally mortgaged to the United States. Twenty years hence, therefore, the big interests will have intrenched themselves in such a manner, and will command such means as would enable them easily to stifle our future, as well as our desire for emancipation. Those big interests which made the independence of Cuba a solemn fiction

will, if Philippine independence were further delayed, make that independence, an eternal aspiration, impossible of realization. If the present situation continues for twenty years more, at the end of that period, the Philippines will be a political, as well as an economic tributary of American capital. Individual initiative in the manhood of our race will have disappeared, and we will be nothing but a race of bureaucrats and employees groaning beneath the thumbs of political chieftains, and whatever vestige of Democracy we now have will then be a myth.

In addition to the thirty-year program, there has recently been advanced a new proposition that, if possible, is more illusory, more impractical, and altogether less logical than the scheme of making years the measure of delay. I call it the Utopian plan. It provides that when the Filipino shall have attained a certain degree of education, culture, political prowess, economic stability, and other qualifications, the nature and sufficiency of which shall be decided by us, according to our own standards or our own interests, and at a date that is conditioned on various exigencies, then—and not until then—the Filipinos shall have their freedom if we think they deserve it and know how to use it. This is perhaps the most bizarre of all the plans yet proffered.

If the most powerful and prosperous nations of the world—the United States, England, France—were obliged to guarantee the permanent stability of their respective economic and financial systems as a condition to the further enjoyment of sovereignty and independence, I am afraid they would be unable to satisfy the requirement. They could no more assure the unchangeableness of their economic system than they could warrant the immutability of their social and political condition. Yet the opponents of independence for the Filipinos are attempting to im-

pose on the people of the Islands the obligation of insuring "a stable economic structure" as well as a responsible, durable, democratic form of government. No such requirement was exacted in the case of Cuba, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia or any other nation whose independence we have recognized in the last fifty years. No people struggling for independence could have met this novel proviso. Certainly our colonies could not have fulfilled such conditions.

In the last sixty years nearly every European government has undergone radical changes. France, Germany, Spain, Russia, Greece, Austria, and Turkey have ceased to be monarchies and have become republics. Even in the New World there have been many important departures. Two of the most notable of these were the passing of the Brazilian Empire in 1889, and the erection of the Cuban Republic in 1901. If "stability" had been guaranteed and preserved in the case of each of these countries we should still have eight empires and kingdoms instead of the democratic systems which have replaced them.

So much for the argument for delay. I shall now weigh the argument which challenges the right of Congress and the President to dispose of the Philippines, without the warrant of a Constitutional amendment—which could be obtained, if it were necessary, only after the lapse of many years. It is in effect a contention that two thirds of the Representatives and Senators, and the legislatures of three fourths of the States, must sanction the alienation of the Philippines as a condition precedent to the independence of their inhabitants. I have been unable to find that any lawyer in either the House or the Senate has voiced this contention.

On one occasion, the Chairman of the Insular Affairs Committee of the House raised the point, and it was sub-

sequently submitted officially to the Attorney-General, who answered that there was nothing in the contention. That formal opinion of the legal advisers of the executive and legislative officers of the Federal Government ought to have ended the usefulness of this argument, but it is still in the service of the propagandists against nationhood for the Filipinos.

It will be recalled that in 1899, when the treaty with Spain was before the Senate for ratification, those who assailed it on the ground that it would launch the country into a policy of colonization, were assured that the question of ultimate disposal of the Philippines would be left to Congress. As Senator Lodge put it: "Suppose we ratify the treaty: the Islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care."

Only a cursory examination of the debate in the Senate is necessary to show that the treaty was finally ratified under that assumption. Similarly, President McKinley viewed the matter in the same light when, ten days after the treaty had been ratified, he told the American people: "The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is the voice, the conscience, and the judgment of the American people. Upon their judgment and conscience can we not rely?"

In 1924, as I have said, the question was submitted to the Attorney-General, who on April 30 of that year, in a formal opinion on the question said:

The Philippine Islands have never been incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof. They are held as an insular possession, appurtenant to the United States but not incorporated into the United States. (See *Downes v. Bid-*

well 182 U. S. 244, 341-342; *Dorr v. U. S.*, 195 U. S. 138). The Constitution of the United States has never been extended to the Philippine Islands. It has been so extended to the Territory of Alaska by congressional enactment. (*Rasmussen v. U. S.*, 197 U. S. 516.)

Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has complete control over territories. It likewise has such control over insular possessions, and may do with such possession as it may see fit. If Congress deems it expedient to grant complete independence to the people of the Philippine Islands or a limited independence, it may, in my judgment, do so.

More recently a memorandum on the subject, likewise accepting the view that Congress does possess such power, was prepared by the office of the Legislative Counsel of the United States Senate, and was inserted in the "Congressional Record" of January 29, 1930. Justice Malcolm of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in his treatise on Philippine Constitutional Law (page 173), upholds a similar view.

The power of Congress to alienate territory or to give the Philippines their independence may be supported on any one of six grounds: First, because such power is expressly granted to Congress under the Constitution; second, because the power may be implied from powers expressly granted to Congress; third, because the power resides in Congress by virtue of its resultant powers; fourth, because it is inherent in sovereignty; fifth, because the power exists in the President and in the Senate of the United States by virtue of the treaty-making power; and sixth, because it resides in Congress as a power implied from the power to pass legislation necessary to carry out treaty commitments.

Since the decision in the Insular cases, cited in the opinion of the Attorney-General, there has been no seri-

ous contention by any one, except some of the extremists in the opposition, that the Congress did not have power to grant it. All recognized Constitutional authorities concede that the inherent right of a sovereign to acquire territory unquestionably includes the right to dispose of it. And until the Philippines are incorporated as a part of the territory of the United States, which the Supreme Court says has not been done, the Congress undoubtedly has the constitutional authority to grant independence.

Congressman Hatton W. Sumners, a distinguished lawyer, discussing the Constitutional question in the House of Representatives on January 23, 1930, said:

Without supervision, without limitation, the people conferred upon the Federal organization the power to declare war at any time upon people, to imperil the life of every human being in the States, to exhaust the resources of the country to the last farthing, to borrow money upon credit without limit, to subject every foot of soil to the hazards of invasion and of conquest, and yet, according to those who deny the power to rid ourselves of the Philippines, withheld from that same Federal Government the power to make peace, if in order to do so cession of territory should be necessary. . . . The United States is maintaining government in the Philippine Islands. The Congress of the United States established that government. It can withdraw it. It has the constitutional power to do it.

The Hon. James M. Beck, formerly Solicitor-General of the United States, now a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania, and a noted Constitutional authority, takes the same position. Senator Swanson of Virginia, an able student, discussing the matter in the Senate on March 5, 1930, said: "We have a right to-day to dispose of the Philippines under the clause of the Federal Constitution which says that Congress has control of the

territory of the United States, and I do not know anybody who has ever disputed that fact since that decision, except somebody who believes that minority opinions ought to be the law of the country."

Another lawyer, a former judge in his State of Kentucky, Senator Barkley, takes this view: "It would seem rather illogical to contend that the President has unlimited power under the treaty-making power, to purchase territory, but that after it is purchased or acquired in any way by treaty, the United States Congress has no way of disposing of it."

Judge Elliott has this to say:

"The Constitution," said Chief Justice Marshall, "confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring territory by conquest or by treaty." Under the provisions of the Constitution Congress may either sell the territory which it so acquires, hold and govern it by such rules and regulations as it deems wise to make, or carve it up into numerous states and admit them into the Union. It follows that until new states are created out of the national territorial property and admitted into the Union the Constitution of the United States is not in force in such territory.

We all remember the debates and uncertainty concerning the question of a permanent retention of the Philippines, which developed in the year 1899. At that time Judge James Bradley Thayer, professor of law at Harvard University, read a paper to which was given a place on the front page of nearly every newspaper in this country, and which was discussed with approval by the public. It may be said that it decided the American mind with regard to the legal right to acquire and dispose of the Philippines. It was intended for the non-professional mind. Judge

Thayer, in his opinion, stated very emphatically that he was opposed to the acquisition of the Philippines. His reasoning has never since been successfully gainsaid by any one. The address is found in Thayer's Legal Essays, beginning on page 153. This learned legal authority devoted nearly thirty pages to the subject. I quote only three of his paragraphs:

Let me at once and shortly say that, in my judgment, there is no lack of power in our nation, of legal, constitutional power, to govern these islands as colonies, substantially as England might govern them; that we have the same power that other nations have; and that we may, subject to the agreements of the treaty, sell them, if we wish, or abandon them, or set up native governments in them, with or without a protectorate, or govern them ourselves. . . . The Constitution has to be read side by side with the customs and laws of nations. The operation of our Constitution is not to create a legislative body which is wholly bereaved of power to do anywhere the things which are forbidden within the United States. It is not stricken with inability, destitute of power, as if paralyzed, on these subjects, anywhere and everywhere and under all circumstances. The prohibitions, although they do not say it, deal only with certain circumstances and persons and places. . . . The great difficulty when the United States Constitution was made, was the adjustment between the power of the States and of the United States. The territories played no part at all. They were disposed of in the Constitution, so far as anything was said of them, by placing them wholly under the control of Congress. Article IV, Section 3: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." In Article I, Section 8, Congress is also given power of exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over the district, not exceeding ten miles square, where the seat of government should be fixed, and over places purchased by consent of the States for forts and the like.

There is room for legitimate difference of opinion about the duty of the United States to bestow independence on the Filipino people, or about the details of the relinquishment of our sovereignty over the Philippines, or about the time and method of announcing the American decision; but on one subject there is complete unanimity. All of the witnesses who appeared before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, either to assist or to oppose the cause of independence—representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and others—were of the same mind, that the present indecisiveness of our policy is deleterious alike to the interests of the Filipinos and our own.

That this unanimity on so vital an aspect of the question impresses itself on the committee is evident in the report that the majority of its members submitted to the Senate. The following is the language of the report:

It is significant that, without exception, every witness of the many who appeared before your committee admitted that the present situation of uncertainty as to the political future of the Philippines should be removed. The record contains many appeals for a removal of the unsatisfactory conditions which exist at the present time. Even those who oppose early independence for the Philippines admit that the present dubious status of the islands should not be permitted to continue.

The reasons are manifest. The Filipino is neither a citizen of the United States nor is he a citizen of a free country. A Malayan by race, an Oriental geographically and by tradition, a foreigner under certain of our statutory provisions, the Filipino has had thirty years of existence as a pseudo American. Living 7,000 miles from our western coast, on 7,000 islands in the Far East Pacific, these 13,000,000 people, thrown by a great war into the protective arms of a western nation, find themselves, after a generation, to be in law and in fact neither Americans nor foreigners.

The Filipino is a national, but not a citizen of the United States. He is an inhabitant, but not a citizen of the Philippines. His two flags symbolize two allegiances, but neither a nation of his. He came to us by purchase—so he feels—and his status is that of an appurtenance to the land that Spain transferred to the United States. That reflection pains him. The cause of it should shame us to action.

Mr. Charles D. Orth, President of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, who testified before the Senate Committee, very frankly opposed the granting of immediate independence to the Philippine Islands, described how the press of the country had been circularized with letters by his organization, and told how a number of pamphlets had been disseminated in this propaganda. He was probably one of the chief spokesmen of the opposition, certainly one of the most intelligent and vigorous. His views, it was contended, were those of many American manufacturers and exporters. He saw and admitted that uncertainty had been detrimental to the Philippines. I give extracts of his testimony:

Mr. Orth: Unwittingly a great injustice has been done the Philippine Islands by denying to them fixity of tenure during all these years. It has prevented any important capital from going into the Islands. Had Congress, in 1924, as was then proposed, definitely fixed the status of the Philippines for a period of years, the islands would today be very much nearer a self-sustaining basis under independence than they are.

Senator Hawes: . . . What I would like to ask you is this: Is it not true that this uncertainty, as you state it, is harmful to the American merchant and importer and to the Filipino?

Mr. Orth: Yes; it is.

Senator Hawes: And that there ought to be a period fixed

so that the Filipinos can adjust themselves and so that American capital can adjust itself?

Mr. Orth: I think so. . . .

At the same hearing other business men from various sections of the United States were heard, and they all agreed that Congress should act; that the uncertainty should be removed.

THE DUTY OF CONGRESS

What Congress should do with regard to the Philippine Islands and their inhabitants is not a partisan question. It would be shameful to permit the rights and hopes of the Filipinos, and our own interests, responsibilities, and obligations to become issues in a contest between political parties. We have seen how this same problem of the Philippines was regarded in a partisan light both by Mr. McKinley and Mr. Bryan at the time the treaty was ratified, and when political expediency was allowed to dictate attitudes and actions in relation to it. What have been termed in a preceding chapter "selfish interests" are to be found in all the States of the Union. There is no political partisanship in the attitude of the farmer, the manufacturer, the laborer or the exporter, and there should be no partisanship in these discussions before our Congress. It is a question that involves the welfare of the thirteen million people of the Islands; our own industrial and social interests, our moral integrity. Partisanship should never be tolerated in the determination of such an issue.

If we are to retain the Islands, frankness and common honesty require that we proclaim that intention. Such a declaration would cause resentment, deep and everlasting, among the Filipino people, and perhaps suspicion in the minds of other Orientals, but at least it would give

that "stability" of which the foes of independence have so much to say.

As was suggested by the Senate Committee in its report of June 2, 1930, there are five possible courses open to Congress. These are: (1) The granting of immediate independence; (2) the setting of a date in the distant future when independence shall be granted; (3) the expression of an intention permanently to retain the Islands and to create what might be termed a colonial form of government for them; (4) the admission into the Union of the Philippines as one or more States; and (5) the organization of a free government and the facilitation of a decision by the Philippine people as to whether under the new conditions they desire to become independent; and if they do, the bestowal of independence upon them.

With these five avenues open, Congress can have no valid excuse for not moving forward to a determination. It appears, however, that the multiplicity of courses from which to make a choice is itself a new cause for hesitancy.

It will be noted that no bill has been reported providing for the granting of immediate independence, so that solution No. 1 requires no discussion at this time.

Suggestion No. 2—that for setting a far distant date for independence—has been discussed in previous pages. It would settle nothing. It would simply prolong uncertainty for many years instead of a few years. Moreover, the precedents of Congress are against it. This is the pet plan of those who are ashamed to acknowledge themselves open advocates of permanent retention.

The third suggestion, that concerning the establishment of a colonial policy for the government of the Islands, must be analyzed: The United States has never heretofore been a colonizing nation. Our only experience as such is that which we have gained in the Philippines. It has not

been a pleasant or a morally or financially profitable experience. Since 1916, the American people have given neither time nor attention to any proposal to adopt a new form of administration in the Islands. They are likewise unfamiliar with the vast changes that have taken place in British administrative policies and methods. I make that point because it is to Great Britain's new philosophy and procedure in colonial government that we should look for a model if we really design to retain the Philippines as an exclave which we must prevent American ideals and traditions from entering. I take for granted that in view of our previous relations to the Philippines and our promise of ultimate independence, we could not expect to give them a sort of colonial government less liberal and progressive than that which Great Britain has established in her dependencies. Our difficulty in the Philippines would be greater than that of Great Britain outside of Asia, because the people of her major colonies are mostly Occidentals, while the Filipinos are Orientals, Asiatics.

The most striking example of the innovations in England's colonial mechanism is to be found, of course, in the Irish Free State. Only recently this new State received by imperial grant the right to a seal of its own, this to be used in international communications. Accordingly, the king's head is retained on one side, but the harp replaces the lion and the unicorn on the other. The state papers of the Government of Southern Ireland will hereafter be distinct from those of Great Britain.

Mr. Robert A. MacKay, Professor of Government at Dalhousie University, Halifax, contributed to "Current History" for September, 1931, a well-considered article on reforms and improvements in British colonial government. In this he points out that these vital changes have been accomplished with the active or tacit concurrence of

the imperial authorities. He describes the evolution taking place in the imperial system, cites a conference in 1926, a committee to discuss the subject of the conference in 1929, and the virtual abandonment of what was called disallowance and reservation (heretofore retained by the British Parliament), which resulted in the new Statute of Westminster, effective not later than December 1, 1931. He thus outlines what happened:

The Statute of Westminster will repeal the colonial laws validity act of 1865, which defined the term repugnancy, and will declare that no act of a dominion legislature is to be held void because it is antagonistic to any existing or future act of the Imperial Parliament. The dominion Parliaments, moreover, are to be accorded the power to repeal any act of the Imperial Parliament, and no act of the Imperial Parliament is to bind a dominion unless it is expressly declared therein that the dominion has requested and consented to the act. The sole exceptions to these changes are the constitutional acts of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, which are the supreme law of these dominions solely because they were enacted by the Imperial Parliament. Legally, it could, of course, resume this authority, but the likelihood is as remote as the possibility of its legislating for the Colonies which revolted in 1776.

Of the change in the temper of Parliament and in policy, he says:

In 1776, Parliament refused to recognize social facts and, with disastrous results, insisted on its legal rights. Today Parliament, in the Statute of Westminster, is recognizing social changes and altering the law to conform to them. The new legal position approximates that for which John Adams, Jefferson, Madison and others contended in the eighteenth century.

The right recently given to the colonies to initiate and conduct international negotiations on their own account

he properly records as a notable advance. As we already know, the colonies won for themselves the right to participate as equals in the League of Nations. Professor MacKay observes:

The entrance of the dominions into the field of foreign relations forced the development of new customs within the old law. If, for example, Canada wished to negotiate a treaty with the United States the Canadian Government would pass an order-in-council advising the appointment of a definite individual as plenipotentiary for the negotiation of the treaty. The King would then appoint the person designated and sign the document known in diplomatic circles as the full powers.

Finally, the results of these epochal changes he summarizes thus:

These three developments—the removal of legal restraints upon dominion Parliaments, the selection of the Governor General by the dominion concerned, and the extension to the dominion of formal powers for the conduct of foreign affairs—go far toward the recognition of a formal equality of position within the Commonwealth. Politically, by removing almost the last vestiges of imperial control, they demonstrate more clearly that the real bond of unity in the British commonwealth of nations is not force of law, but will. Whether this is a cement strong enough to stand the stress of time remains for some future historian to chronicle.

If we can not give to the Philippines a colonial régime equal in its power, dignity, and democracy to the colonial government of British colonies it would be wiser to continue the present system. For it must always be remembered that we promised the Filipinos complete independence, not merely a measure of self-government, and the United States, the greatest democracy in the present or the past, can scarcely be less liberal to the people of the Philip-

piners than Great Britain is to the inhabitants of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Ireland. Nor can we afford to introduce into the Islands the system against which we revolted in the eighteenth century, while Great Britain—against whom we fought—is giving her colonies the sort of government that belongs to the twentieth century.

But if we are to grant to the Islands such prerogatives, rights, and powers as Great Britain is bestowing on her colonies, we shall first have to give our colony the right to select a native as Governor; allow the Filipinos to participate in our foreign affairs through representatives of their own choosing; authorize them to regulate their tariff relations with the United States; and finally permit them to deal directly with any nation with which they may desire or need to negotiate. These rights would carry with them all the elements of independent sovereignty now possessed by Great Britain's colonies, with the important distinction that the latter so favored are bound to the mother country by ties of race, blood, heredity, and tradition—bonds utterly lacking in the relationship between us and the Filipinos. Our responsibility to defend the Islands, and in fact all our responsibilities of an international nature, would remain, with the attendant possibilities of our being involved in Oriental disputes.

We signed the Four-Power Treaty without consulting the people of the Philippines. If the conception of colonial government now accepted by Great Britain had governed us in 1921, the Philippine people would have received the right to participate in any future discussions affecting this treaty, and the right also to challenge any action we might take with respect to it. But even if we should establish such a modern colonial policy now or shortly hereafter, the next succeeding Congress might regret and revise the whole arrangement and substitute another, whether better

or worse. And so, the Banquo's ghost of Uncertainty obtrudes again, in whatever direction we turn.

The fourth course through which the Senate Committee saw the possibility of reaching a solution of our problem in the Philippines is that the Islands could be incorporated as one of the States of the Union. This can hardly be regarded as feasible, as I have shown elsewhere. No political party in the Philippines could survive if it urged or accepted such a solution. The Filipino party that once favored American statehood has been driven from political power and out of existence. No party in the United States would advocate such a course; none of them could commit itself to the creation of a commonwealth of Orientals within the household of the Union. Manifestly, then, the suggestion was included in the Senate Committee's report in order that the whole range of possibilities might be covered, and not as a recommendation having any prospect of adoption.

There remains only the fifth suggestion—that the Islands be established as a separate, sovereign, independent nation. This destiny could be assured to the Philippines by the enactment of the Hawes-Cutting Bill, which is perhaps the most drastic measure ever presented for the acceptance of a people seeking independence. It is a composite of nearly all the previous legislative proposals for Philippine independence presented to the House and the Senate. In my opinion it is too severe in its prescriptions and exactions. For one thing, I think there should be a longer period for the readjustment of tariff duties as between the United States and the Islands.

The Senate Committee, persuaded at the time that there might be some basis for the charges and innuendoes of insincerity on the part of the Filipino leaders, and of dissidence among the Filipino people with respect to their

political future, framed this bill in such fashion that it should serve as an "acid test." That is the committee's own phrase. It is my conviction and my prediction that the Filipinos—leaders and rank and file alike—will regard independence as a pearl worthy of purchase even at such a great price as this bill demands.

I quote extracts from the Report to demonstrate that, though the Filipino people desire independence on the best terms they can procure, they will nevertheless take it on almost any conditions. They have given many proofs that they would rather have independent nationhood with poverty and hardships than continue as a vassalage—however prosperous and progressive.

In its report to the Senate the committee said:

We submit for your serious consideration this salient fact, that in the election at which they shall decide whether or not they shall be independent, the Philippine people will be called upon to say whether they shall sever their connection with the United States at the very hardest period of their reconstruction problems, after having been subjected to the weight of our trade barriers and to the full effect of the constitutional provisions which we impose upon them in the formation of their new government. . . .

The reference here is to the plebiscite for which the committee's bill provides and which is described in a paragraph yet to be quoted. The report continues:

In a general way, S. 3822 may be said to contain four major purposes, as follows: (1) To provide for the drafting of a constitution for a free and independent government of the Philippine Islands; (2) To provide for a ratification by the Philippine people of the constitution so formulated, and the election of governmental officials under the new constitution; (3) To provide a 5-year period of test for the gradual change in the economic and political relationship between the Islands

and the United States, thus giving the Philippine people an actual experience of such relationship, and an opportunity, following such experience, to decide at a plebiscite whether they approve or disapprove of separation from the United States; (4) To provide, in the event of an affirmative vote in the plebiscite for the final withdrawal of American sovereignty over the Islands, with such agreements by treaty or otherwise as may be necessary for the protection of American rights and properties in the Philippines, the liquidation of the public debt of the Philippines, and the retention by the United States of sites for coaling or naval bases as the United States may deem advisable.

During the "test" period and under the constitution to be adopted by the Philippine people for this period, the United States, in pursuance of the terms of the bill reported, remains in complete supervision and control of every step taken by the Philippine people toward Philippine independence, and is not to relinquish the Islands finally until the provisions of the bill shall have been satisfactorily complied with and until the Congress of the United States shall have approved both the constitution to be framed by the Filipinos and every other step in their progress toward competence as a self-governing people.

In detail, the bill (S. 3822) provides as follows: (1) That the Philippine Legislature shall elect delegates to a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a constitution for a free and independent government, the expenses of such convention to be provided for by the Philippine Legislature; (2) That the constitution so formulated shall provide for a government republican in form and adequate to secure a stable, orderly, and free government; (3) That the constitution so formulated shall, pending the final and complete withdrawal of United States sovereignty, provide among other things as follows: (a) Citizens and officers of the Philippine Islands shall take the oath of allegiance to the United States; (b) Religious freedom and tolerance shall be secured and all citizens protected in their religious worship; (c) Property owned by the United States, and cemeteries, churches, par-

sonages, convents, and buildings used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation; (d) Foreign affairs of the Islands shall be under the supervision of the United States; (e) All acts of the Philippine Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the United States, which shall have the right to annul such acts; (f) The United States may intervene for the preservation of the government of the Islands; (g) The Philippine Government shall maintain public schools, in which the language of instruction shall be English, and an adequate system of sanitation for the protection of public health; (h) No revenue shall be used for sectarian or denominational purposes; (i) The authority of the High Commissioner of the United States to the Philippine Islands shall be fully recognized and accepted. (4) That after the adoption by the convention of the constitution so formulated, the constitution shall be submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands at an election and they shall vote directly to accept or reject it; (5) That the constitution so adopted and approved shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States for approval or rejection; (6) That if approved by the Congress, the President of the United States shall certify this fact to the Governor General of the Philippines who shall issue a proclamation for the election of Philippine officials to assume and administer the new government; (7) That the new government having been thus formed and installed, trade relations between the United States and the Philippines shall be, during the 5-year period, upon the following basis: (a) During the first year, trade relations shall be as at present; (b) During the second year, 25 per cent of existing duties shall be levied upon all articles imported into the United States from the Philippines, and on all articles imported into the Islands from the United States; (c) During the third year, 50 per cent of such duties shall be levied; (d) During the fourth year, 75 per cent of such duties shall be levied; (e) During the fifth year, full duty shall be levied upon imports to both countries in the same manner as on all foreign imports. The proposals for the gradual application of tariff duties

during the period of transition from the present status to complete independence were adopted from the provisions of a bill introduced by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a member of this Committee. Should the Philippine people fail to ratify the proposal for independence in the plebiscite, the bill provides that tariff relations between the Islands and the United States shall be restored to the basis in effect at the time of the passage of S. 3822.

THE PLEBISCITE. (8) Within the first six months of the fifth year after the adoption and approval of the constitution, and the election of officials under it, the intervening period being the "test" period under the new trade relationships, the Philippine people shall vote on the question of ratifying or rejecting the granting of Philippine independence by the United States, and if in this vote they do so ratify independence, this fact shall be certified to the President of the United States, who shall issue a proclamation withdrawing, at the end of the 5-year period, the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands, transferring to the duly elected officials the government of the islands. (9) Before the withdrawal of sovereignty, the government of the islands shall make provision for the acquisition by purchase or lease by the United States in the islands of adequate naval bases, shall provide by treaty or otherwise for the protection of property rights of Americans and the United States in the Philippines, and shall, on terms acceptable to the United States, provide for the disposition of all fiscal matters and the settlement of all debts and liabilities.

Your committee desires to emphasize again the fact that the bill (S. 3822) grants independence to the Philippine Islands but not forthwith. The actual withdrawal of sovereignty will depend on the result of the plebiscite, which is to be held only after a test of the new relationship between the islands and the United States and after the Filipinos shall have experienced the effects of independence.

In general, the bill which the committee's report out-

lines meets my approval, though as a measure of prudence—precaution—I should prefer that the period of probation, so to say, be somewhat longer than five years, and yet less than ten years. The Filipinos would have, in the longer interval, a fuller opportunity to prepare themselves for eventualities, and at the same time American exporters and importers could better accommodate themselves to the new and different relationship between the United States and the Islands. Other changes may be necessary in the details of the broader provisions. The bill may attempt too many provisions and may require simplification.

But I wish to set down here that I favor and, to the best of my abilities, I will further the independence of the Philippines on terms and conditions which will cause the least disarrangement in the economic relations between the United States and the Islands.

In the face of all the objections of the few and unrepresentative Americans in the opposition, I will work for and vote for Filipino nationhood. I know the people of the Philippines will face a different situation, and they have studied it and realize this. But the Filipino people contend that after the war we allowed Spain ten years in which to adjust business and trade relations and that they are entitled to at least the same consideration.

With independence will come new demands and difficulties. Filipino statesmanship may not devise prompt and effective remedies. In that they will be by no means egregious. Other statesmen, in other lands, have lately been accused of ineptitude and failure. I am persuaded, however, that the Filipinos, in the pride of being a free people and with an inevitable sense of responsibility, will work harder to solve the problems of an independent country than they ever will work for a land they inhabit without owning, and support without governing.

Not so many centuries ago our European ancestors were emerging from barbarism. At that juncture there were great civilizations in Asia—in Japan, in China, in India. They had, each of them, a literature, a native art, different systems of religion and philosophy. We soon overtook them and passed them on the road—largely because our forefathers had better concepts of human rights, of human liberties and of government. Love of liberty and of self-determination ultimately produced for us a higher civilization, a larger freedom, greater progress. The spur was a longing for liberty, a passion for equality, a demand for the right to think and act according to reason and conscience. These are boons that we can not justly—nor consistently—withhold from the Filipino. He has learned from us to prize them, to wish to possess them as his own. The lesson of freedom we taught him, and he looks to us to translate it into our relations with him. He knows for how many peoples in every quarter of the globe our Declaration of Independence became a charter of freedom. He hopes—and shall we not hope with him?—that America shall write a declaration of independence for the first Christian Republic in the Far East!

EPILOGUE

HUMAN nature, especially young human nature, is the same the world over. Two incidents, separated by seventeen years of time and ten thousand miles of distance, will illustrate my meaning.

On a visit I made to Ireland in 1914 to buy the diminutive cattle of the region about Bally Bunion, I had with me an editor and one of the leading business men of St. Louis. We had a tire puncture just as we got into Cork under the bells of Shandon, and were soon surrounded by school-children. I crossed the street to what was advertised as a "sweet shop" and bought some candy. A member of my party joined me. I gave him a jar of the candy to distribute to the boys and girls. He tried to dispense it by the handful. The children thronged about him, downed him! Then they despoiled him!—and soiled him, too. He was a "mess" when he arose.

One day during my recent sojourn in the Philippines we started to Baguio. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada was in the party. One of the tires on our car was punctured. This occurred near a little Filipino candy store opposite a school, and at the noon hour.

Senator Pittman, like all great lawyers, is very human. He went to the little candy store, purchased sweets, and commenced to bestow these on the little boys and girls who were leaving the school. Soon Senator Pittman devised a little game of putting a bag of candy on the ground and letting the youngsters scramble for it. I watched him for a minute, then asked my secretary, Mr.

Geaslin, to get ready both "still" and movie cameras, and be prepared for what was about to happen.

Sure enough, Senator Pittman, with his hands full of candy, tripped and fell. The little boys and girls made a dive for the candy and swarmed over the Senator. We got some excellent still and motion pictures of the scene. He got up unhurt, and laughing. I told him how history, with slight variations, had repeated itself.

The children of men are much the same the world over!

APPENDIX I

Letter of General Emilio Aguinaldo to Senator Harry B. Hawes, dated July 25, 1931. This letter was written in Spanish and has a number of corrections made with pen and ink, and was translated into English by General Aguinaldo's son-in-law, José Melencio, a fine linguist.

Distinguished Senator:

I have read with care the questions you formulated on the subject of Philippine independence. My answers are herein conveyed in the form of a memorial which I have prepared for such use as you may deem convenient. I only regret that due to my confinement in this hospital it has not been possible for me to venture into a fuller discussion of the subject. I hope, however, that although the answers are incomplete, you will have an idea of my points of view on the independence of my country.

I am thankful to you from the bottom of my heart for having requested an expression of my opinions on the salient phases of this question, so vital to all of us. The restoration of the Philippine Republic has been the principal longing of my life. That republic, we had erected after tremendous sacrifices; it was the compendium of our dreams as a nation subjugated for three centuries by foreign domination; it forms a part of our very being as a people.

The efforts you are exerting to bring about the restoration of that Republic have the unanimous support of the Filipino people. To you and to your colleagues in the Congress who have assumed the difficult task of helping us in the campaign, we all owe a debt of gratitude. In our hearts you will find the monument to your great work.

No one, I believe, without committing an injustice, could question the sincere and unanimous desire of the Filipino people to obtain their coveted independence. Our revolutions are proof of that desire. Since then the sentiment of the Filipinos regarding their emancipation has not changed.

The insinuation that the popular expressions in favor of independence have been secured by intimidation is without justification. On the contrary, it may be said that the political leaders have had to declare themselves openly for independence, because a contrary behavior would have brought popular condemnation upon them.

The demand for independence by the Filipino people will be more and more pressing as the years go by, not only because of the innate desire of peoples for self-determination, but also because of the assurances given by the United States thru her legitimate representatives, both civil and military, that, upon occupying these Islands America did not entertain designs of exploitation but of emancipation. The delay, therefore, in the concession of independence serves only to accentuate the people's desire for liberation and at the same time to aggravate the political and economic situation of the country.

It is true that the concession of independence will usher in new domestic problems. But it is then that our statesmen could, and will, dedicate themselves to the consideration of those national problems, preferably the economic, which have been and will continue to be neglected and relegated to the background, as long as our political situation is not defined in harmony with our age-long aspirations. If we recall our revolutionary epoch of 1896 and 1898, I may be permitted to state that at that time we faced grave internal problems under the dictatorial and revolutionary governments and later under the Philippine Republic, but thanks to the patriotism and civic spirit of our people, we emerged successful from the test to which Fate had subjected us.

What is more, I believe that when we are independent we shall have a better kind of democracy than that which prevails in the Islands at present. As it is now, it may be said

that we have only one political party. The opposition has always been weak, and this is attributable to the system whereby the majority party has intrenched itself formidably in power with the unconscious abetment of the representative of American sovereignty.

Twenty-four years have elapsed since representative government was inaugurated here and yet the opposition party has not succeeded in coming into power. If things are to continue as they are now, I doubt whether the opposition, no matter what efforts it exerts, could ever succeed the majority party in the Government. With independence the opposition will have a better chance; many national questions will be the theme of discussion; party responsibility and fiscalization will always be a serious issue. We could then expect periodical changes in party administration and the consequent betterment of the public service.

The possibility of a civil war or of a general disturbance is not an impediment to the concession of independence. Civil wars and uprisings have in many cases been the price which independent peoples have had to pay in order to consolidate their institutions. If it is written that the Filipino people shall pass thru such a terrible ordeal, they will not hesitate to do so provided they could be masters of their destinies. Civil wars, however deplorable, are often inevitable when constitutional means are impotent to restore the reign of law. But, despite all that, I do not believe in the possibility of a civil war or general disorder if independence is granted. By nature we are a peaceful people, lovers of public order, and it is not hazardous to affirm that if we are declared independent, there will be a firmer union among the Filipinos brought about by the sense of a common responsibility and desire to support and elevate the country redeemed. This was the case in the days of the Philippine Republic.

With the termination of the present uncertainty in the relations between the Philippines and the United States public attention will be concentrated on our economic problems, capital will emerge from its retirement, and as a result, the ma-

terial progress of the country will be emancipated from its present stagnation.

I believe that a delay of twenty or thirty years in the concession of Philippine independence will work irreparable harm to the cause of economic and political progress, aside from the fact that during such a long period of time new difficulties might arise which would necessitate further postponement of the grant. At present, the country is literally mortgaged to the United States. Twenty years hence, therefore, the big interests will have intrenched themselves in such a manner and will command such means as would enable them easily to stifle our future as well as our desires for emancipation. Those big interests which made the independence of Cuba a solemn fiction will, if Philippine independence were further delayed, make that independence an eternal aspiration impossible of realization.

If the present situation continues for twenty years more, at the end of that period the Philippines will be a political as well as economic tributary of American capital. Individual initiative in the manhood of our race will have disappeared, and we will be nothing but a nation of bureaucrats and employees groaning beneath the thumbs of political chieftains, and whatever vestige of democracy we have now will then be a myth.

Other contingencies too might arise if the granting of independence were to be delayed further. The difficulties incident upon severance of relations will naturally increase a thousand-fold. Various other new interests of the United States might be affected by the continuance of our association. Tariffs on our products will have to be imposed in the meantime if certain American industries are to be saved from extinction. A greater agricultural or industrial development here will have its telling effect on America's own agricultural and industrial interests. The severance of free trade relations would seem to be inevitable. Congress could not prevent that even if it wanted to. The time, therefore, will surely come when the relations between America and the Philippines will be purely political;

we will be a foreign country to her as regards trade relations, but politically we will be under her supervision and protection.

On the other hand, if independence were granted now, it would stimulate our initiative as a nation. The idea of political dependence will disappear from our minds. We could begin to fashion the structure of our nationality in our own way. We shall grapple with our problems in accordance with our capacity and means. And we shall have an opportunity to be strong and really prosperous, a thing we never can accomplish under the tutelage of another nation.

The argument that we are not prepared for independence is gratuitous. And in the strict sense, we are not being prepared for independence anyway even under the aegis of the United States. Where is the preparation for an army and navy, for aviation and for aërial defense? Where is the preparation in diplomacy and consular service? It is true that much has been accomplished under American guidance; we have better roads, sumptuous government offices, a higher standard of living and a modern system of public instruction. Nevertheless, as the enemies of independence would interpret the word "preparation," we have not got it, in spite of thirty years tutelage. And two centuries from now we will be told the same thing.

The present uncertainty, as I have stated above, retards the economic development of the country. Capitalists have said that they do not care to make investments here in view of that uncertainty in our political status. If the uncertainty were terminated, the situation will change. Even in bolshevistic Russia and in China, with its continuous civil wars, foreign capital keeps pouring in. It can be safely predicted, I believe that once independent, we also can get desirable foreign capital invested here. Our industries and financial growth will also be accelerated. The responsibilities attendant upon the changed status will be so great that our people will exert all their efforts to create more wealth with which to meet their obligations. This has been the experience of countries that

have attained their independence. And the Philippines does not have to be the exception.

I would prefer the opening up of world markets for our products. We have many tropical products which are in great demand not only in the United States but also in other lands. If we could place those products in the markets of other lands besides, it would surely be to our advantage. With the possible exception of cotton and steel and machineries, we could produce the things we need locally. We do not need much for our daily living. Foodstuffs we could produce in abundance. The raw materials for the primary manufactures are here also in abundance. We could be in a position to compete in the markets of the world.

The free trade relations we now have with the United States were established by the Congress. I do not remember that we have asked for this arrangement. It has been beneficial to the Islands to be sure; but from the point of view of our national destiny, it has deprived us of other markets and hence other chances.

The result of this free trade arrangement is as follows: Encouraged by the demand in the American market we have produced more sugar and we have also increased our production of oil and other products. But this increase is not now looked upon with favor by American agricultural interests and we are being told to restrict our output, because we are competing with American products in the United States. At the same time we are told to develop our country economically if we desire to be free. It would seem, therefore, that we are between the devil and the deep blue sea.

I venture to assert then that the economic structure of the country will be more stable if we secure an access to other markets besides those of the United States; although for reasons of gratitude and other considerations which we hold towards her, we would be willing always to consider America as the favored nation under equal circumstances.

I am convinced that the contemplated readjustment of free trade relations should come after the concession of indepen-

dence. Disposed as we are to face the consequences imposed by new obligations that will arise, our country will intensify its activities in all lines of endeavor with those new obligations in mind. Necessity is the mother of progress, and on the necessities incident upon an independent government, the Filipino people will construct the edifice of their prosperity and national greatness. On the understanding, therefore, that the adjustment regarding free trade should not precede the concession of independence, notwithstanding opinions to the contrary, I would suggest a period of not more than ten years within which we hope to be able to adjust the economic difficulties attendant upon separation in a way satisfactory to both peoples. Let independence come at the earliest hour, however, at the latest within the next five years, inasmuch as the continuation of the present guardianship will kill our spirit of initiative as well as the characteristic elements of our nationality.

There is no doubt that the danger of a foreign invasion will be greater when we are independent than now under the sovereignty of the United States; this, in spite of America's commitment under the quadruple treaty that the Philippines will not be fortified further. The mere presence of the United States here, without necessity of fortifications, is sufficient guarantee against any possible danger of invasion. The country is perfectly aware of this advantage, but it cannot sacrifice to it its independence ideal.

It would be desirable of course if the principal powers of the Pacific could reach an agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the Islands. International relations are slowly evolving towards concord and peace, and a treaty of neutrality would be a good guarantee of the external safety of the Philippines in the future. But if there should be difficulties in the realization of such a treaty, the country will not renounce its ideal because of those difficulties. The Filipino people desire their independence and they will pay the price that Destiny might exact.

Our people have waged two revolutions, shed much blood

and sacrificed innumerable lives and fortune in order to attain their political independence; they are disposed now to forego the material advantages they enjoy and even the greater ones they might enjoy in the future in exchange for their liberation. After all, these are transient advantages, and we have seen how, recently, a movement has been started, and is gathering momentum, to terminate the present tariff relations between the Philippines and the United States. Hence even under the present state of dependence, there is a possibility, not remote, of those advantages disappearing.

The preservation of our public lands for the present and future generation of Filipinos is undoubtedly one of the serious problems which will require most careful study by our statesmen. The present laws, however, offer sufficient guarantees of protection for foreign and for local capital alike, and whatever attempt there will be to liberalize the present public land laws will meet with decided and vehement popular protest. No political party would dare father a measure which would thus rile popular sentiment.

It has been argued that with the advent of independence there will be a backslide in the sanitary conditions of these Islands. Nothing is more erroneous. The present sanitary service, which is a success, has been in the hands of Filipino officials for more than fifteen years. In case of independence, therefore, the danger is not in a possible backsliding but in going ahead too fast, for then there will be greater desire to serve the country recently emancipated.

The so-called Moro problem has never existed and does not exist. During the life of the short-lived Philippine Republic our Mohammedan kinsmen shared with us in the benefits of that Government and abided by the orders and decrees promulgated. I repeat that there is no such problem. It has been fabricated by the enemies of independence in order to discredit us in the eyes of the Government and people of the United States. Our Mohammedan brothers are conscious of our desire and solicitude to impart to them the benefits of civilization enjoyed by the Christian Filipinos.

With respect to the oft-repeated Japanese menace, I would state that Japan has a noble rôle to play in this part of the globe as a nation which is at the vanguard of the other nations of the Far East. It would be a dark day for Oriental peoples if Japan would seek to impose her sovereignty on every one of them. The awakening of China and other Oriental countries during recent years is not a sign that would encourage Japan to entertain designs of suzerainty over the Far East. On the other hand it would be to her advantage if she could have the friendship and good will of all her neighbors. Overlordship based on might has never endured. Weak peoples will not continue weak forever. Always there have been upheavals resulting in their emancipation. National consciousness and the instinct of self-preservation have always saved nations, however small, from humiliation and disaster.

There are, it is true, many more Chinese than Japanese in the Philippines. Whether, however, the Chinese constitute a menace to the country is something we cannot as yet foresee. Indications are to the contrary. The Chinese here are peaceful and law abiding. They do not bother the government nor their neighbors. They comply with their obligations and attend industriously to their industrial and commercial speculations in which it is hard to excel them. They mix with Filipinos, they intermarry with Filipino women and their children become good Filipino citizens. A treaty on immigration between China and the Philippines would be good for the preservation of their friendly relations.

I believe that the fact that there are only about 7000 Americans who have taken up their residence here, is due to the distance from the United States and also to the climate here. Having been born and reared in surroundings vastly different from ours, the lure of home and of dear relations would be too strong for them to want to stay here all their lives.

Our feeling of gratitude towards the United States will be intensified with the grant of independence. This is but natural. America and her illustrious statesmen have repeatedly announced that her presence here is not actuated by selfish

motives, nor is it for exploitation, but to aid us in the establishment of a representative system of self-government. We placed implicit faith in her word. Its fulfilment will be the occasion for rejoicing thruout the Islands; it will strengthen our faith in the sincerity of the United States. To our people the waiting has been too long. Many Filipinos of worth who have fought for the freedom of the land have already passed on—they would have been glad to witness the restoration of the Republic they proclaimed and defended. If, on the other hand, the United States does not fulfil her promise, then the Filipinos will be convinced of the injustice that has been their fate; they will realize that all their efforts and sacrifices, in war and in peace, have been in vain, and that they made a great mistake for which their children and their children's children will rebuke them, in having trusted in the word of the United States.

Reiterating my sincere gratefulness to you and to those other members of Congress who are taking an interest in the independence of my country, I am

Very sincerely yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

St. Joseph's Hospital
Manila, July 25, 1931

Senator Harry B. Hawes
Manila Hotel
Manila

APPENDIX II

Address of Senator Harry B. Hawes delivered before a joint session of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands, July 28, 1931:

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and members of the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives:

The many courtesies and wonderful hospitality extended to me since my arrival in your beautiful Islands now culminates in the honor of this invitation to address in joint session both branches of your Legislature.

It affords me an opportunity to restate my own position in the matter of independence, but more important still, to give to you briefly, not my personal opinion, but the opinion of the Committee which reported favorably on this subject.

There should be no partisan politics injected into this matter. It is too serious, too vital to permit party advantage or factional gain to have the smallest consideration. I have observed that both of your political parties have placed this subject upon the highest human pedestal. I hope there will be no division between Democrats and Republicans in my country.

Senator Cutting, joint author of the bill, is a Republican. I am a Democrat. There was no partisan politics in the preparation of our bill. It will be supported by both Republicans and Democrats as it is here by both of your political parties.

It has not occurred to me in receiving your hospitality that it was personal. It was because of the bill that your generous hospitality has been extended. It would have been the same for any other man. If it had been Senator Cutting, the reception would have been identical.

So, I have not had the feeling that the united response to my inquiry was personal. It happened that Senator Pittman and myself were here, so the answer was given more directly to us.

Neither Senator Pittman nor myself have attempted to influence your opinion.

I came to your Islands because they interested me. There was a romance connected with them. Your repeated struggles and sacrifices for liberty are known. You have a real mission to perform in this part of the world; you must do it yourselves; it cannot be done for you by another race of people. So, the more quickly the sole responsibility is yours, the more rapid will be the advance.

We sent to you some of our great men. Their personalities have impressed themselves upon your government, have advanced your welfare and, I am sure, promoted your happiness. I have a feeling of justifiable pride in their personal achievements in the matters of health, sanitation, and jurisprudence.

We are familiar with your struggles for liberty under the old Spanish rule, and with your revolution of 1896 and that of 1898, showing a united intention to secure freedom.

Since the arrival of the American school-teacher, your children have been taught the finest pages of American history, which has added to your natural aspiration for liberty, self-government, and independence.

Starting almost immediately after the war our teachers and our public men have read to you our Declaration of Independence, celebrated the 4th of July, and upon every occasion extolled the virtues of our colonial ancestors. This combined the history of your country and my country in their endeavors to secure self-government.

To find myself in your far provinces introduced to large audiences by graduates of the leading American universities, such as Yale, Harvard, Cornell, Chicago, Columbia, and others, increases my pride in American accomplishments.

The subject of my special inquiry was to determine whether you earnestly, unitedly ask for independence, for complete

self government, whether you realize that the severance of the ties with America would carry with it heavy responsibilities, possibly increase in taxes and some loss of trade.

I desired an answer to the propaganda directed partly from Manila that the voice of independence was a small, well-organized voice, or whether it came from all classes of your people, your leading business men, your executive officials, the governors of your provinces, the mayors of your cities, your local councils, from the schools, and, of great importance, from your press.

Our Senate Committee in its report in May 1930, said: "Your Committee desires to call attention to a propaganda intimating that the Philippine leaders are not sincere in their demands for independence. It is insinuated that the Filipino people do not actually desire independence; their leaders do not really favor it."

On the day of my arrival in Manila, June 18th, I made this statement: "The object of my present visit is to ascertain just one thing: Do the Philippines want to be independent in the near future? Are there any Filipinos who are opposed to it? If the Philippines are united, determined and persistent, in my judgment independence will be granted.

"The American people never intended to hold the Philippines for the sole purpose of commercially exploiting its people. The American people want your trade, your friendship, your confidence. We desire even more, your respect and your affection."

These statements by the Senate Committee and myself are clear and should be easily understood.

Your answer to the charge of insincerity has been given with unanimity. It came in great volume, with energy and good natured enthusiasm. No one can doubt either its strength or convincing sincerity.

This remarkable unanimity of opinion in the matter of independence by your people, your public men, and your local newspapers will be all-controlling in America. Stories have gone to the States conveying a wrong impression, and upon

these stories editorials have been written conveying a wrong impression of the attitude of your people.

The subject of independence involves the contentment and the happiness of 13,000,000 people, and rational happiness and content should be the first object of all government. It is unfair to your people and to our people to deceive them regarding either the unanimity or sincerity of your expressions.

The question of the sincerity of Filipinos in asking for independence was not raised by me. The responsibility for its presentation must rest upon those who introduced the doubt, who made the charge.

The door of doubt was not opened by me. My small part has been merely to assist in ascertaining the truth. You have now closed the door upon the falsehood.

In my country we have political leaders who express themselves, and they are supposed to express the opinion of their followers; we have great national conventions that make declarations; we have city councils and representative bodies that control our cities. We have a vigorous and intelligent press. These are the usual avenues of expression of public opinion, and it was to similar bodies here that I directed my inquiry.

In every city visited I have been presented with resolutions passed by the city council. In every province I have been accompanied by the Governor of the province. In every place there have been arches across the roads; there have been parades; there have been flowers; there have been delegations of men and women, and the representatives of the old soldiers of Aguinaldo. There has been but one answer; it was complete, effective, conclusive.

Your press united in stating that the independence demonstration on the 12th of this month was the greatest of its kind ever held in the Philippine Islands; greatest in point of numbers; greatest in enthusiasm; greatest in good nature and good order.

So your answer came from every source, from your political leaders, from your organized towns, from your newspapers. From every source there was one reply: We want indepen-

dence. We realize the sacrifices that must be made. We have an affection for the American people; we consider them to be our friends, we rely upon the fulfilment of their promise. This will add to our gratitude.

The Paralysis of Uncertainty

Having answered hostile propaganda and disposed of the question of sincerity, we come to the serious matter of economic stagnation created by uncertainty as to the future, harmful in its effect both in America and in the Philippines.

Upon this point our Senate Committee said: "Every witness who appeared at the hearings whether he was an official of the central or the insular government or a private person with admitted economic interests at stake, agreed that a definite policy towards the Philippines would be both necessary and desirable as a means of curing the present uncertainty.

"The initiative of the Filipino is hampered by his status. The development of 114,000 square miles of island area is being handicapped, and certain manufacturing possibilities are being dwarfed because of the general uncertainty.

"American capital, doubtful of the future declines to enter the islands. Foreign capital with no voice whatever in the settlement of the problem will not invest there.

"Under such conditions satisfactory economic progress is impossible."

During the past twelve years billions of American money have been invested abroad, but less than one sixteenth of one per cent of these investments have been made in the Philippine Islands notwithstanding the fact that the Islands have great latent resources.

The reason is the uncertainty which exists. This has prevented any new important capital from coming into the Islands.

Not only has this uncertainty prevented the introduction of new American capital, but it is having its serious consequences in the matter of the American population in the Philippines.

In 1903 the population of the Philippine Islands was 7,035,-

420. To-day it is estimated at 13,000,000, showing an increase in twenty-eight years of approximately five and a half million.

But during the same period although the Islands have been under American sovereignty for over thirty years there has been a decrease in the number of American residents of the Islands.

In 1903, over a quarter of a century ago, civilian Americans in the Philippines numbered 8,135; to-day the estimate is only 7,000, of whom it is stated, about 6,000 reside in Manila and only about 1,000 are scattered through your provinces.

In my opinion, this decrease is due to two causes. The first is climatic conditions. The second is uncertainty regarding the future.

American business men will not come here or make any new investments until this uncertainty is removed. Young American employees will not come because of the uncertainty of the tenure of their employment.

Few young Americans are here now. The American residents are nearly all gray-haired veterans. Neither money nor men will come from America until this uncertainty is disposed of.

Still more embarrassing is the present uncertain political status of the Filipino. Under this uncertainty a Filipino is not an American citizen; he is not a Filipino. A foreigner under certain of our statutory provisions he is uncertain as to his national status and not sure of his international status. He carries two flags, and may not even be permitted to peacefully express his appeals in a plebiscite. He cannot elect his national executives, not even the Mayor of his capital city of 350,000 people, and yet from his pockets comes the money to pay all the cost of government including the salaries of all appointed officials.

With the exception of the salary of \$10,000 a year to each of the two Resident Commissioners to the United States Congress and a contribution to the enforcement of quarantine regulations and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, all expenses of the government are borne by the Insular Treasury.

Our Department of War reports that we have spent in your Islands up to June 30, 1929, \$485,000,000 for Army and Navy purposes and only \$8,000,000 for civil government of which \$3,000,000 was for emergency relief purposes.

Even beautiful Baguio rising 5,000 feet above the sea—giving pure and cool air to your citizens—was built and is maintained by money from the Philippine treasury. I was surprised to find that some Americans did not know that the entire cost of government in the Islands, the government of Manila and the summer capital at Baguio is maintained by Philippine and not American taxes.

Fifteen years ago, in 1916, the Congress passed the Jones Act, and since that time there have been no important changes in your organic law. In my opinion, in view of the preamble to the Jones Act: "Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement, and—

"Whereas it is, as it always has been, the purpose of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein," the government of the Philippines was not intended to be permanent, but merely a prelude to independence.

There are some justifiable excuses for the silence of Congress during these years. The World War began in 1914 and its effects were felt by the peoples of all the earth, and the thought of the world, including the United States, was directed to this world-wide conflagration. In the year 1917 the United States entered the World War, marshaled its resources, contributed its money, placed the burdens of great bond issues upon our people for the maintenance of our Army and Navy, contributed money to assist our Allies, and the attention of Congress was diverted not only from our domestic affairs but from the problems of the Philippines.

Readjustments because of the war, the depression, agricultural losses and other immediate domestic problems have ab-

sorbed the attention of our Congress. But there can now be no excuse for further delay in the matter of a permanent decision of our future relations with your people.

There are but three courses.

The first is admission into Statehood in the American Union, which for political reasons now seems impractical.

Second, the creation of a modern colonial system similar to the Canadian plan. But this would not settle either the tariff or the immigration problem, because Congress will still have the power to change its Philippine policy at any succeeding session. The present uncertain situation will continue.

And third, independence with its responsibilities, but also with its contentment, leaving each separate nation to deal with the other upon the basis of mutual interest, trust and confidence.

One of these plans should now be adopted.

I realize the effect of uncertainty upon your own deliberations. With the thought of independence uppermost in the minds of your members it must be difficult to give undivided attention to economic and other subjects.

Temporary Character of the Jones Law

The Jones Act created political machinery for your government somewhat similar to the early colonial government of Great Britain prior to our American Revolution, the strongest evidence that it was temporary in character.

While our present administration remains much the same Great Britain has since that period completely changed her form of colonial government with the exception of India, which is in a state of transition. She has approved the policy of agreeing with the colonies as to what form of government they should have.

In this way she solved her Irish question by calling the representatives of Ireland and agreeing with them as to what was to be the nature of their future relations.

Every historical fact demonstrates conclusively that the pres-

ent form of government established under the Jones Act was temporary. On this subject the Senate Committee said: "If there be any doubt left that the ultimate purpose of the United States in its legislation with respect to the Islands has been to prepare them for independence it should be removed by the fact that in the 30 years in which we have held the Philippines we have not attempted to incorporate them.

"By the operation of our own laws we have set up what must be a temporary government in that we have continued the administration of certain affairs of the Philippines in the War Department. We have left the general supervision of the Philippine government to the War Department. We have provided that the Governor-General report annually to some official designated by the President of the United States, and that official is not the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of War. The plain implication is that our tenure of the Philippines is temporary in character."

The Element of Time

There may be honest differences of opinion as to whether independence should be given in five, seven, or ten years, but the proposal to delay decision for 15 or 20 or 30 years is not a plan, it is a subterfuge.

It is dodging the issue; it is a subtle plea for permanent possession. It does not end, it continues the present paralyzing uncertainty.

To propose a plan to be executed when the proposer will probably be dead is what might be termed a graveyard settlement, a passing of responsibility to a succeeding generation; a safe guess upon what may happen, by persons who, while boldly looking 30 years into the future, refuse to decide a situation which is immediately before them.

Those opposed to independence should have the courage to admit it. If there are reasons why the present situation should continue, frankness may furnish information, for which crocodile tears are not a substitute.

Opinion of the Senate Committee

The Senate Committee's report too well expresses my own judgment and is so comprehensive that I take the liberty of reading its conclusions: "(1) That it is the policy of the American Government to free rather than retain the Philippines. (2) That the Philippine people are justified in their plea for independence at this time. (3) That the Philippine people have made remarkable strides in the path of self-government. (4) That at the present time the Philippine people are conducting, except in a few instances, the affairs of government. (5) That the Philippine people are keenly alive to the untoward eventualities of independence. (6) That the Philippine people, realizing serious hardships may result from independence and from the loosening of the ties that now bind them to American sovereignty, prefer to risk these hardships at the present time, when they are confident of their ability to endure them than at a remote date when the hazards of separation from the American Government would be so great as either to threaten disaster or to preclude their independence. (7) That so far as the interests of Americans are concerned in Philippine trade it will be more simple to grant independence at an early date than when their interests have a deeper and more far-reaching contact with the Philippines. (8) That at the present time the conditions existing in the Philippines and the uncertainty of the future status of these islands is operating to dwarf their initiative, handicap their agricultural and industrial development, hamper their efforts to obtain investments of foreign capital, and militate against their enjoying the full possibilities of their economic development. (9) That there are important elements, both American and Philippine, whose interests demand some action on the part of Congress in the settlement of this national uncertainty. (10) That the action of the American Government in relation to the Philippines will determine America's prestige in the Orient. (11) That the Philippine Islands, of doubtful advantage at present from a purely trade standpoint, have little

or no utility in times of war, and might even become a burden and a threat to us in the event of our embroilment with certain powers. (12) That proposals to postpone the date for the granting of Philippine independence for any great number of years will result in the expansion of certain economic ties which may ultimately make impossible the granting of independence. (13) That no selfish motives of commercial advantage or expansion should interfere with the redemption of our pledges to these people. (14) That the Philippine people are unanimous in their demand for early and complete independence. The United States owes a solemn duty to the Philippine people—the duty of an honest declaration of our future intent. If we have decided to retain these Islands under some form of colonial government, we should be frank enough to proclaim it. We should not further encourage national aspirations to ultimate independence on the part of the Philippine people if we are ourselves opposed to their independence. If the delay of independence for 30 years is for the purpose of defeating independence, we should say so frankly.”

Our Congress

Fifteen years have passed without amendments to the law under which the Islands are governed although changing our own laws regarding our relations with the world and by new treaties. This must be disappointing, at least a cause for conjecture.

In addition to the national perplexities occasioned by the world war and domestic problems, our Congress, because of the necessity of solving special questions has been compelled to meet in extra session almost continuously to dispose of its regular work.

The last Congress had before it approximately 20,000 bills, besides resolutions, treaties, and confirmations. The morning hours are devoted to extended Committee hearings so it is very difficult to bring upon the floor for discussion or to pass any measure.

A bill, to pass, must have behind it public necessity and the pressure of public opinion. It must be one of immediate domestic concern to have a chance of passing.

A measure involving the independence of your Islands, setting up the machinery for a change and a new government, will require long discussions and debate. Therefore, there is a tendency not to take up such questions, but to pass them to a future period.

So, to secure consideration of your national aspiration will require patience and persistence to bring the matter to a vote.

The story of your aspirations cannot be told too frequently in America, as your opponents are active. In my opinion Congress will deliver its decision upon the opinion it forms of your earnestness. Your own expressions, therefore, will have great weight with it.

You may be encouraged, however, by the fact that for the first time in fifteen years a bill in your behalf was favorably reported by the Senate Committee.

The sending of a Commission to present your cause was very helpful, both before the Congress and outside of it.

Your subject is not one that is all sentiment. In fact it is a very practical matter. It has its moral side, but practical considerations will be brought forward and I hope that it will be decided upon the basis of common sense.

Your standards will never be identical with our own. There will always be a difference, but what may be called the fundamentals are the same.

Your last Commission made a most favorable national impression. It acquired experience and brilliantly presented your appeal.

But the personnel of our Congress changes; a new Congress goes into session. There are many new Senators and new Congressmen and it is important that they should have the advice and opinion of the Filipino people. Information should be readily available; it should be in close touch with our legislative situation. Another Commission, with representatives of

business and educational interests should be prepared to furnish facts, information, and to answer questions.

Any uncertainty as to your national attitude, if any now remains, would be dispelled by this Commission, and American newspapers should make their own inquiries direct from your authorized representatives, and not be compelled to rely upon flashes from Manila.

Prospects for Independence

"What are our prospects for Independence?" is the question most frequently asked of me. I can only give my opinion.

First, the American people know the Islands belong to you. It is your land, your blood, your bone, your inheritance, and its government your ultimate responsibility.

Second, distance and climate will never make the Philippines a place of permanent colonization for Americans.

Third, yours is an agricultural country. There are millions of uncultivated farm acres in America awaiting development.

Fourth, your native population of Malays is rapidly increasing, and although under American sovereignty for over thirty years, the American residential population in your Islands is decreasing.

Fifth, if your united national aspirations for Independence are withheld, it will breed unhappiness and discontent which liberty-loving Americans will not permit.

Sixth, American participation in the World War to assist the European nations to secure the right of self-determination in Europe is too recent to permit its national conscience to deny the same right to an Oriental people.

Seventh, because our national promise of Independence has been given to you, our national honor will compel fulfillment.

Eighth, no Congress can legally bind a succeeding Congress for a long period of years, and the present destructive uncertainty to both American and Philippine interests can only be settled by independence.

Ninth, because I believe you will, by orderly, peaceful persuasion, convince Americans of the justice of your cause.

There are economic and military considerations which will naturally suggest themselves, but it is largely because of these elemental and fundamental considerations that I believe your national aspiration will be granted.

When America retires from your Islands, it is my hope that there will always remain the memory of good deeds and practical accomplishments for your welfare and in our country a justifiable pride in the period of our trusteeship.

The truth of what has happened here will reach America. For truth has the faculty of ultimately entering into the understanding of our people. One of our great American Presidents, Abraham Lincoln, wisely said: "You can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."

I have caught some of your enthusiasm: it has given me what Americans call a thrill. My conviction was from the head; now it is from the head and heart, and I leave your Islands with a feeling of some sadness, sad because you are so far away I may never return, but I take back with me the fine thought that you unitedly place liberty above every other consideration, economic or financial, the conviction that you will willingly pay a high cost for freedom.

My memory will always retain the benediction given before the bowed heads of 150,000 patriotic people, when Dr. Bocobo, appealing to our God said: "Bless Thou every hand that toils and every heart that throbs for freedom. Grant that in the vehemence of our struggles for liberty no ill-will or hatred may creep into our hearts."

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